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A Research Note
The., former British diplomats and officials Who consented
to be interviewed by me showed an extraordinary courage and
kindness in discussing the foreign policy affairs in which they
themselves were directly or indirectly involved. These interviews
were conducted in October — December 1986, at a time when the
Spycatcher Trial had just opened and there was widespread
uncertainty about the scope and implications of the Official
Secrecy Act. It was natural, therefore, that all those to whom I
spoke repeatedly insisted, both in correspondence and during
discussions with me, that on no account should they be directly
quoted. The Official Secrecy Act has also meant that I have been
unable to acknowledge their assistance directly. Asterisks in the
text, however, clearly mark the points at which my arguments
benefited from their responses to my questions.
Recently released documents at the Public Record Office
have been of immense help in illuminating various points made in
the second and third chapters of this thesis. Unfortunately these
documents only became available as I was completing the thesis.
However my strict schedule did not permit me to make an exhaustive
study of this material. My own impression is that the overall
interpretation of British Foreign Policy as offered in this thesis
will not be radically altered by the subsequent research I hope to
do on these documents.
A Note on Terminology:
Use of the Terms Malaya, Malaysia
It should be made clear at the outset that the country was
known as the Federation of Malaya from 1948 until 1963. After
the merger with Singapore and the Borneo Territories on 16th
September 1963, the enlarged federation came to be known as
Malaysia.
In order to avoid repeated use of the cumbersome
construction Malaya/Malaysia, the term Malaysia has been used
while making general statements concerning the ten years, 1957
to 1967. See, for example, its use on page 1.
However, whenever reference has been made to the specific
periods before independence, after independence, and after the
formation of Malaysia on 16th September 1963, a distinction has
been made between Malaya, the Federation of Malaya, and Malaysia.
Finally, the term 'Malay' has been used for the
indigenous population apart from hill and tribal people. The term
'Malayan' means everybody living in the Federation of Malaya.
After the formation of Malaysia, 'Malayan' has been replaced by
'Malaysian'.
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Errata
Page 16,
	 Para I, 5th Line, should read, nationalism in Asia
that will not be falsified in Malaya. Whether we
consider the relation of nationalism to colonial rule,
(not nationalism to colonial rule,).
Page 33-34, last sentence on page 33 (continued on page 34) should
read: Secondly, even before the Japanese_occupation of
South East Asia, the emergence of Japan as a great
power had clearly begun to change the balance of power
in Asia. As Kenneth Younger pointed out, "Japan had
administered the first shock to western supremacy in
Asia when she defeated a great EUropean power in the
Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5; her rapid occupation of
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya, Indonesia, Indo-China
and Burma was the coup de grace."
	
(not Secondly,
even before the coup de grace."(99)).
Page 91,
	 Para I, 9th Line, Phillip Darby (not Philip Darby, it
should be read as Phillip Darby throughout the
thesis).
Page 97,
	 top line, quote from Cmnd. 264, should end "Her
Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Australia
and New Zealand in respect of the assistance
which they give to the Government of the Federation of
Malaya in its prosecution of the campaign against the
Communist terrorists."( 335) (not H. M. Government."(335))
Preface 
In the history of post war British foreign policy,
Malaysia occupies a position of unique interest. It holds this
position for.- two reasons. In the first place, British foreign
policy towards Malaysia offers the extraordinary spectacle of an
ex—imperial power not only guaranteeing external security to its
former colony, but also actually honouring its pledge, in spite of
mounting economic and political opposition to such a policy at
home. Indeed, in the course of fulfilling her defence commitments
to Malaysia, Britain even went to the extraordinary length of
endangering her own more immediate security interests.
The second side of the story is equally interesting. At
the height of its involvement in Malaysian security, Britain
stationed sixty five thousand armed personnel in the area.
However, within a short span of less than two years, their number
had reduced to thirty thousand. ( i ) Such troops as remained were
pledged to be withdrawn by the end of 1971. From being the major
provider of security to Malaysia at the beginning of our period,
towards the close of our study we find Britain totally disenchanted
with this role and determined to withdraw completely. The
magnitude of this change in the British attitude towards Malaysia
in particular and South East Asia in general, is clearly a matter
of great interest. This interest is further enhanced by the fact
that while studying the British responses to the developments in
Malaysia, we can also discern the broader pattern of Britain's
adjustment to its altered status, i.e. from being an imperial power
into a mere European state.
(1) Fabian Tract, No.365, "Britain and South East Asia", P.1.and
Cmpid 3203: Supplementary Statement on Defence, H.M.S.O., London,
July 1967, para. 27, respectively.
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Clearly, this is a large and ambitious task, and to prevent
it becoming unmanageable, or lacking in focus, we must de limit
very carefully its precise scope. This may best be done by identif-
ying the two different contexts within which British foreign policy
towards Malaysia took shape. These contexts can of course only be
distinguished analytically; in practice, they overlap and interlock
in ways which make their separation impossible.
There is, on the one hand, the relatively narrow regional,
i.e. South-East Asian, context within which British foreign policy
was formulated and pursued. Within this regional context, special
attention will be given to British foreign policy considered in
its direct bearing on the Malaysian situation. What will
particularly concern us here is the decade 1957-1967. The decade
began with the grant of independence to Malaya, and almost
immediately witnessed the signing of the Anglo-Malayan Defence
Agreement (AMDA). As Chin Kin Wah has rightly observed, "This
unequal burden treaty, which embodied a -blank cheque' from
Britain, had no parallel elsewhere in South Fast Asia". (2) As the
decade unfolded, an extended federation was created by the old
imperial master and the newly independent ally; then came confront-
ation with Indonesia; and the decade closes with the voluntary
departure of British forces, which again is an event of far-
reaching consequences for British history. All this is obviously
an important part of our concern.
There is, on the other hand, the broader context of British
foreign policy at large, within which the narrower context of
Malaysian policy is located. In this broader context, policies
(2) Chin Kin Wah. Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: Transform-
ation of a Security System,1957-1971, C.U.P., Cambridge, 1983. pl.
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towards Malaysia are no longer influenced only by regional South
East Asian considerations, but are also influenced and shaped by
the overall British decline as an imperial power after World Wax-II.
In this broader context, the combined impact of British delusions
of grandeur,. the harsh political realities of the altered inter-
national balance of power, and the economic priorities of a welfare
state, generated and shaped the controversial Fast-of-Suez policy,
a policy fraught with deep implications for British foreign policy
towards Malaysia.
Both these contexts of British foreign policy towards
Malaysia have been separately the subject of extensive scholarly
attention, yet relatively little research has been conducted on
them in conjunction with one another. In fact, these two contexts
are inseparable. The primary concern of this thesis is to rectify
the situation by concentrating upon their mutual interconnection.
In this perspective, the thesis may be regarded as a modest
contribution to an understanding of the problems of adjustment
Which Britain encountered in the course of its transformation from
an Empire into a mere EUropean state.
There is, however, another concern which is related more
overtly to theoretical problems. This concern will be made
explicit in the Conclusion. There, at the end of our detailed
research, an attempt will be made to indicate the relevance of our
work in relation to the principal established theories of
international politics.
The aim of this study, then, is to examine British foreign
policy towards Malaysia within a combination of narrow and broad
contexts. In setting out, our first step must be to review the
existing relevant literature. To this task, the next chapter is
devoted.
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CHAPTER I.
The Search for a Perspective
The initial task which we face in this thesis is that of
deciding upon a satisfactory perspective. For this purpose, a
considerable number of approaches which offer plausible explanations
for the ten fateful years of British foreign policy with Which we
are primarily concerned must be briefly reviewed. In the concluding
part of this chapter the particular approach to be adopted in the
present study will be indicated.
With this task in our mind, we may turn our attention to
the relevant literature on our topic. The most marked feature of
this literature is a tendency to confine the analysis of British
foreign policy towards Malayealaysia within the relatively narrow
context of Asian or South East Asian politics. The studies in
question are written, in other words, from a very restricted
perspective. For example, Richard Allen's Malaysia: Prospect and
Retrospect, (3 ) is simply a story written from the official British
view—point. In the interest of clarity and convenience, the
prevailing approaches to be found in the large body of work may be
arranged into five different categories.
(a) Paternalism
Books in this first category tend to suffer from excessive
paternalism, which is hardly surprising since some of the authors
are ex—colonial officials. Two important illustrations of this
approach are provided by C.S. Caine and T.H. Silcock. Caine
(3) Richard Allen, Malaysia: Prospect and Retrospect: The Impact
and hftermath of a Colonial Rule, O.U.P., London, 1968.
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served in the Colonial Office and thereafter became the Vice-
Chancellor of Malaya University from 1952-56. In an article on
"The Passing of Colonialism in Malaya", Caine described British
intervention in Malaya "as a kind of umbrella under whose shelter
two different societies grew in vigour and strength until they
combined to discard the protecting cover". (4) He regarded the
British presence as "positive intervention" and listed the
numerous benefits bestowed upon the backward Malaya during the
period of colonial rule.m)
Basically agreeing with Caine, Silcock went further and
responded to British failure against the Japanese invasion of
Malaya in a highly emotional and moral tone. Whilst accepting that
the British had failed to provide security for their colony, his
view was thaethe real wrong that had been done to Malaya was not
the failure of an elder brother to give due protection: the wrong
was the failure of a government (for which all Europeans carried
some responsibility) to help to give form and life to the nation
it was governing 	
 As a result of this realization, a sense
of guilt was converted into something Which may have been more
constructive". (6)
This highly emotional and moral reaction to British
failure "to help to give form and life to the nation it was
governing", was based on the old notion of the "white man's
burden". This concept may be traced back to the moralization of
(4) C.S. Caine, "The passing of colonialism in Malaya", Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 29 No.3, July-September, 1958, p.258.
(5) Ibid., p.258-268.
(6) T.H. Silcock, Towards a Malayan Nation, RItern University
Press, Singapore, 1961, p.3.
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politics by the so called -Clapham Sect' at the beginning of the
19th Century, (7 ) and was firmly established in British imperial
thought by the eighteen thirties. The moral bent Which colonial
politics had by then acquired is evident, for example, in the
report of the Committee on Aborigines (1835-37), which declared
that, "He who has made Great Britain what she is will enquire at
our hands how we have employed our influence".( 8 ) Subsequently,
thinkers like J.S. Mill gave elaborate theoretical consideration
to the moral ideal of an imperial trust, in the course of developing
nineteenth century concept of Progress. (9 ) It is true that, at the
turn of the century, radical writers like J.A. Hobson and L.T.
Hahouse reacted strongly against what they judged to be the
immorality of the "age of High Imperialism". What must be
stressed, however, is that even radical .
 critics of this kind were
concerned with the techniques of imperialism; the concept of
empire in itself remained unchallenged. 0-°) By the nineteen
(7) Ernest Marshall Howse, Saints in Politics: The Clapham Sect
and the Growth of Freedom, George Allen and Unwin, London, esp.
Ch.IV, pp.65-94.
(8) E.A. Benians, "The Empire in the New Age, 1870-1919", The
Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol.III, C.U.P.,
Cambridge, 1959, p.7.
(9) J.S. Mill, On Representative Government, J.M. Dent, London,
1962, Chapter 18, pp.376-393.
On the idea of progress, see J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress,
Dover Publications, New York, 1955.
(10) John Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and fall of the British
Empire; The Ford Lectures and Other Essays, (ed.) by Anil Seal,
C.U.P. Cambridge, 1982, p.83.
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twenties, the old Whig doctrine of empire as an essentially limited
trust for protecting the governed which had dominated British
political thought from Locke to Burke, had completely disappeared.
In place of this old limited concept, the high minded liberal
imperialists had extended the concept of imperial trust into an
all embracing ideal of cultural and economic advancement. ->
It is this sentiment, then, that provided the background
to the idea of the white man's burden and the attitude of the
Colonial Service. Consider, for example Robert Heussler's two
volumes on Malaya, (12) which illustrate the undying faith of
colonial officials in western supremacy and in the white man's
concomitant responsibility for guiding immature or childlike races
like the Malays towards civilization. The very title of the second
volume, Completing the Stewardship, resonates with the sentiment.
The white man's burden, as Heussler makes clear, entails two
features.The first is that the immature natives are unable to govern
themselves.( 13, The second is that the natives (in accordance with
the concept of empire as a trust) should not be exploited or
abused but should be protected and guided towards maturity.
Similar sentiments were expressed by Victor Purcell, who
(11) E.A. Benians, op.cit., p.7.
(12) 'Robert Heussler, British Rule in Malaya: The Malayan Civil 
Service and Its Predecessors, 1867-1942, Ohio Press, Oxford, 1982,
and Completing the Stewardship, Malayan Civil Service, 1942-1957,
Greenwood Press, West Point, Connecticut, 1983.
(13) For example, Sir Frederick Weld (1880-1887), wrote to the
Secretary of State that "it is contrary to the genius of their
race" that the Asiatics should ever learn to govern themselves.
Robert Heussler, British Rule in Malaya, op.cit., p.15.
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was the Director General of Information in Malaya during and
immediately after the second world war. In his Malaya: Communist
or free?(-4) Purcell viewed the post worldwar situation in Malaya
from the vantage point of what he termed the "halcyon period" of
the pre world war years, when "Malaya was vi ally ruled by the
Malayan Civil Service". That Civil Service, he wrote, consisted of
"a body of disinterested officials whose only aim and inducement
was to do the best they could in their several offices".(1)
Purcell illustrates a further aspect of paternalism when he
comments that in prewar Malaya, "there were none of the checks or
impediments of democratic government, there was no need to play up
to the prejudice or ignorance of an electorate, nor to sacrifice
the public benefit to political expediency".( 16 ) Amusing as this
paternalism may now seem, it would nevertheless be foolish to
dismiss it as mere sham or hypocrisy. As Malaysian authors them-
selves haveoccasionally acknowledged, it conferred genuine
benefits upon Malay society. James P. Ongkili, for example, in
his article "British and Malay Nationalism, 1945-1957", openly
praises Malcolm MacDonald's attempts to bring various political
factions into a single broad-based political party in 1949.(17)
Regardless of its merits or defects as a principle of
political power, however, the standpoint which paternalism entails
(14) Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or free?, Stanford
University Press, California, 1954.
(15) ibid., p.42.
(16) Ibid., p.42.
(17) James P. OngkiliMeBritish and Malay Nationalism, 1945-
1957", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. V. NO.2, September
1974, pp.258-259.
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severely limits the value of the historical studies produced by
those Who have subscribed to it. By their very nature, these
studies oversimplify the complexities of historical reality by
representing it in black and White terms, devoid of those shades
of grey which constitute the substance of politics and political
change. From the standpoint of this well-intentioned paternalism
it is inevitable, for example, that political change should be
seen primarily as the activity of saints (i.e., those Who shoulder
the white man's burden, or if they are not involved, at least
offer him a helping hand), on the olle_ hand, and sinners (i.e.,
those who obstruct the civilizing mission by preaching such
impious notions as independence, rebellion and self-government),
on the other. For our purpose, then, this literature obviously
fails to provide an adequate perspective, although it does of
course have documentary value.
(b) Defence and Security
Another aspect of AngloMalaysian relations which has been
extensively covered by both British and Malaysian authors is the
strategic needs of the newly born country.Chin Kin Wah's "The
Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: Transformation of a Security
System, 1957-1971"( 18) is the major work in this field. The major
merit of Chin's analysis lies in his succesful exploration of the
multidimensional defence-links between Malaysia, Singapore and
Britain. However, his treatment of the changing relationship
during the final years is confined primarily to the South Fat
Asian context, and the contemporary debate on the East of Suez
policy in Britain is comparatively neglected. (2.8) Once again it is
(18) Chin Kin Wah, op.cit.
9
Malaysia and Singapore that engage his attention rather than
Britain. Chin's other work, The Five Power Defence Arrangements 
and AMDA,(19) could be placed in the same category. There are more
studies conducted on a similar pattern by Malaysian authors. For
example, Chandran Jeshurun's two studies, The Growth of Malaysian
Armed Forces, 1963-1967,( 20) and Malaysian Defence Policy, 1963-
1967, A Study in Parliamentary Attitudes, (2 both restrict
themselves entirely to Malaysian points of view, being more
concerned to depict the Malaysian attitude towards the mother
country rather than to unfold the domestic and international
constraints on British policy.
But defence is not exclusively a Malaysian concern, amongst
non-Malaysian scholars who have written on this aspect, David Hawkins
and Derek MacDougall are worth particular consideration. In contrast
to the Malaysian authors attitude, these two authors view the defence
problem largely from a British point of view, although the
Malaysian side is not treated unsympathetically. Thus David Hawkins'
article, "Britaill- and Malaysia - Another View"( 22) and Derek
(19) Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA, 
Some Observations on the Nature of an Evolving Partnership,
Occasional Paper No.23, Institute of South East Asian Studies,
Singapore, 1974.
(20) Chandran Jeshurun, The Growth of Malaysian Armed Forces, 
1963-67, Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, 1975.
(21) Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysian Defence Policy, 1963-67, A
Study in Parliamentary Attitudes, Penerbit Universiti, Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur, 1980.
(22) David C. Hawkins, "Britalen and Malaysia - Another View" )C
Asian Survey, Vol.9, No.7, July 1969, pp.546-562.
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MacDougall's "The Wilson Government and the British Defence
Commitment in Malaysia - Singapore", (2 both cover the stormy
side of Anglo-Malaysian relations and the declining phase respect-
ively, yet their views do not portray any dismay or bitterness on
the British part. It is more a sense of resigned fate and irony
that emerges from their analysis of British views. For example,
David Hawkins remarked in, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, 
from AMDA to ANZUK,( 24) that, "It is perhaps more surprising that
we (British). should expect still to be in Singapore thirty years
after Hiroshima". (2) This was his response to the Labour
Government's decision in July 1967 to withdraw completely from
South East Asia.
Studies of this kind either concern themselves with a
partial enquireLinto defence requirements, without tracing any
links with political considerations, or else are restricted to
political aspects of the problem such as communist insurgency
(1948-60) or the Indonesian confrontation (1963-66). The major
preoccupation of British authors, for example, has been with the
outbreak of communist insurgency in 1948, of which there are
numerous studies. Outstanding amongst them are works by Anthony
Short, Richard Clutterbuck and Noel Barber. (26) These studies
(23) Derek MacDougall, "The Wilson Government and the British
Defence Commitment in Malaysia - Singapore", Journal of South
East Asian History, Vol.X, No.1, March 1969, pp.69-94.
(24) David C. Hawkins, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, 
from AMDA to ANZUK, Royal United Services Institute for Defence
Studies, London, 1972.
(25) Ibid., p.28.
(26) Anthony Short, The Communist InsurTe ction (Continued overleaf)
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are particularly valuable in the way in which they link together
various political, administrative and military factors, whose
substantial interconnection would otherwise have remained obscure
and incomprehensible. Other writers concentrate on aspects such as
the Indonesian 'confrontation' with Malaysia. General Walker, (27)
for example, elaborates the military aspects of British strategy
in 1963-1966. At a general level, Mackie's exhaustive work on
confrontation includes both the national and regional aspects (28)
(c) Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
Apart from military and strategic aspects, diplomatic
considerations have also been covered by various Malaysian and
British authors. Michael Leifer's article, "Astride the Straits of
Johore",( 29) deals with the triangular (i.e., British-Malaysian
and Singaporean) relationship and the problems it involved. In
another article, "Anglo-American differences over Malaysia", (30)
(26) (From overleaf) in Malaya _ 1948-1960, Frederick Muller,
London, 1975; Richard Clutterbuck, The Long Long War: The 
Etergency in Malaya, 1948-60, Cassell, London, 1966; Noel Barber,
The War of Running Dogs, Collins, London, 1971.
(27) General Walter Walker, "How Borneo was Won: The Untold Story
of an Asian Victory", Round Table, Vol.LIX, No.232, October 1968,
pp.9-20.
(28) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 
1963-1966, O.U.P., Kuala Lumpur, 1974.
(29) Michael Leifer, "Astride the Strait of Johore, the British
presence and Commonwealth rivalry in South East Asia", Modern
Asian Studies, Vol.1, 1967, pp.283-296.
(30) Michael Leifer, "Anglo-American differences over Malaysia",
World Today, Vol.20, No.4, April 1964, pp.156-157.
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the same author concentrates on the international aspects of
Malaysia and -confrontation', and particularly on Anglo-American
policies. It is unfortunate, however, that there are not 11. any
good studies by British authors in this sphere, although on the
Malaysian side a considerable amount of research has been done.
Naturally the central focus of the Malaysian studies is Malaysia
rather than Britain. Inevitably all of these studies deal with
British foreign policy, even if it is a subsidiary concern.
Foremost amongst such works is Dato Abdul lah Ahmad's TnigKU
Ab4.1.4
!Rahman and Malaysian Foreign Policy, 1963-1970.( 31 ) Since Dato
Ahmad includes the pre-1963 period as a background, this work is by
far the most illuminating study on AngloMalaysian relations from
the present point of view, even though some of his observations
are charged with emotion and personal bias. For example, his
reaction to Harold Wilson's warning to Turku Abdul Rahman against
any physical harm to Lee Milan Yew is typically nationalistic.
Calling it, "patronising on Wilson's part", he held that Wilson's
act "made Tunku more determined to separate Singapore from
Malaysia". (pp.119-120)(32) But such an attitude is understandable
since the author has been personally involved in the formulation
and execution of Malaysian foreign policy.
Among other studies which take Malaysia rather than
Britain as their central concern are Robert O. Tilman's Dilemma of 
(31) Data Abdul 1 ah Ahmad ;17  ,ktu	 ahman and Malaysia's
Foreign Policy, 1963-1970, Berita Publishing SDn. BHD., Kuala
Lumpur, 1985.
(32) Ibid., pp.119-120.
Australian Outlook, Vol .17, No.1, April 1963, pp.42-53.
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a Committed Neutral, (33 ) and T.H. Silcock's The Development of 
Malayan foreign policy. ( 34 ) Ebth these authors treat the external
and internal environment within which Malaysian foreign policy
operates. Of course, British foreign policy is seen as the major
factor behind this environment. From the Malaysian side,
J. Saravanamuttu's The Dilemma of Independence: Two Decades of
Foreign Policy of Malaysia, 1957-1977,( 35 ) is a remarkable attempt
in this direction. On the British side, David Walder's "Our
Allies: Their Problems and Outlook: Malaysia"( 36) represents a
more balanced viewpoint.
Within this category, there are some major studies of
deomestic problems in Malaya which also touch on various aspects
of the Anglo-4Malayan relationship. Notable among these are two
studies by Malaysian scholars, viz. M.N. Sopiee and B.
Simandjuntak.(37) These studies are of course, of very limited
(33) ' Robert 0. Tilman, Dilemma of a Committed Neutral, Foreign
Policy of Malaysia, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, 1967.
(34) T.H. Silcock, "The Development of Malayan Foreign Policy",
(35) J. Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma of Independence: Two Decades 
of Malaysian Foreign Policy 1957-77, Penerbit University Sains
Malaysia, Penang, 1983.
(36) David Walder, "Our Allies: Their Problems and Outlook:I'
Malaysia", Journal of Royal United Services Institute, Vol.LX,
No.638, May 1965, pp.105-111.
(37) M.N. Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: 
Political Unification in the Malayan Region 1945-1965, Penerbit
Universiti, Malaysia, 1974; B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, 
1945-1963, O.U.P., London, 1969.
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value for use as a model because their focus of enquiry is the
domestic Malayan politics. An outstanding study, however, has been
produced by A.J. Stockwell. In his British Policy and Malay
Politics during the Malayan Union EXperiment, 1942-1948,(37e0
Stockwell presents a comprehensive picture of the interplay
between British Colonial policy and the domestic politics of Malaya.
Unfortunately, the study does not deal with the post-independence
period. Therefore, we need to move on in our search of an approp-
riate model or perspective.
(d) Malaysian Nationalism
In the analysis of post-war relationships between imperial
and post-colonial states, theories of nationalism offer one of the
most interesting frameworks within which to analyse both the pre-
independence and post-independence situation. In this category, we
encounter two illuminating accounts of Malayan nationalism. One of
them is The Origins of Malay Nationalism, by W.R. Roff,( 38) and
the second is a long article entitled, "Nationalism in Malay", by
T.H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz.( 38) The central focus of Roff's
book is the gradual evolution of nationalist sentiment among the
Malays. Roff's contention is that although there were a few
attempts to steer Malay nationalism in extreme directions, these
(37a) A.J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the
Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-48, MBRAS monograph No.8, Kuala
Lumpur, 1979.
(38) W.R. Roff, Origins of Malay Nationalism, Yale University
Press, New Haven, 1967; and T.H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz,
-Nationalism in Malaya' in William E. Holland ed., Asian
Nationalism and the West, Octagon Books, New York, 1973.
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never enjoyed any popular support among the indigenous people.
Nationalism before 1942 was primarily cultural and religious
rather than political and anti-British.
This line of argument is pursued by Silcock and Aziz in
"Nationalism in Malaya". Once again, we find that the old formula
of a national identity based on anti-imperialism simply does not
operate in Malaya. "It is hardly possible to make any generali-
sations about nationalism to colonial rule, or its relation to
religion, or its relation to economics", Silcock and Aziz conclude
"the simple truism will not work". (39 ) They credit the multi-racial
composition of Malayan society and the paternalism of British rule
for the extraordinary moderation of Malayan nationalism. °)
Apart from these studies, two articles by James P. Ongkili:Vie
British and Malay Nationalism 1945-1957",(41) and Wang Gungwu,
"Malayan Nationalism", (42) are major contributions made by
Malaysian scholars. After independence, and more particularly so
after 1965, when Singapore was separated from Malaysia, there was
a growing tendency among Malaysians to blame Britain for almost
everything. However, these two authors have kept their hold on
reality, refusing to take refuge in anti-colonial -mud-slinging'
at Britain. Both take full note of the complex racial composition
of Malaysia and the problems created by it.
As has been said earlier, none of these studies portrays
Anglo-Malaysian relations from an anti-imperialist of nationalist
(39) Silcock and Aziz, op.cit., p.269.
(40) Ibid.
(41) James P. Ongkili, op.cit.
(42) Wang Gungwu, "Malayan Nationalism", Royal Central Asian
Society Journal, Vol.XLIX, October 1962, pp.317-319.
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standpoint. This supports our own decision not to employ
nationalism as a perspective for understanding and analysing
British foreign policy towards Malaya/Malaysia after independence.
Although the nationalist perspective can be illuminating
in certain circumstances, in the case of Malaya it is of a very
limited value. The Marxist-Leninist interpretation of nationalism
in particular does not offer any advantage for our purposes. This
interpretation entirely ignores the complexities of the political
process, concentrating on putting every aspect of it into the
strait jacket of economic determinism. (40 ) For example, consider
this illustration from R.F. Holland, "The Imperial Factor in
British Strategies from Attlee to Macmillan, 1945-1963". Here the
author argues that the communist guerillas were fighting in Malaym,
"to prevent the metropole mapping a future in which their group
interests (as landless peasants and wage earners ...) were likely
to get scant respect". (44) This type of analysis, which waters
down political factors for the sake of economic determinism, will
hardly take us very far in our study.
Also worth mentioning is A.J. Stockwell's article on
"British Imperial Strategy and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia,
1947-1957", which is a commendable attempt to combine the narrow
domestic and broader international contexts. Stockwell's argument
is that, "Domestic, International and Peripheral factors - those
(43)T6scph Stalin, The FputicLatio-ris Of Leylir, isTri: The_
i0Y1 a- I PY 0 b te. rr)„	 )-rt. e r 1-1 a-tic) ), (24_ _Pg bi,Lo, N evio7K,
1932.
(44) R.F. Holland, "The Imperial Factor in British Strategies
from Attlee to Macmillan, 1945-1963", Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, Vol.XII, No.2, January 1982, p.175.
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three sisters who stirred the cauldron of British imperialism -
cast their spell over the decline of empire as over its expansion
a centurybefore.(45) He considers, more specifically, the impact
of strategic and economic factors on British policy towards
Malaysia after the Second World War. The only defects of this
otherwise excellent article are its rather limited time scale and
above all its lack of detail, which is of course inevitable in a
short article. So far as the time-scale is concerned, the study
does not deal with the post-independence period and so far as lack
of detail is concerned, some points vital for our purpose are
passed over rather hurriedly. For example, the impact of the
changes in defence strategy after the war is given only one long
paragraph.(46)
It is amply clear from this brief survey that the
published and unpublished post-war literature on Anglo-Malaysian
relations and British policy in Malaysia fails to provide us with
an adequate perspective from which to conduct the present study.
Valuable though many of these studies are, they are mainly
confined, as we have seen, to narrow aspects such as economic
problems, internal security, and regional threats and imbalances.
Although Stockwell's article is an exception, it is unfortunately
far too brief to provide anything like an adequate framework for
our purpose.
Having reviewed in brief the existing literature on our
(45) A.J. Stockwell, "British Imperial Strategy and Decolonization
in Southeast Asia, 1947-1957", in David Bassett and T.V. King
(eds.), Britain and Southeast Asia, Occasional Papers, No.13,
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Hull University, 1986, p.79.
(46) Ibid., p.80.
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subject, the problem which must now be faced is that of finding an
alternative approach which avoids the most obvious limitations
that much of it displayed. It will be useful to end the chapter,
therefore, by briefly summarizing the guidelines upon which our
- ideal' approach can be based.
In the first place, we need a perspective which rejects
abstract or reductionist approaches in any form. Amongst reduction-
1st approaches, we were equally critical of the nationalist one
adopted by liberals, of the economic ones adopted by marxists,
and the moralist one adopted by proponents of British paternalism.
Secondly, we need a perspective which also avoids a
foreshortened time-scale. The decline of British commitment in
Malaysia did not come like a bolt from the blue, as sometimes
seems to be suggested. An adequate study of the final phase of
that decline must therefore be firmly situated within a broader
setting that takes account of the deeper and more enduring strengths
and weaknesses of the British imperial colonial tradition in Malaya.
Thirdly, and finally, we need a perspective which eschews
any unilateral approach, whether British or Malaysian, and takes
full account of the complex reciprocal interaction of the relevant
factors. This interaction occurs in a variety of contexts,
extending from local and regional levels up to national and inter-
national ones, and all must receive due consideration.
Since none of the studies examined above satisfies these
three criteria, we are unable to select anyorie of them as the 'model'
approach for our study. With these criteria in mind, we may now turn
from our review of existing literature to our second task, Which is
to sketch the background of British foreign policy towards the
independent Federation of Malaya, and Malaysia after 1963.
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CHAPTER II 
The Backaround
It was stated in the previous chapter that British policy
is only fully _intelligible when it is situated within a broader
historical perspective. With a view to establishing such a
perspective, we will begin by reviewing briefly the story of how
British colonial success in — nineteenth-century Malaya
eventually degenerated into the fiasco of Malayan Union. The
brilliant achievements of the past only made it more difficult to
adapt colonial policy to the new situation which emerged after the
Second World War. Subsequently, we will consider in more detail
how imperial habits influenced British colonial policy towards the
grant of independence to Malaya. In this way, it is hoped that the
analysis will provide a valuable background against which we can
then investigate in detail British reactions to the altered
Malayan situation which emerged after the granting of independence.
British Colonial Policy: A Perspective 
We now turn, as was just said, to look more closely at the
conduct of British colonial policy, more especially in relation to
Malaya. The story of this involvement may be divided for present
purposes into three distinct phases. The first phase begins with
the earliest British contacts with the region and extends down to
the beginning of the Second World War. The second phase starts
with the surrender of Japanese forces and the return of British
rule in 1945, and ends with the establishment of the Federation of
Malaya in 1948. The third and final phase consists of the period
of communist insurgency and the negotiations with various Malay
and non-Malay organisations and ends with the grant of independence
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in 1957. To undertake this exercise is essential, since it is only
within this framework that British policy after independence
becomes fully intelligible.
(A)	 British Colonial Policy in Malaya before 1945.
The first phase of the British involvement with Malaya
consists of two consecutive policies. The first is a policy of
least intervention and keeping a low profile vis-a-Niis Dutch
authority. The second is a policy of active intervention and
indirect rule. c.47 ) The first policy lasted for nearly a century,
extending from the British presence in the Malay peninsula in
1786, when the island of Penang was acquired by the East India
Company, down to its transfer to the Colonial Office in 1867. The
second period extends from 1867 until the occupation of Malaya by
Japanese forces during the Second World War.(',7e0
"In the late edqbteenth century", Nicholas Tarling has
observed, "the British had three major interests in the Peninsula
and Archipelago, deriving from their involvement in India and
China. In the first place a naval base placed there would readily
secure a command of the Bay of Bengal, ... Secondly, the region
was important because through it ran the route to China, ...
Thirdly, the region was important because the Country Traders
(47) Nicholas Tarling, "Intervention and Non-Intervention in
Malaya" Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.XXI, No.4, 1962, pp. 523-7.
(47a) Rupert EMerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect 
Rule, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1964, is the
pioneering account of this direct and indirect rule by Britain in
Malaya.
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would secure produce - tin, marine and jungle products".(48)
Although these overriding commercial and strategic concerns
prompted the British East India Company to adopt a forward-looking
policy, the "British had few territorial ambitions in the Malay
world, trade not territory was the objective". (49 ) From the very
beginning until 1867, an extremely precarious diplomatic act
enabled the British to reap a rich harvest of benefits, without
incurring any heavy military involvement. ( 50 ) The Anglo-Dutch
Treaty of 1824-is the best illustration of this minimum inter-
vention policy. The treaty left the Dutch, "politically
predominant, while giving the British commercial opportunity". (5"
Unfortunately, this congenial climate gradually receded
into the past due to the unforeseen decline of Dutch power in
Europe, an event which had major repercussions on the balance of
power in South Fast Asia. In the second half of the nineteenth
century, the existing policy also came under severe strain as a
result of a multitude of other factors. (52) The first factor was
the
that, due to the Dutch decline in/Straits of Malacca, the British
(48) Nicholas Tarling, Southeast Asia, Past and Present, F.W.
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1966, p.112.
(49) J.B. Dalton, The development of Malayan External Policy, 
1957-1963, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Oxford, 1967, p.10.
(50) L.A. Mills, "British Malaya, 1824-1867", Journal of Malayan
Branch of Royal Asiatic Society, Vol.XXXIII, No.3, 1960, pp.203-10.
(51) Nicholas Tarling, op.cit., p.116.
(52) J.S. Bastin, "British as an Imperial Power in South-East
Asia in the nineteenth century", pp.177-188, in J.S. Bromley and
E.H. Kossman (eds.), Britain and the Netherlands in Europe and
Asia, Macmillan, London, 1968.
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trade with China was threatened by sea pirates. Secondly, there wtTe
the adventurous and forward looking policies ctaNiocated, by -0,e. Ti a lar-v-
aivn Ge-rNient3. Thirdly, local British and Chinese merchants
persistently advocated deeper British involvement in local
politics. Finally, the prevailing anarchy in the Malayan political
world, coupled with the impact of European rivalry in South East
Asia, compelled the British government to shift from non-intervention
to direct intervention. (53 ) Dalton aptly observed that it was "the
necessity to introduce law and order in this potentially explosive
situation [which] prompted Britain to accept responsihdlity".(54)
The policy of protecting trade and commerce at the cost of
direct political and military intervention had an ominous
beginning in 1867,(55) when the governor of the Straits Settlements
was directed by the Colonial Office, "to do all [he] could to help
British commerce. But [he was] not to let matters go so far that
the home government might be called on to sanction political moves
that would involve military expenses and trouble with other
European powers or native authorities nearby". (56 ) It became
increasingly difficult, however, to keep trade and politics apart.
Political instability compelled the British and Chinese merchants
to implore the British Government for direct intervention.(57)
(53) C.D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of 
British Political Control, O.U.P., London, 1961.
(54) J.B. Dalton, op.cit., p.12.
(55) David MacIntyre, "Brits Intervention in Malaya. The Origin
of Lord Kimberley's Instructions to Sir Andrew Clarke in 1873",
Journal of South East Asian History, Vol.II, No.3, 1961, pp.47-69.
(56) Robert Heussler, British Rule in Malaya, op.cit., p.6.
(57) EMerson, op.cit., pp. 112-118.
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These cries of help were echoed by the successive governors as
well. Finally, Lord Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary, inquired of
the Governor, Sir Andrew Clarke, whether, "the appointment of a
British agent, of course with the consent of the native rulers and
at the expense of the settlements", ( 58 ) would help in restoring
law and order in the Malay world. In fact, this system of agents
and Residents later on became the precursor of direct British rule
in Malays. Within the next thirty years, i.e. 1876-1909, a whole
network of treaties was created and the British Residents were
accepted by the Malay Sultans. ( 59 ) It reduced the Sultans to the
level of dependents on British protection, helped the Chinese
community to acquire almost a total monopoly of the middle level
of the Malayan economy, encouraged an uncontrolled flow of
immigrant labour from China and India, and isolated the Malays
from the national mainstream of economics and politics. (60) Though
some of the governors were genuinely concerned over Malay isolation,
a paternalistic attitude still prevailed in their policies. For
example, Sir Frank Swettenham who himself was actually involved in
consolidating the Resident system, noted with satisfaction in 1906
that "All is well now", in Malaya. For him, "Time means progress and
expansion for all ... under British influence".(61)
(58) Ibid., p.10.
(59) Eunice Thio, "The British Forward Movement in the Malay
Peninsula, 1880-1889", in K.G. Tregontng (ed.), Papers on Malayan
History, University of Singapore. Singapore, 1962; and Sir
Swettehham, British Malaya, Allen and Unwin, London, 1948, pp.206-305.
(60) D.G.E. Hall, A History of South Fast Asia, Macmillan,
London, 1964, p.536.
(61) Sir Frank A. Swettehham, op.cit., p.345.
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In order to counter: 	 , the problems created by this
interventionist policy, a policy of decentralization was advocated
in the Colonial Office after the end of the First World Wax-. (52)
However, it was, unfortunate for the Malays that the stated
objectives of the policy were not in harmony with contemporary
British and Chinese mercantile interests. (63) Thus an inherent
discrepancy developed between the theory and practice of British
colonial policy in Malaya during the interwar period, whereby the
Malay sultans were supposed to be the rulers, but British
authority remained supreme. ( 64) Though the Malays were supposed to
be the indigenous people, European and Chinese economic interests
were nevertheless always given priority. (6 This policy further
intensified the fragmentation of Malaya into different racial
communities, thereby hampering the growth of any substantial
nationalist movement (6 and leaving the country wholly unprepared
for self-government. (67)
This was the situation at the outbreak of the Second World
(62) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., pp.29-29.
(63) D.G.E. Hall, op.cit., pp.788; and B. Simandjuntak, op.cit.,
p.24.
(64) John Bastin and Robin W. Winks, (eds.), Malaysia: Selected
Historical Writings, KTO Press, Nendelh, Netherlands, 1979,
pp.286-288.
(65) Rupert Emerson, op.cit., pp.321-4.
(66) Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and
Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation of
Malaya, 1941-46, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1983, p.17.
(67) Rupert Emerson, Malaya: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule,
op.cit., p.498.
25
	
4"":114144ilarl
War. After approximately one century of indirect and half a
century of direct rule, Malaya presented a unique combination of a
fully developed colonial economy with highly underdeveloped
political institutions. (68) For a considerable length of time, the
Colonial Office had been advocating a policy of decentralization,
the object of which was to liberalize British rule in the Federated
Malay States, to centralize the Unfederated Malay states with the
Straits Settlements into a single administrative unit. (69) However,
due to opposition from disparate groups, united by their mutual
hostility to the policy, the scheme never got off the ground. This
vacillation finally came to an end with the Japanese occupation of
South-Past Asia in 1942.( 7°) The event proved to be a watershed in
the history of British rule in Malaya. (71.) However, at this stage
it will be helpful if a brief survey of British colonial policy
under the Labour government is undertaken, in order to provide a
precise context for post-war British policy in Malaya.
(B)	 British Colonial Policy towards Malaya, 1945-1951.
The Second World War brought new challenges to the British
Empire, opened new possibilities and posed new questions to the
(68) D.G.E. Hall, op.cit., pp.748-757; and J.H. Drabble:ISorne
-Thoughts on the Economic Development of Malaya under British
Administration", Journal of South East Asian Studies, VO1.5, NO.2,
September 1974, pp.199-208.
(69) John Bastin and R.W. Winks, op.cit., pp.290-293.
(70) A.J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, op.cit.,
pp.17-38.
(71) Ibid., p.17-18.
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policy makers. (7'2) In Africa, Britain tried to tidy up the EMpire
by introducing new development programmes, but in the rest of the
apire the situation was not amenable to response. (73) "Unable to
master the forces of Arab and Asian nationalism, Britain sought
adjustments which might hold off an apparently unfathomable tide.
The Labour Party was opposed to maintaining the Ebpire by force.
It is a nice and possibly a significant coincidence that when
Britain did not have adequate force, her government was in the
hands of a party committed to abandoning imperial rule".(74)
In this second phase, a key element was introduced for the
first time by the new Labour Government. Unlike the previous
government, it did not feel committed to the imperial past;
imperial glory did not have the same attraction as for the
Conservative party. <7 Therefore, it was easier (in principle at
least) for the Labour administration to recognize the radical
change in the status of Britain as a world power and to adjust to
the changed situation, (76) though it was painful for them to admit
(72) WM. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1977, covers the American hostility to the British
Empire.
(73) J.M. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government.
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, gives a vivid account of these
problems.
(74) M.A. Fitzsimons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour
Government 1945-51, University of Notre Dame, Paris, Notre Dame,
Indiana, 1953, p.56.
(75) David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 
1945-61, O.U.P., London, 1964, pp. 247-248.
(76) Wm. Roger Louis, op.cit., pp.555-558.
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that, "Britain was now a power with world interests, not a world
power".(77)
As a socialist government, however, it faced a dilemma. On
the one hand, the Labour Government in office was bound by its
election promises and committed to maintaining the over-all image
of a socialist government. (78) On the other hand, it confronted a
hostile international environment which precluded any radical
change in the foreign policy followed by British Governments in
the pre World War years. In addition to this intractable environment
the presence of Labour leaders in the coalition government during
the war helps to explain the comparatively insignificant changes
in the foreign policy of the new government. ( 79 ) In short, a
strong preference for realism over ideological niceties is
strikingly evident in the post World War years. Ernest Bevin
himself openly spoke about it at the party's annual conference, "I
would ask the Conference to bear in mind", Bevin exhorted his
listeners, that "Revolutions do not change geography and revolutions
do not change geographical needs". (80)
The colonial policy of the Labour government runs parallel
to its foreign policy. On the one hand, the Labour Party was
anxious to apply its cherished principles in the realm of colonial
policy. On the other, its hands were tied by consideration of inter-
(77) M.A. Fitzsimons, op.cit., p.29.
(78) Partha Sarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour
Movement, 1914-1964, Macmillan, London, 1975, pp.283-284.
(79) M.A. Fitzsimons, op.cit., p.25.
(80) Ernest Bevin, "Report of the 44th Annual Conference of the
Labour Party, London, 1945, p.108.
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national power politics and national interest.(81-)
It is in this context that the development of Britain's
attitude towards its colonies must be interpreted in the years
following the Second World War. (82) The Labour government
inherited a very confused and fluid international movement in the
colonies. While presenting the Civil Estimates for debate in the
Committee of Supply, the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Creech Jones, revealed the changed attitude of the Government when
he said:
"I am convinced that in this modern age, with its forces
of nationalism and freedom, its economic changes, its spread of
education and the political and social awakening which is going
on, we must adjust ourselves to a much quicker tempo of
constitutional development than would have seemed practicable a
few years ago".'
Besides the working of these external factors, their own
cherished values of social equality and justice led the Labour
government to adopt a liberal line on colonial questions. &4 "In
the decades before 1945", Creech Jones went on to argue, "the
socialist movement in Britain had challenged the older notions of
colonial possessions. ... Few socialists had found themselves able
(81) For the conflict between principles and practical needs, see
Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign
Policy 1914-1965 , Stanford University Press, California, 1969,
pp.102-153.
(82) J.M. Lee, op.cit., pp.13-25.
(83) Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, Vol .441, 29th July
1947, Co1.226.
(84) Kenneth Robinson, op.cit., pp.56-59.
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to reconcile their conceptions of human rights and social
democracy with this kind of truculent national egoism".(85)
The Labour party's cherished values of social democracy,
Jones continued, could not be reconciled with "colonialism". It
was a popular belief in Fabian circles that, "colonialism had
brought in its train an intolerable legacy for which the old idea,
of possession and laisser—faire seemed as utterly irrelevant as
the notionsof imperialism".(66)
At the same time, however, Creech Jones warned against
haste and folly. "We have to experiment boldly, though not
necessarily rashly ... The process may be a painful one, but the
alternative of increasing bitterness and tension in the relationship
of the people to the Government would be disastrous".(87)
It is in the light of the above statements that the
colonial policy of the Labour government must be examined.
Inspired as it was by a combination of ideology and political
pragmatism, the policy entailed a fresh look on the relationship
between the mother country and the colonies. The policy consisted
of two main elements. In the first place, it expressed a willing-
ness to take risks by granting political independence at least to
colonies Which were deemed sufficiently "mature" to be given
responsibility for governing themselves. Secondly, it meant
tidying up the local administration, in order to create a structure
of local government which would be capable of experimenting on its
(85) Arthur Creech Jones (ed.), New Fabian Colonial Essays,
Hogarth Press, London 1959, p.19.
(86) Ibid., p.19.
(87) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons. Vol .441, 29th July,
1947 pp.266-7.
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own initiative, thus finally equipping the local population for
responsible self-government. (8e,
During the following years, the Government continued to
reject the idea of any total surrender by Britain and to emphasise
the limitations of liberal policies. "No Government could suddenly
bring to an end -colonial status' and colonialism without creating
more pain and difficulties than might be removed", Creech Jones
wrote later on in New Fabian Colonial Essays (1959). Nor, he said,
"could there be any question of
	 abdication of Britain fm
obligations incurred in the past, or of transfer of territories to
inexperienced or to some nonexistent international authority".(89)
The debates in the House of Commons on colonial affairs
during the immediate post war years slowly moved towards a more
comprehensive reassessment of British colonial policy. O) Of
course, the opposition took an active part in this process of
reassessment, although theirs was generally the view that might be
expected from old champions of empire. By the beginning of 1948,
they had accepted the alteration in the status of Great Britain,
but mainly because they were deeply concerned about the dangers
lying ahead. Mr. Gammans (M.P. for Hornsey, and veteran champion
of the old colonial policy), warned the government that besides
the aim of guiding the colonial territories to responsible self-
government within the Empire, "there must be another aim as well"
(88) Creech Jones, New Fabian Colonial Essays, op.cit., p.28.
(89) Ibid., p.25.
(90) Paul de Hevesy, "The United Nations and the British Common-
wealth", Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.XXII No.26 June 27,
1957, p.809.
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and "that is to hold the Rapire together as a world force".(9I)
In the course of the debate, Gammans put special emphasis
on two points. "The first is that Great Britain is either a great
imperial power or she is a lonely friendless island in the North
Sea, unable to feed herself and unable to defend herself. "The
second point emphasised by him was that "whilst Great Britain
cannot exist without the Empire, it is equally true that the
colonies cannot exist without us. Independence without security is
meaningless (92)
By the beginning of 1949, the colonial policy of the
Labour Government had assumed the form recorded in Command Paper
Cmd.7433. That paper placed emphasis on (a) the need to encourage
political progress and further the growth of indigenous political
institutions; on (b) the need to harness the new aspirations by
direction of nationalist sentiment to constructive purposes; and
on (c) the need to staff a colony's civil service more and more
from the ranks of its own inhabitants. 3)
In the economic field, the British Government's responsi-
bility went even further. As the Cmd.7433 made clear, "... Great
Britain had a dual mandate ... on the one hand to promote the moral
and material welfare of the colonial peoples, and on the other, to
develop the resources of the Colonies, not only for their own
people, but for all mankind".
(91) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .453, 8 July
1948, cols. 614-5.
(92) Ibid., co1.615.
(93) Cmd.7433, The Colonial Empire 1947-48, H.M.S.O., London,
1948, 1D-4.
(94) Quoted by Paul de Hevesy, op.cit., p.809.
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This brief survey of the Labour Government's colonial
policy might seem to suggest that it showed, in the words of David
Goldsworthy, "much conscientiousness and some imagination in
seeking social, economic, and political application of liberal
humanitarian principles".( 9s) Such a view, however, is too
simplistic to be completely acceptable, supposing as it does that
Labour policies were almost exclusively the outcome of its
ideological sentiment. As we have seen, British colonial policy
under the Labour Government was shaped at least as much by the
calculated response of an imperial power to pragmatic considerations
presented by "domestic, inteTnational and peripheral factors", (96)
in the post-World War years.
Against the background of this review of the Labour
Government's colonial policy, we may now analyse more closely
British colonial policy towards Malaya in the post World War years.
British troops returned to Malaya in an altogether changed
environment after the surrender of Japanese forces in South East
Asia. ( 97 ) Two sudden and unforeseen changes had surfaced in
British colonial possessions in Malaya. In the first place, the
British withdrawal and Japanese occupation had touched off a bitter
struggle for power between the communities by letting loose the
explosive forces of nationalism. ( 98) Secondly, even before the
(95) David Goldsworthy, op.cit., p.23.
(96) A.J. Stockwell, "British Imperial Strategy and Decolonization
in South-East Asia, 1947-1957", op.cit., p.79.
(97) Chin Kee Onn, Malaya, Upside Down, Federal Publications,
Kuala Lumpur, 19,46, pp.101-7.
(98) F.G. Carnell, "British .Policy in Malaya", The Political 
Quarterly, Vol.XXIII, No.3, July/September, 1952, p.275.
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coup de grace".(99)
The Japanese occupation gave a new impetus to Malay
nationalism, with the result that the problem of inter-communal
harmony finally emerged into the open. (100) During the occupation
years, the Japanese displayed a natural suspicion towards the
Chinese community in Malaya. ( 101 ) Behind the anti-Chinese
sentiments of the Japanese were traditional hostilities, as well
as the fighting between Japan and China on the Chinese mainland.
The Japanese successfully exploited the existing communal
differences and, "deployed the Malayan police force, which consisted
mostly of Malays, to suppress the Chinese resistance movement". (102)
The Japanese occupation was decisive in arousing Malay
expectations. In the course of the Japanese occupation, the Malays
had tasted power over the Indians and Chinese. The Chinese, who
had played a crucial role in British espionage and sabotage
activities in Malaya during the Japanese occupation, were expecting
favourable treatment in the forthcoming arrangements. (109) A new
factor, almost non-existent in prewar Malaya, was the emergence of
militant tendencies both among the Chinese and the Malays.(1°4)
(99) Kenneth Younger (ed.), Fabian Colonial Essays, London,
Hogarth Press, 1951, p.41.
(100)For a detailed study of the Japanese impact on South East
Asian politics, see Willard H. Ellsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast
Asian Nationalist Movement, 1940-1945, C.U.P., Cambridge, 1953.
(101)Jan Pluvier, South-East Asia from Colonialism to
Independence, O.U.P., Kuala Lumpur, 1974, pp. 200-201.
(102)B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., pp.154-159.
(103)Cheah Boon Kheng, op.cit., pp . 154-159.
(104)Chin Kee Onn, op.cit., pp.101-7.
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These militant tendencies enjoyed full play as a result of the
absence of governmental authority, in the two months which
intervened between the surrender of Japan and the British take-
over. (-°) In the wake of this period - of near anarchy, the
British authorities faced problems of immense magnitude.
The general turmoil which prevailed in Malaya, was
exacerbated by the disruption of the economy, as made clear by the
Table 1.( 106 ) Moreover, the forthcoming independence of mature
colonies like India and Burma further encouraged nationalist
fervour which had been lying dormant before the outbreak of war,
and was now expressed primarily in racial divisions. (107) These
divisions only generated further confusion and uncertainty amongst
the colonial administration. In the absence of a united
nationalist movement, the British policy makers were prone to be
interpreted as "taking sides" by showing favour to one community
at the expense of the other. The old dilemma of indigenous Malay
peasant interests vs. Chinese mercantile interests opened new
hazards during 1945 and 1946 since even the slightest indication
of partiality would have sparked a fresh outbreak of communal
violence. (108)
The overall result of this plethora of problems was that
the situation in Malaya resembled an imminent volcanic eruption.
(105) Ibid., pp.180-186.
(106) See Table 1. (overleaf)
(107) Wang Gungwu, op.cit., pp.317-319.
(108) Anthony H. Short, "Nationalism and Emergency in Malaya", in
Michael Leifer (ed.), Nationalism Revolution and Evolution in
South East Asia, Centre for South FAst Asian Studies, Null
University, 1970, pp.44-49.
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(106)	 Table 1 
Economic Disruption in Malaya, 1941-46
(a) Production of Tin (in Long Tons)
1939	 44,627
1940	 80,651
1946	 8,432
(b) Tin,Ore (Long Tons)
1942	 21,873
1945	 4,380
(c) Coal (Average monthly Production in Tons)
1940	 65,126
1946	 18,723
(d) Padi	 Acreage
	 yield (in grantangs)
1941	 820,480	 215,924,000
1946
	 789,480	 149,880,000
(e) Displacement of Labour
1941	 1946	 Percentage change
Estate	 300,104	 218,841	 -27%
Government
	 33,441	 32,654	
-2%
Department
Mines	 29,120	 16,008	 -45%
Source: Malayan Union: Annual Report on the Malayan Union for
1946, April to December, Kuala Lumpur, 1947.
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In order to minimize the danger of such an eruption, some pre-
cautionary steps were urgently needed. For the British however,
problems were made still more complicated by the fact that their
victory over_Japanese forces was only indirect. Because the
Japanese surrender was due to the American atom bomb rather than
to direct combat, the British could not claim the prestige that
belongs to a victorious country. m°9 ) In post war Malaya, this
factor, along with the "feeling of guilt" for not being able to
protect Malaya against the Japanese invasion itself, (2.10) had cast
dark shadows over the minds and activities of the Army, colonial
administrators, and the Colonial Office. "The Japanese attacked
and destroyed our existing position", observed the Colonial Office
in Malaya, "in consequence of our failure to offer the protection
promised". (111)
The official British response to this post-war breakdown
of law and order in Malaya was acceptance that "war has made great
changes in the world and released new forces and influences for
freedom and democracy which cannot be ignored ... In any case a
more liberal constitution is imperative, for under the prewar order,
self-government could not be achieved". (2.12) Within the context of
this objective, the old colonial policy of intervention and
indirect rule was gradually replaced by a new and distinctive phase
based upon developing the colony for self-government within the
(109) Anthony Short, Ibid., p.44.
(110) T.H. Silcock, op.cit., p.3.
(111) C0/865/1/M101, A letter from Messrs. McKerron and Day to
the Colonial Office, dated 8 December, 1942.
(112) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.420, 8th March
1946, co1.641.
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EMpire.( 2.13) According to Stockwell, "The three pillars of pre war
policy - the sovereignty of the Malay rulers, the autonomy of the
Malay States and the privileged position of the Malay community -
were demolished". ("40 The place of these three pillars", he
argued, was now taken by a policy concerned with territorial
consolidation of the "Malaysia" region, political and financial
stability, multi-racialism and staged advance towards democratic
self-government' . (1i5) It was this new objective, then, which
became the hallmarks of British colonial policy in post-war Malaya.
The Colonial Office deemed that by transforming Malaya
into a single political and administrative unit, its progress
towards self-government would be facilitated. (2.26) Two important
documents, 	 (C.Le4s..-t,1:0 ')(
viz. Cmd.6724: Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on
Future Constitution, and Cmd.6749: Malayan Union and Singapore: 
Summary of Proposed Constitutional Arrangement, were issued in
January and March 1946. These two papers, along with a lengthy
debate in the House of Commons on the Straits Settlements Repeal
Bill on 8th March 1946, are the chief symptoms of the altered view
now to be found in the Colonial Office. (2.1) The CMd.6724 boldly
(113) ibid., pp.646-647.
(114) A.J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, op.cit.,
p.17.
(115) A.J. Stockwell, "Imperial Strategy and Decolonization in
South East Asia, 1945-1957", op.cit., p.84.
(116) Victor Purcell, "A Malayan Union: The Proposed New
Constitution", Pacific Affairs, Vol.XIX, No.1 March 1946, pp.27-31.
(117) A.J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics,
op.cit., pp.21-30.
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discounted any possibility of returning to the prewar system
mainly on two grounds. Firstly, it was an outdated system for the
postwar Malayan-world; and secondly, it "would not lend itself to
tfie-
that political adjustment which will offer .g. telmeans and prospect
of developing Malaya's capacity in the direction of responsible
-
self-government". (118) Therefore, if there was to be social and
political advance, the creation of "coordinated policy and
uniformly directed services"( 119 ) was to be desired in Malaya.
It was with this objective in mind that the Colonial
Office entrusted the MacMichael mission with the task of achieving
a single unified political unit in Malaya. Ironically, however,
and despite the best intentions of its planners, the mission
itself became a major instrument in provoking Malay nationalist
sentiment. (120) The idea of merging the Federated and Unfederated
Malay states into a single political urdt, viz. the Union of
Malaya, was regarded with deep distrust.( 121 ) It was alleged in
the British parliament that the Malay Sultans were not approached
by Sir Harold MacMichael in a proper manner, and that they "had
been coerced and intimidated in secret". It was also said, more
generally, that the people had not been adequately consulted. (122)
Some of the Malay Sultans themselves supported this view, insisting
(118) Cmd.6724: Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy
on Future Constitution, London, H.M.S.O., January 1946, p.2.
(119) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .420, 8th March
1946, Co1.640.
(120) Jan Pluvier, op.cit., pp.396-397.
(121) Gerald Hawkins, "Reaction to the Malayan Union", Pacific 
Affairs, Vol.XIX, No.3, September 1946, pp.279-285.
(122) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.420, Co1.672.
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that their consent was far from spontaneous and whole-hearted. (123))
Moreover, the union of Malay proposed by Cmd.6749 only convinced
the Malays that, "they were politically degraded to a mere
colonial status and that their Sultans were being made to descend
to the level of 'serfs' in a crown bureaucracy". (124) Apart from
wounding Malay sentiments, the proposed Union of Malaya demanded a
level of centralization Which was simply not workable within the
prevailing circumstances in Malaya. (128) Even the members of the
Malayan Civil Service thought that "London interpreted her
interests too narrowly, based her policies on inadequate information
and insisited on a degree of control from the centre that was self-
defeating". (126)
he upshot was that a country-wide protest against the
proposed union and the liberal citizenship laws rapidly engulfed
Malaya. (127) The newly born United Malays National Organization
came to be the spearhead of Malay mass-protests. (128) However, an
enigmatic feature of the Malay protest was that it was not so much
(123) Khong Kim Hoong, Merdeka: British Rule and The Struggle for
Independence in Malaya, 1945-1947, Institute for Social Analysis,
Peta ling Jaya, Malaysia, 1984, p.81.
(124) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.42.
(125) A.J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, op.cit.,
pp.165-166.
(126) Robert Heussler, Completing the Stewardship; op.cit., x
p.123 and Jan Pluvier, op.cit., p.401.
(127) A.J. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, op.cit.,
pp.64-71.
(128) Ishak Bin Tandin, "Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism, 1946-1951",
Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol.1, March 1960, pp.65-73.
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anti-British as anti-Chinese and anti-Indian. (29) The slogans
adopted by the protest movement, for example, "We want protection
and not annexation",( 19°) were indications of Malay faith in the
necessity of.. British administration. "Father, protect us till we
grow up", was the Malay sentiment echoed by the Straits Times.(131)
As a matter of fact, "The Rulers and UMNO leaders were not
revolutionaries or even radicals opposed to British colonialism.
In fact, they viewed British rule as being generally just and
necessary for Malaya. ... Even at the height of the protest
against the Union, the Sultans and the UMNO leaders kept their
close links with British government officials".(132)
Unlike the Malay response, the initial Chinese and Indian
reaction was marked by apathy. However, the strong pro-Malay
policies of U.M.N.O. only strengthened the hands of radical
elements within the non-Malay communities. ( I33 ) The apparent
readiness of the UMNO conservatives to embrace British protection
and to cooperatX)/e with the government in achieving self-government
within the Commonwealth, placed them in a highly favourable
position in relation to the radicals. ( 3-3.4 ) The possibility of the
radicals arriving at any compromise with the British authorities
was meagre due to the extreme nature of their own programme.(1-35)
(129) Khong Kim Hbong, op.cit., p.85.
(130) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.43.
(131) Khong Kim Hoong, op.cit., p.84.
(132) Ibid., pp.97-98.
(133) Jan Pluvier, op.cit., p.402.
(134) D.R. Rees-Williams, "The Constitutional Position in Malaya",
Pacific Affairs, Vol.XX, No.2, June 1947, pp.174-176.
(135) B. Simandjuntalc op.cit., pp.47-752 (Continued overleaf)
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When the British government opened discussions on the future
constitutional arrangements, UMNO therefore became the major
participant, whilst radical parties like PUTERA and AMCJA decided
to stage demonstrations against any Anglo-UMNO compromise. (136)
The rising wave of nationalism in Malaya along with the
polarization of politics into a struggle between conservatives and
radicals, brought about a profound modification in the British
view of the situation. ( 1-37) First of all, the Colonial Office moved
towards a policy of consultation and discussion rather than seeking
to impose policies from above. ( 13e ) Secondly, the conservative
leadership of UMNO proved to be a willing partner in implementing
British policies for administrative change in Malay. ( 139 ) In
return for this cooperation, Britain now accorded priority to Malay
political interests over Chinese ones.(14°)
The outcome of two years of discussion was command paper
Cmd.7171, which made major concessions to the Malays on the question
of federal citizenship and the authority of the Sultans. ( 1'42-) In
spite of these concessions, the basic aim of establishing a strong
(135) (From overleaf) and M.N. Sopiee, op.cit., pp35-37.
(136) G.P. Means, op.cit., pp.81-97.
(137) A. 3. Stockwell, The Development of MalayPoli teg Zuring the Course of The
Mayon ttn)01.1
itNperiment, 1942-1948, An unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London
University 1973, pp. 144-148.
(138) Ibid., pp.145-146 and M.N. Sopiee, op.cit., pp.156-160.
(139) J.P. Ongkili, "British and Malayan Nationalism", op.cit.,
p.269.
(140) Robert Heussler, Completing a Stewardship, op.cit., p.155.
(141) Cmd.7171: Federation of Malaya: Summary of Revised
Constitutional Proposals, July 1947, H.M.S.O., London, pp.2-5.
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central authority and jurisdiction over all important matters was
fulful led. (12) Although the proposal for a new Federation of
Malaya contained in Cmd.7171 satisfied both British needs and
UMNO's national aspirations, it left a large section of the non
Malay communities frustrated and disillusioned with the whole
erf this ITustreiti ori
British policy of constitutional reform. <- 	 As a resultk the
formal inauguration of the Federation of Malaya was soon to be
followed by the outbreak of guerilla warfare throughout the
country. ( 1.!14) With the advent of guerilla warfare, a new phase in
British Malayan history commenced. This was to last until the
grant of independence in 1957.
(C)	 British Colonial Policy towards Malaya, 1949-57.
Before approaching this third and final phase, it must be
recollected that except for thetkrreeinitial years of communist
insurgency, the Conservative party was in power in Britain. This
fact had far reaching consequences for the final outcome of the
guerilla war in Malaya. By 1951, the Labour Government was finding
it increasingly difficult to tackle, communist violence. Mr. James )C
Griffith$,the Secretary of State for the colonies, admitted to his
successor in 1951 that, "It has become a military problem to which
we have not been able to find the answer". 145 ) It was this
(142) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.464,41-EhNaill",
CIS. 1010-1011.
(143) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.262.
(144) Federation of Malaya, Official Year Book, Vol.Two, 1962,
Kuala Lumpur, 1962, pp.387-409.
(145) Oliver Lyttleton, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, Bodley Head,
London, 1962, p.362.
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situation which the Conservative government confronted when
Churchill returned to office later in that year. Since this change
of authority was to have considerable influence on the course of
Anglo-Malay-relations in the years immediately before and after
Merdeka Day, it is necessary at this stage to review briefly the
colonial policy of the new government.
British Colonial Policy under the Conservative
Government 1951-57.
In spite of their bitter attacks on Labour's colonial
policy whilst in opposition, the new Conservative Government did
not immediately introduce any major change into existing colonial
policy. ( 146 ) This can be attributed to the fact that, whereas the
Labour Party was almost uniformly committed to decolonisat ion, the
Conservative Party was deeply divided on the future of the pire
and the colonies. ( I47 ) A prominent group of Conservatives MPs led
by Dodds-Parker declared during a debate in 1948 that, "Great
Britain is either a great imperial power or she is a lonely
friendless island in the North Sea unable to feed herself and
unable to defend herself". ( 148 ) On the other hand, the former
Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley, had openly accepted in 1949
that both parties had arrived at "some community of purpose". (149)
(146) Ibid., op.cit., pp.351-356.
(147) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .542, 21 June
1955, cols. 1152-1269, The debate on colonial affairs clearly showed
the division of opinion among the rank and file of the Conservatives.
(148) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .454, 8 July
1948, co1.615
(149) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, (Continued overleaf)
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This division within the Conservative Party was nowhere as
glaring as it became during the nineteen fifties. ( 3- o) Whilst the
Prime Minister declared as late as 1954 that, "I have not become the
rylvs ft Wilistorivior4iir - to preside over the dissolution of British
Empire", (2) his Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton, had used
••n•
almost the very words of Mr. Creech Jones while elaborating
Conservative colonial policy in the House of Commons in 1951. His
"respected predecessors'" policy, Lyttleton insisted, was "at once
the only enlightened and the only practical theme for a colonial
policy in the nineteen fifties".152)
With hindsight it can be argued that this deep division
within the party arose because as late as the nineteen fifties,
"vague attitudes based on nostalgia, together with a quite
specific hostility towards the advancement of colonial nationalism
in certain areas, still had many spokesmen". ( 153 ) If this pro-empire
the second. egret of L.abour's policy
attitude clashed with the ideals of self-governmentflid not bring
any such clash. The avowed aim of developing the colonial economy
as a support for and an extension of the home economy found
enthusiastic champions among the Conservative rank and file."54)
Although the cause had been taken up before the war, and the
(149) (From overleaf) Vol.467, 20 July 1949, cols. 492-3.
(150) James B. Christopher (ed.), Cases in Comparative Politics,
Little Brown, Boston, 1965, p.94.
(151) C.E. Carrington, Liquidation of British Empire, The Reid
Lectures of Acadia University, Harrap, London, 1962, p.11.
(152) Oliver Lyttleton, op.cit., pp.335-336.
(153) David Goldsworthy, op.cit., p.287.
(154) R.F. Holland, "The Imperial factor in British Strategies
from Attlee to Macmillan, 1945-1963", op.cit., pp.166-171.
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Labour Government had already created the Colonial Development
Corporation in 1948, nothing substantial had been achieved by
1951, despite a vastly increased budget. (See Table 2).(15)
Thia unsatisfactory situation has been attributed by
Anthony Seldon to "the dearth of finance and ideas that had
bedevilled colonial development plans before the [Korean] war". He
confirmed that some additional difficulties had appeared by the
early 1950's. These included the "problem of finding skilled man-
power ... and a shortage of raw materials. ..." (156) On top of
these domestic problems, the divergent economic situation in each
colony required individual attention. As a result, "devising an
overall grand strategy became next to impossible, and problems
(155) Table 2
C D & W. 1946-1952: Issues and Financial Provision
Year
	
Issues	 Financial Provision
	
1946-47	 £3.5 million	 £9.3 million
	
1947-48	 5.3	 .	 7.5	 .
	
1948-49	 6.4	 6.5	 .
	
1949-50	 12.9	 .	 13.2
	
1950-51	 13.2	 19.25	 • .
	
1951-52	 14.0	 (estimated)	 19.4	 .
Source: D.J. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development,
VO1.3, A Reassessment of British Aid Policy 1951-1965, Macmillan,
London, 1980, p.21.
(156) Anthony Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer: The Conservative
Government 1951-55, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1981, p.353.
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were tackled as and when they arose".( Im7) However, the government
conscientiously persisted in its efforts, despite occasional
setbacks and failures. (158 ) For example, the House of Commons was
informed by„the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs that,
"Colonial Development and Welfare Act has already furnished £140
millions, and a further £80 millions have now been added".(159)
The genuine British concern for the political and economic
advancement of its colonies was severely hampered by a multitude
of considerations during 1951-57.( 160) The Welfare State and
economic reconstruction restricted room for manouvre, whilst the
growing militancy of the nationalat movement dampened British >\
enthusiasm for their own liberal and humanitarian convictions. (161)
But how, we must ask, did this affect policy towards Malaya in
particular? The answer is to be found by considering the
consequences of these two modifications in existing policy Which
were made by the Conservative Government.
In the first place, the government slowed down the pace of
granting independence; and secondly, it demonstrated British
readiness to use sufficient force, should that be necessary in
order to enforce the government's policies. (162) For example, in
Malaya the maintenance of law and order as a prerequisite for the
(157) Ibid., p.353.
(158) D.J. Morgan, op.cit., pp.21-49.
(159) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, VO1.542, 21 June
1955, co1.1166; and D.J. Morgan, op.cit., pp.26-27.
(160) J.M. Lee, op.cit., pp.78-140, and D.J. Morgan. op.cit.,
pp.1-13.
(161) J.M. Lee, op.cit., p.243.
(162) Anthony Seldon, op.cit., 1D.348.
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grant of independence now became the principal tenet of colonial
policy. (63) As Oliver Lyttleton put it, "It is mockery to give a
man a vote when you cannot protect his life". 0-64 ) The pragmatic
and downto7earth approach of the Conservative Party contrasts
strongly with the rhetoric of self-goverment favoured by its
predecessors.
The third and the final phase of British colonial policy
towards Malaya spans the most crucial and traumatic years of
Malayan history. The decade after 1948 witnessed the eruption of
guerilla warfare, a relentless British and Malayan fight against
it, and a simultaneous effort to create a political infrastructure
in readiness for the future grant of independence. These two
events, viz., the defeat of communist insurgency and the
attainment of independence, were inseparable. As a matter of fact,
"the struggle against the one was also the birth trauma of the
other". <t6) Consideration of Sir Robert Thompson's strategic
recommendations provides a valuable insight into the problems
involved. He contended that:
(1) The Government must have a clear political aim: to establish
and maintain a free, independent united country which was
politically and economically stable and viable.
(2) The Government must function in accordance with law.
(3) The Government must have an overall plan.
(4) The Government must give priority to defeating political sub-
version, not the guerillas.
(163) Oliver Lyttleton, op.cit., pp.364-368.
(164) Ibid., p.364.
(165) Anthony H. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 
1948-1960, Frederick Muller, London, 1975, p.503.
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(5) In the guerilla phase of an insurgency, the Government must
secure its base areas first.(I66)
The official British response conformed to Thompson's
strategy. As a result, military, economic, psychological and
political factors were given equal consideration in working out an
overall strategy. General Templer, the chief architect of British
success against communist insurgency in Malaya, revealed a better
grasp of reality than anyone else in his unwavering belief that,
"The answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but
in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people".( 167) In line with
this belief, General Templer adopted a "carrot and stick" policy.
Though he was sometimes accused of being too highhanded and even
of bordering on ruthlessness, his method ultimately yielded the
desired results. At the same time, he showed a genuine concern for
the problems caused for the ordinary citizens by the insurgency
and counter-insurgency measures. ( 168 ) In fact, throughout the whole
of the emergency years. British officials in Malaya "had observed
the golden rule that political steps needed to be taken side by
side with military operations", and had appreciated that these
operations "might often be prejudiced if not accompanied by appro-
priate steps in the political field". (69)
(166) Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency,
Praeger, New York, 1966, pp.50-57.
(167) K. Tregonning, "Malaya: 1955", Australian Quarterly,
Vol.XXVIII, No.2, June 1956, p.25.
(168) The counter-insurgency methods adopted by General Templer
were subject to controversy. For example, Victor Purcell in Malaya: 
Communist or free?, op.cit., vehemently critised his measures.
(169) Anthony Short, op.cit., p.323.
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The fight against communist insurgents in Malaya,
therefore, contained an intrinsic economic dimension. 0-7°) British
officials became increasingly convinced of the necessity for
insulating the rural Malays and Chinese population from falling
prey to communist propaganda. This could best be achieved by
improving their conditions of living. You can only win the people
over, in my opinion", observed General Templer, "by capturing
their hearts and minds. The Strategy is to win,it", he elaborated
further, Ploy getting the population on your side, by getting
prosperity, a higher standard of living ..." (17" This strategy
was sustained over the years by a sharp increase by the British in
development and welfare activities in Malaya during 1951-1955, as
is shown in Table 3 below. This increase cannot be dismissed as a
Table 3
United Kingdon's Financial EXpenditure in Malaya & British Borneo.
(Figures in Pound-Sterling millions, rounded to nearest '000.)
Category of EXpenditure Financial Years
(a) Colonial Development
1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55
and Welfare
(b) British Council
.693
.009
1.169
.014
1.095
.021
.948
.026
Source: F0/371/123259, "United Kingdom Financial Years in Colombo
Plan Countries, Commonwealth and Sterling Area, 1951-1956".
(170) For example, see Richard Stubbs, Counter-Insurgency and the
Economic Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Price Boom on the
Malayan Insurgency, Occasional Paper No.19, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Singapore, 1974.
(171) Ibid., p.51.
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mere coincidence since the years 1951-54 were the most menacing of
the EMergency.
As was said earlier, this increase in development and
welfare activities was concomitant with a steep rise in military
expenditure. See Table 4 which is based on the same source.
Table 4
United Kingdom's Military EXpenditure in Malaya and
British Borneo including SingaPere.
Financial Years	 Million in Pound Sterling
1950-1951	 25.5
1951-1952	 29.8
1952-1953	 29.5
1953-1954	 30.0
1954-1955	 31.7
1955-1956 (estimated)	 34.4 
180.900 Total
Source: F0/371/123259, "United Kingdom Financial years in Colombo
Plan Countries, Commonwealth and Sterling Area, 1951-1956".
The end result of this unusual combination of military and
socio-economic strategy was that the insurgents were never able to
pose such a menacing threat to the British as the Vietnamese
guerillas succeeded in doing to the French and Americans. Another
desired outcome of this strategy was that the number of civilian
and Security Forces' casualties steadily declined. According to
the official reports, there were 1,195 Security Forces' casualties
in 1951, as compared to 889 in 1950 and 664 in 1952. After 1952,
the total number of Security Forces' casualties never rose above
51
250 annually. (172)
Apart from delaying the grant of independence, communist
insurgency became crucial in deciding the future shape of indepen-
dent Malaya. It was so because the insurgency was seen as part and
parcel of the international communist conspiracy, and against
or`
which Malaya was regarded as the frontline defence. The avowed
policy of self-government created a whole new set of problems for
the British government. The major questions were the future status
of Malaya as a front line anti-communist state, and the future
status of British forces. British anxiety is vividly expressed in
a letter from Anthony Head to Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for X
Foreign Affairs, on 15th November 1954.( 173) The letter anticipated
likely developments in Malaya, in the event of the withdrawal of
British forces. The most obvious result, he observed, would be the
creation of a power vacuum in the region. In that event, Head
argued, the whole area would be vulnerable to internal subversion.
Head's proposal was to counter-balance this threat by making it
publicly known that the "British were equally determined to
guarantee (Malayan] independence against the tide of communism by
providing the necessary imperial forces for that purpose". (174)
The letter also suggested that a review of SEATO's role in relation
to the cold war should be undertaken by the Defence Committee, and
that this report should be placed before the next Commonwealth
(172) Emergency Statistics for the Federation of Malaya since 
June 1948, Federation of Malaya, Department of Information, Kuala
Lumpur, 1960.
(173) CO/1050/67, To Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from
Anthony Head, the Secretary of War Office, 15th November 1954.
(174) Ibid., pp.2-3.
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Prime Ministers' meeting. In our view, this letter may be regarded
as the starting point of future AMDA deliberations.
In the political field, British achievements were as
dazzling as in the military one. Even though the pace at which
independence was to be granted haid, been slowed down, as was argued
above (p.48), the Colonial Office nevertheless persisted in its
objective of preparing the country for eventual self-government. (17s)
One difficulty lay in resisting pressure from ultra conservative
and radical Malay factions for radical steps against non-Malays.
Such radical steps were made difficult by the fact that the non-
Malays could not be ignored because of the constant need to
discourage them from sympathising with the guerillas. Nevertheless
the various Malay organisations apart from MNP demanded preferen-
tial treatment by virtue of being the indigenous people. ( 176 ) The
Colonial Secretary had a particularly tough decision to take when
confronted for example, by UMNO's demands for exclusion of the
Chinese from "an equal share of managing affairs when self-government
comes". The idea was totally unacceptable because it would have
committed the British Government to ensuring "indefinite but
probably permanent Malay political superiority", (1w) resulting in
a hardening of Chinese hostility towards constitutional and legal
measures. Oliver Lyttleton saw the major menace as the emergency
itself and declared that, "Military operations to end the EMergency
must take precedence over any advance towards self-government". (178)
(175) F.G. Carnell, "Constitutional Reforms and Elections in
Malaya" Pacific Affairs, Vol.XXVII, No.3, September 1954, pp.216-35.
(176) G.P. Means, op.cit., pp.118-151.
(177) Anthony Short, op.cit., p.323.
(178) Victor Purcell, "Colonialism in (Continued overleaf)
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But this statement aroused a lot of suspicion in Malaya, and the
Colonial Secretary therefore issued another statement that, "While
military operations would be intensified, legislation to advance
self-government would be introduced simultaneously"."78)
Besides the emergency and the future security problems, a
unified Malaya was deemed to be a precondition for the grant of
full freedom. "8°) "The pace of constitutional change will be
determined", an official Report had already argued, "by the
strength of nationalist feeling and the development of political
consciousness within the territory concerned". "81 ) The Colonial
Office so firmly believed in the necessity of a unified Malayan
nation that every conceivable step was taken to ensure its growth.
This policy, Stockwell maintained was faithfully put into practice,
despite the constraints imposed by the federal agreement, the
emergence of communal politics and the security situation . (182)
A similar interpretation of the Colonial policy was given by F.G.
Carnell. "This policy was characterised", according to Carnell,
(178) (From overleaf) Contemporary South East Asia", Journal of
International Affairs, VOl.X, No.1, 1956, p.51.
(179) Ibid. Although Purcell was a major critic of British policy
in Malaya at this stage, however, the above mentioned views are in
line with Lyttleton's own account. See The Memoirs of Lord Chandos,
op.cit., pp.359-383.
(180) J.P. Ongkili, op.cit., pp.271-272.
(181) CAB 129/71: C(54) 307, The Future of Commonwealth Membership:
Report by the Official Committee, 21 January 1954.
(182) R.B. Smith and A.J. Stockwell (eds.), British Policy and
the Transfer of Power in Asia, Documentary Perspectives, School of
Oriental and African Studies, London, 1988, p.89.
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"by gradually widening the avenue of citizenship for non7Malays,
by raising of Malay living standards, by educational reforms ,  by
unfurling of a national flag and also by proposing a Federation
army".(3.03)
By 1955, this strategy had started to pay dividends.
However, although insurgency was no longer a menace, it was an
exceptionally bold decision when the Colonial Office decided to
hold general elections in 1955. The decision was warmly welcomed
by all-the political parties in Malaya. When the elections were
finally held in 1955, an alliance of UMNO, MCA and MIC secured a
majority. After the elections, it was this Alliance that began the
final negotiations on the future constitution and transfer of
power. c184) During the remaining two years, a moderate policy was
practised by Britain.
The sudden increase in the pace of development in Malaya
caught the British officials unprepared for the transitional
period. In Whitehall, no one was expecting the transfer of power
before 1960. 0-85) At this juncture, British colonial policy in
Malaya took a final and decisive turn. It was a turn which not only
marked the closing of an era but also laid down the foundations of
the future relationship. Within this short span of two and allalf
(183) F.G. Carnell, "British Policy in Malaya", Political 
Quarterly, Vol.XXIII, No.3, July-September, 1952, p.276.
(184) Cmd.9797: The Colonial Territories, 1955-56,
London, 1956, p.2.
(185) Smith and Stockwell, op.cit., p.90,
• 55
years, a major change in the relationship took place. From being a
relationship between "a tutor and a student", as Sir Donald
MacGillivray called it, (86/i) 	 relationship moved on to the level
of mutual friendship between equal sovereign states. It is to the
analysis of these final two and a half years of British-Malayan
history that we turn our attention now.
The transfer of power into Malayan hands, presented
British decision makers with an immense problem. This had three
major aspects, relating respectively to defence, commerce and
finance and the constitution. Of these three aspects, the first
was successfully tackled when the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement
was signed on 12th October 1957.	 This is not in the least to
suggest that the other two aspects were less important to the
British side. They were not so, since all three aspects were
entwined and interlocked in such a way that it was impossible to
separate them, on the practical level at least. On that level
Stockwell has argued, British policy towards Malaya was initially
interwoven since this policy was regarded by other [British]
departments "in the broader perspectives of British domestic
needs, imperial strategy and international relations in South East
Asia". ( 188 ) While fully acknowledging the impossibility of separ-
ating the three aspects, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish
these for analytic purposes; and this is Which must now be done.
(I)	 British economic policy and negotiations prior to Merdeka
As soon as the Alliance Government was sworn in, the
(186/7) Sir Donald MacGillivray's speech after Independence
Agreement was signed in Kuala Lumpur on 5th August 1957, The Times,
6th August 1957, p.6, col.e.
(188) Smith and Stockwell, op.cit., p.83.
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British Government embarked upon a reappraisal of its existing
policies in Malaya. The general tenor of this reappraisal is
evident in for example, a letter from the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, Lennox Boyd to Sir Robert Black, the Governor of
Singapore.
	 Boyd mentioned in the letter that, "If Malaya
wants self-government, it must make every effort to pay its own
way".( 169) Running parallel to this line of argument was a second,
as expressed in a draft Cabinet Paper which stressed that in the
forthcoming transfer of power, "every effort should be made to
seek assurances to safeguard the future of United Kingdom economic
interests in Malaya".( 19° ,
 The new policy was the subject of a
Cabinet meeting, at which the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
President of the Board of Trade and the Secretary of Colonial
Affairs were entrusted with the task of reviewing British require-
ments and making necessary recommendations in this regard. (292)
This paper ruled out the necesity of seeking any formal
treaty-like arrangement with the new Federation. 92) Nevertheless,
as a precautionary measure, the members of the Malayan delegation
in the forthcoming constitutional talks were required to
"reiterate their Government's past assurances", on economic issues.
The draft Cabinet Paper suggested that nearer the time of the
transfer of power an understanding should be reached on financial
and commercial interests. In particular, the Paper stressed, an
understanding should be reached about "the Federation's position
(189) C0/1030/71, From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to
Singapore, (Sir Robert Black) 17th August 1955.
(190) C0/1030/72, Draft Cabinet Paper, "Deceryther 1966, PIL
(191) Ibid.
(192) Ibid., p.3.
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in the Sterling Area, past and future borrowings on the U.K.
capital market and the maintenance of certain preferences, which
she at present extends to the United Kingdom".(193)
Foremost amongst the problems which concerned the British
Cabinet was that of Malayan membership of the Sterling Area. This
was vital "because of malayes ability to finance Britain by way of
building up Sterling balances in London". (24) According to a
report published by British Survey . ,'"In 1951 ... Malaya earned
US$400 million (over M$1,000 million), of which she only spent 17%
and paid 83% into the Sterling Pool in London. 'Without Malaya",
the report concluded, "the sterling currency system, as we know
it, could not exist". ( 195 ) These claims could not be dismissed as
simply an exaggeration since the confidential report submitted by
B.R. Pearn of the Foreign Office Research Department also makes
similar claims.
According to Pearn's report of the net balance of payments
surplus of the Sterling Area with the Dollar Area during 1952-53,
35.26% was contributed by Malaya and Singapore.(1-96)
However, the proximity of the grant of independence
compelled the concerned British statesmen to attempt a balancing
act by Which the uninterrupted flow of Malaya-earned dollars into
the sterling area would be preserved, while simultaneously allowing
(193) Ibid., p.3.
(194) Richard Stubbs, op.cit., p.21, A.J. Stockwell, "British
Imperial Strategy", op.cit., pp.82-83.
(195) British Survey, Main Series, No.29, June 1952, p.17.
(196) 11 . T5tocKwen,"/-saperiai stlixte9y otAlciL Zecoiovitict.tioe,
.AT, cit., tx12...
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the Malayans to control and manage their own economy. (197) For a
few months, it seemed as if this balancing act might succeed. If
the British Government was keen to get an assurance that the
existing privileged position would not be abolished after
Merdeka, the Malayan Government was no less anxious to secure a
substantial amount of aid from Britain as a symbol of departing
good will. The Malayans wanted this aid for three purposes.
Firstly, they needed to meet the cost of EMergency; secondly,
there was the cost of developing and expanding the Malayan armed
forces; and thirdly, there was the cost of projected social and
development programmes.(196)
Of these interlocking AngloMalayan interests, that
relating to the cost of the Emergency turned out to be the most
hotly debated issue in January 1956. The Malayan delegates who
were participating in the Constitutional Conference played success-
fully upon the most sensitive fears of British investors and the
British Government alike. "Since British interests produce some
60% of the rubber in Malaya and 60% of the tin", C61. H.S. Lee
observed in a memorandum to the Coltinial Secretary", it is clear
that in order to protect these interests, the United Kingdom
Government cannot afford to see Malaya being overrun by
communists". ( 1- 99 ) While reminding the Colonial Secretary of
(197)FO/ 371/123212, From Commissioner General for the U.K. in
S.E.A. to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 18, 1956.
(198)CO/1030/72, A letter from the Treasury, Federation of
Malaya, Kuala Lumpur to the Colonial Office, 29th December 1955.
(199)CO/1030/72, Memorandum by Col. H.S. Lee, a member of the
Malayan delegation to Secretary of State for Colonies on 31
January 1956.
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British obligations not only towards Malaya but also towards the
Western community, Col. Lee maintained that "the present emergency
is part and parcel of international communism. It is therefore,
quite unfair for the Federation Government alone to pay ... u(200)
The Malayan delegate clothed his argument in psychological and
humanitarian terms. For example, he referred to "the ordinary man
in the street or in the Kampong" (Para III); observed that "On
returning to Malaya, the Malayan delegation cannot afford to say
to the people" (Para VII); and insisted that "It will be a great
encouragement not only to the Federation Government but also to
the whole population ..." (last para); and so on. (201) This
rhetoric was highly effective in making it difficult for British
officials to turn down his requests for aid to Malaya. It is
hardly surprising to find that, in the wake of this eloquent
memorandum Col. H. S. Lee's proposals were most sympathetically
considered by the Finance Committee of the Conference. (202) In the
event, the Constitutional Conference Report contained generous
promises from the British Government for various purposes. The
Report, while recognizing the " vitally important position of the
Federation in the worldx4olestruggle against communism", confirmed
that the British Government would "render every possible help to
Malaya!
headings:-
(200) Ibid.
(201) Ibid.
(202) CO/1030/72, Finance Committee's Report to the Constitutional
Conference.
(203) Cmd.9714: Report by the Federation of Malaya Constitutional 
Conference, H.M.S.O., London, February 1956, p.10.
(203) Economic assistance was to be given under four
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I. "If the Emergency has not been brought to a successful end" by
the time of independecne, then Britain would consider "whether the
financial needs of the Federation would justify special assistance
towards meeting the cost of the Emergency":
II. The British Government "will maintain their undertaking to
finance certain capital costs of expansion of the Federation Armed
Forces in an agreed programme":
III. "Her Majesty's Government will at all times be ready to
examine sympathetically with the Federation its borrowing needs on
the London market in connection with its development plans":
IV. "Her Majesty's Government will stand by their undertaking to
provide assistance, subject to the approval of Parliament, in the
form of a loan to the Federation to enable it to finance its
contribution to the Tin Buffer stock, should it be unable to
obtain the necessary loan finance from any other suitable
source". (204)
This British generosity was in response to Malayan
acceptance that membership of the Sterling Area was to the "common
advantage" and that it was therefore their intention "to remain in
it after attaining full self-government and independence within
the Commonwealth". (205)
Until now, economic negotiations had proceeded smoothly.
Unfortunately, however, the mutual understanding on economic
affairs did not last too long as it soon became a pawn in the
bargaining over defence. According to confidential government
records, the initiative in linking economic with defence
negotiations was taken by Sir Robert Scott, the Commissioner
(204) Ibid., pp.10-11.
(205) Ibid., p.9.
General for the U.K. in South East Asia. In the course of devising
plans for future security in the area, he strongly ruled out any
possibility of signing an economic agreement prior to one related
to defence. (206) "If her Majesty's Government are committed on aid
before the Malayans are committed on defence", Sir Robert warned
the Secretary of State for the ColtInies, "then our bargaining )C
position will obviously be much weaker". ( 207) In his opinion, it
was highly desirable that the Working Party on defence agreements
should reach at an understanding with their Malayan counterparts
before the beginning of financial talks in London. (208) His advice
to the Colonial Office was that the British Government should
strictly consider the Malayan request for aid only to the extent
that concessions were made by the Malayans on the defence agree-
ments.(209)
Mindful of these instructions, the British delegation
on 21 tivri1 , 1 95% P71 Kuala Lurnpuv.
opened the talks on defencek However, to their discomiture, they
soon found out that the Malayans were pretty much a match for them
in diplomatic bargaining. Certainly they could not easily be talked
into giving ground on defence matters. On the occasion of the first
meeting, the redoubtable Col. H. S. Lee raised the question of
British assistance to Malaya. (2.0) In this regard, Lee's proposal
(206)akh 7/494, File No. 487/013/03. Inward Telegram from
Commissioner General in South East Asia to the Secretary of State
for Colonies, 24th February 1956.
(207) Ibid.
(208) Ibid.
(209) Ibid.
(210) an, 7/495, M.D.T.W.P. (56), Inward Telegram from the
Commissioner General's Office in Singapore (Continued overleaf)
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was that "there should be an annex defining the ways in which the
United Kingdom would help the Federation to train and develop her
forces, and also covering the financial arrangements". ( 211 ) To
this proposal, Sir Harold Parker replied that the "question of
finance should not be covered in the treaty but should be dealt
with in the financial discussion to take place in London later in
the year". (212)
In the course of further negotiations, Sir Harold Parker
reported that "the Malayan attitude on defence started hardening
since they became more aware of the political implications of a
defence agreement". (23) In Sir Harold's view, the "TUnku did not
want to settle the defence agreement until he knew the outcome of
Lee's visit".(2") Sir Harold was not alone in holding this opinion
and his view was supported by Sir Robert Scott, who wondered
whether the Malayans sawoan advantage in postponing final agreements
on theElefenceltexts until the financial talks took place in
London". (21)
These apprehensions did not turn out to be a mere flight
(210) (From overleaf) to the Ministry of Defence, Minute of the
First Meeting - dated 21 April 1956, p.4.
(211) Ibid.
(212) Ibid.
(213) akh 7/4,95, H.P.132, From Headquarters Malaya Command to
Ministry of Defence, London, aclusive for Powell from Parker, 23
May 1956.
(214) Ibid.
(215) Dtlt, 7/495, Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for
the Colonies from Commissioner General for U.K. in S.E.Asia, 24th
May 1956.
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of imagination on the part of the British Working Party. In July,
the Federation revealed its plan to seek a development loan of
2,000 million Malayan dollars from Britain during the forthcoming
talks in October. (26) The Federation's ministers had very skill-
.,
fully interwoven their own development needs with overall British
interests and with Commonwealth strategic planning in South East
Asia. (217) In addition, the Chief Minister and the Finance
Minister of the Federation were to visit London together. More
significantly, however, "the final details of a treaty of mutual
defence and assistance were meant to be discussed during the same
visit, "according to a report in The Times, and "some aspects of
the loan would be involved", in these negotiations. (218)
However, The Times reported five months later that "This
enormous sum of 2,000 million Malayan dollars has of course been
pruned down to 1,000 million by the Malayan government after some
deliberations".( 219) The shrewd Chief Minister of Malaya very
tactfully declined to confirm even this figure beforehand, saying
that "disclosure of the amount might be embarrassing to both sides
in the event of any disagreement". (220) This tactical evasion did
not mean that Malayan insistence on receiving a generous settlement
had diminished. On the contrary, Tunku Abdul Rahman made it clear
that "he has expected Britain to pay half the annually incurred
costs on combating the Emergency". (221) While asking Britain "to
(216) "Malaya Seeks Loan", The Times, July 18, 1956, p.15.
(217) Ibid.
(218) Ibid.
(219) The Times, December 10,1956, p.9 col.b.
(220) Ibid.
(221) Ibid. This amount was estimated at $135m. for 1957.
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regard Communist terrorism as part of the world menace", Tunku
insisted that the "Federation should not be expected to shoulder
the full burden". (222)
The earlier mentioned policy of keeping the military and
economic aspects linked together, was not abandoned even at this
stage. While making his demands clear on financial aid, Tunku
Abdul Rahman spoke simultaneously of his intention of requesting
Britain "to keep the present fifteen battalions of British and
Commonwealth troops in the country, which will operate within a
defined area only".( 223) It was in keeping with this policy that
the negotiations on defence and economic aid were concluded on the
same day, i.e. 11 January 1957. (224)
On the financial side, the British Government agreed to
seek Parliamentary authority to provide assistance to Malaya to
meet the cost of the EMergency. For the first three years an
annual grant of £3 million was to be provided. For the remaining
two years a joint Anglo-Malayan review would decide the amount.
Which was not to exceed £11 million. (22 According to this
report, further parliamentary authority was sought
(a) "to contribute the unspent balance of the grant already
promised towards the capital cost of expansion of the Federal Army
(this balance stood at £6,500.00 on January 1, 1956),
(b) to make available equipment in kind to an estimated value of
£5,500,000 and
(222) Ibid.
(223) Ibid.
(224) "British Aid for Malaya: EXternal Defence Agreement". The
Times, 11 January 1957, p.8. Col.g.
(225) Ibid.
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(c) to provide a grant up to £1,300,00 to finance local purchase •
of equipment and certain building works for the Federation Navy.
The Federation had also proposed that certain H.M. install-
ations should be transferred to it. (To be fully discussed later)*
The British Government agreeato give assistance at this stage.
(d) In addition, the unspent balance at the date of independence
of the Federation's Colonial Development and Welfare allocations,
should be given to the Federation. The balance stood at some
L4,400,000, on January 1 1956 . (226)
Thus Malaya achieved only a part of its desired aid from
Britain. Its leaders therefore announced that they would seek
American assistance towards the cost of the Emergency. However,
the growing polarization of international politics in South East
Asia deterred them from pursuing the issue much further. Within a
few months, however, the British Government relented and showed
willingness to share the Malayan burden in the cost of development.
In June 1957, a further loan of 10 million Malayan dollars was
released by the Colonial Development Corporation to the Land
Development Authority in Malaya. The loan was givenn on fairly
easy tems and repayment was to be spread over many years. (227)
While discussing the Independence of Malaya Bill in the house on
12 July, the Secretary of State announced an increase from £7
According to a later report in The Times on January 24, 1957,
some of these surplus installations of the British Forces were to
be transferred to the Federation without any payment.
(226) Ibid.
(227) The Times, June 18, p.18 col.b, "C.D.C.. Loan for Malaya!'
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million to £14 million for the Malayan armed forces exclusively. (228)
In the end, these Anglo-Malayan wrapglings on econmic aid
to Malaya before the grant of freedom came to a satisfactory close
for both the parties. While the British could not ask for more
concessions without making their acknowledgement of Malayan
independence dubious, the Malayans in their turn also acknowledged
the economic difficulties confronting post Suez Britain. Tunku
Abdul Rahman himself was quoted as saying that he had not come at
Sin e-t 73-ritc4, hevsef, wcts 15-rAK e. PH; thi.c
an opportune time, must turn aside for a little in order to review
the constitutional problems involved in the transfer of power.
Negotiation on the future Constitution
The entire process of hammering out an acceptable
constitution spread over nearly two years. In brief, the major
events are listed below:
1. The Secretary of State for the Colonies visited Malaya in
December 1955, agreeing to hold talks in London in January 1956.
2. The Constitutional Conference took place from 18th Januarre*
6th February 1956.
3. The Constitutional Conference Report was issued on 18th
February 1956.
4. The Constitutional Commission started its work in June 1956
and submitted its report in February 1957.
5. The Working Party, met from February 1957 to April 1957.
6etoeen 13th -
6. The final Constitutional Conference was held . ,4. 241StMay 1957.
The concrete outcome of the initiative taken by the
(2280 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.573, 12 July
1957, co1.646.
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Colonial Office in 1955-56 was a Report by the Constitutional
Car-We/lee submitted 4--to the Queen and the Malay Rulers on 18th
February 1956.( 23°) For our purpose, the Report is a more
important document than either the Independence of Malaya Bill or
even the proposed Constitution of the Federation of Malaya. The
Report examined in detail the peculiarities of the altered
situation and the subsequent changes in the Anglo-Malayan relation-
ship. (231 ) The Report undoubtedly provided the basis for a major
redirection of British foreign policy after the grant of
independence to Malaya.
The Report contained three major sections. These were
related to,
(I) defence and internal security during both in the interim
period and in the period	 after independence within the
Commonwealth; (II) public service and (III) constitutional changes.
On the question of devising future arrangements, the Report
affirmed that, "Our object has been to reconcile the factors of
continuity and efficiency on the one hand, with recognition of the
evolving political facts of the situation on the other". (232) This
principle was just as firmly applied to defence problems as to
everything else. Since external defence was too big a task to be
left to the Malayan Government, it was deemed to be essential that
"Her Majesty's government should retain, during the interim period,
(230) Cmd.9714: Report by the Federation of Malaya Constitutional 
Conference, H.M.S.O. London, 1956.
(231) Hong Kim Hoong, op.cit., p.199; and J.P. Ongkili, op.cit.,
p.270.
(232) Cmd.9714: 10 R 	 R.4.
^
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full responsibility for external defence". (233)
In order to fulfil, their defence obligations during the
interim period, it was ordained that Her Majesty's Government will,
"retain in the Federation the forces which they consider necessary
... To this end, they will require in the Federation the facilities
needed for the maintenance of these forces, which include the
Commonwealth Strategic Reserve". (2)
In view of the complications in the interim period, an
aternal Defence Committee was set up. The Chairman of this
Committee was the British High-Commissioner to the Federation, and
its members were a Malayan Minister for Internal Defence and
Security, the Chief Secretary, the General Officer commanding
British forces, and one senior civil servant( responsible to the
High Commissioner on matters of external defence. This extra-
ordinary structure devised for internal and external defence
vividly illustrates the political complexities involved.
During the interim period, a joint defence arrangement was
required since Malaya was not actually independent and defence
therefore still remained primarily a British responsibility. More-
over, the arrangement was supposed to continue more or less
unchanged even after Malayan independence, since the transfer of
power was not a magic wand which would make prevailing problems
vanish. In the end, it was this interim defence arrangement which
became the foundation of the future AngloMalayan Defence Agree-
ment. The Report also recommended that the two parties should
negotiate a defence agreement for the post-independence period.
The Commonwealth Constitutional Commission was instructed
(233) Ibid., p.5.
(234) Ibid.
69
to draft a federal constitution for a multi-racial Malaya. (23)
The Commission, chaired by Lord Reid, arrived in Malaya in June
and invited memoranda from all organisations and individuals who
desired to submit their views on the future constitution. In total
one hundred and thirty one memoranda were received. 6) However,
the most crucial was the one submitted by the Alliance since it
represented a consensus among the three races in Malaya on the
citizenship issue. ( 237) When the Commission's recommendations were
citizemship and SPIcIal r1alaY719hic
made public, religioniemerged as the only controversial points.(238)
At this stage the Colonial Office decided in favour of
accepting the Malayan views even if they clashed with British
practices and beliefs. The only reservation expressed about the
Malayan position was that it must not impinge upon the particular
points in which the British Government had a direct interest.(239)
Otherwise the Colonial Policy Committee was of the opinion that
"it is in our interest that the new Constitution should rest on
the lines desired in Malaya and (moreover) we have at this stage
little power to impose our own ideas". (240)
These proposals were subjected to a close scrutiny by the
Working Party. The Working Party's deliberations in its twenty
(235) Tun Mohamed Suffian, H .P. Lee and F.A. Trindale (eds.),
The Constitution of Malaysia, Its Development: 1957-1977, O.U.P.,
Kuala Lumpur, 1978, p.5.
(236) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.85.
(237) Ibid., pp.85-86 and J.P. Ongkili, op.cit., p.274.
(238) Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.XXII, No.11, March 14 1957.
(239) CAB 134/1555, Colonial Policy Committee: Report of the
Constitutional Commission for Malaya.
(240) Ibid.
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three meetings between 22nd January and 27th April 1957, finally
paved the way for the final Constitutional Conference in London.
It was at this Conference that all these outstanding differences
were hammered out between 13th - 21st May 1957.( 2`") Commentiny on
the outcome of the Conference, the Far Pastern Economic Review
noted that the changes were believed to buttress Malay safeguards
more than the majority of the Reid Commission had thought
necessary. (242)
The recommendations of the final Constitutional Conference
were placed in the House of Commons in the form of the Federation
of Malaya Independence Bill, No.107, in July. The Bill, which
sought the termination of Her Majesty's sovereignty in Malaya, (243)
passed through all its stages by 29th July. In the course of a
lengthy but uncontroversial debate on the Bill, Members of Parlia-
ment conveyed a sense of relief and pride at the smooth transfer
amid an exceptionally cordial atmosphere. ( 244 ) Their only concern
was about the citizenship laws and the defence requirements of the
newly-born country. The consensus on the first issue, however, was
that intervention might do more harm than good. On the second
issue, the Government announced a further increase of £7 million
(241)Cnind.210. Colonial Office, Constitutional Proposals for the
Federation of Malaya, H.M.S.O. London, July 1957, p.4-23.
(242) "Malaya's New Constitution", Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol.XXIII, No.3, July 18, 1957, p.65.
(243) Bill 107, Federation of Malaya Independence Bill, H.M.S.O.
London, 3rd July, 1957.
(244) Parliamentary Debates, House of Col-nmolis,  Vol. 673, oP tit,
CoI. 633,— 7/5.
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towards the development of the Malayan armed forces. (245) The
independence agreement was signed on 5th August in Kuala Lumpur
and on 31st August the -1o31.9 3 era of British colonial rule in
Malaya came to an end.
The last phase had had an auspicious beginning in 1948
when it was officially declared that the central purpose of
British colonial policy, "is to guide the colonial territories to
responsible self-goverment within the Commonwealth in conditions
that ensure to the people concerned both a fair standard of living
and freedom from oppression from any quarter". (246) In accordance
with this policy, the Colonial Office consistently resisted Malay
pressure to disenfranchise the alien races. (247) Finally, the long
British struggle against the insurgents resulted in a gradual
petering out of guerrilla activity in 1960. In the end, the
adoption by the Federation of Malaya of a liberal democratic
constitution marked a major victory for British policy, indicating
Britain's belief in -freedom from oppression from any quarter'.
(245) Ibid., col.,646.
(246) Cmd.7433: the Colonial pire (1947-1948), H.M.S.O. London,
June 1948, p.l.
(247) The Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton, rejected
U.M.N.O.'s demand on the grounds that the British aimed at a
"united nation ... in which there must be equality for all loyal
and patriotic citizens". Anthony H. Short, op.cit., p.331.
CI-RFIER III 
British Foreign Policy towards the Federation of Malaya, 1957-1963.
British foreign policy towards Malaya during 1957-1963
reflects the dilemma created by the combination of a relatively
weak economy on the one hand, and residual imperial responsib-
ilities, on the other. Until 1956, as we have seen, an illusion of
power, misplaced optimism, and a measure of good fortune had
concealed the danger of this situation, with the result that the
dilemma never emerged very clearly. During the second half of
nineteen fifty-six, however, the Suez crisis had made it
impossible to evade reality any longer.* The theme of this chapter
is how a decade of illusion, i.e., 1946-1956, now gave way to a
period of adjustment, in which attempts to accept reality were,
however, constantly qualified by nostalgia for the imperial past.
This troubled period is characterized by the two apparently
incompatible objectives of decolonisation and the retention of
great power status.
* The arguments in this chapter were largely formulated during
my interviews with Lord Inchyra, Permanent Under Secretary of
State, Foreign Office, 1956-60; Sir Patrick Dean, Permanent
Representative of the U.K. at the United Nations, 1960-64, and
Ambassador to Washington, 1965-69; Sir Arthur De la Mare, U.K.'s
High Commissioner in Singapore, 1968-70, Assistant Under Secretary
of State, Foreign Office, 1965-67; Sir Neil Pritchard, Deputy Under
Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations Office, 1963-67; Sir
Michael C.M. Walker, U.K.'s High Commissioner to Malaya, 1966-71;
and Roland Hunt, Deputy High Commissioner for the U.K. in the
Federation of Malaya, 1957-59.
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By the beginning of nineteen fifty-seven, negotiations on
the future of Malaya were already at an advanced stage, and little
could be done to alter their course. Nevertheless, the outcome of
the Suez crIsis had deep and far-reaching implications for the
course of British foreign policy towards the newly independent
Federation of Malaya. These implications can best be considered in
connection with two important events, viz., the AngloifMalayan
Defence Agreement (AMDA) which was signed on 12th October 1957,
and the creation of an enlarged federation of Malaysia in 1963.
British Foreign Policy towards the Federation of Malaya and the 
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement, 1957.
In complete contrast to its earlier experiences in other
former colonies, the British administration in Malaya was not
given an ultimatum to withdraw completely after the grant of
independence. ( 248 ) Instead, Britain was enthusiastically urged
to join with its former colony as an equal partner in a defence
alliance. (24 For reasons which will be considered later, the
British government responded eagerly to this request. The result
was that on 12th October 1957, the two governments signed the
Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement and entered upon a new era of
mutual friendship and co-operation which was to last almost a
(248) Richard Allen, "Britain's Colonial Aftermath in South East
Asia", Asian Survey, Vol.III, No.9, September 1963, pp.409-414.
(249) Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., pp. 2-3.
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decade. (250) What, it must be asked, were the factors operating in
Britain and the Malayan peninsula which made possible this unique
relationship between an ex-imperial power and its former colony?
(A) The AngloMalayan Defence Agreement: Background Factors
The most important of these factors is the pre-independence
colonial experience itself. During the one and half centuries of
the British imperial presence in Malaya, certain patterns of mutual
faith and respect had been firmly established. (2) It has already
been argued in the previous chapter that the first half of British
rule (i.e. 1786-1867) was based on nonintervention in the
political affairs of the country. By contrast, in the second half,
(i.e. 1867-1942) a policy of intervention and indirect rule had
prevailed. In other words, British aspiration in Malaya, unlike
India, was trade not territory. However, during the initial
phases,the local Malay population remained largely untouched by
virtue of their negligible involvement in commercial activities.
Moreover, the traditional pattern of authority was not
disrupted. (252) In the second part, although the British inter-
vention had seriously undermined the traditional pattern. British
paternalism, and their cautious approach in dealings with the
Sultans, marked Britain as a protector against immigrant Chinese
chauvinism rather than as an intruder. (253)
(250) 3.M. Gul lick, Malaysia, Ernest Benn Ltd., London. 1971..
p.203.
(251) Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.2-3.
(252) Robert 0. Tilman, op.cit., pp.122-123.
(253) Robert Heussler, Completing a Stewardship, op.cit.,
pp.107-221.
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Another factor which had one of the most far-reaching
consequences for the post-independence relationship was the
distinctive character of nationalism in Malaya. (2) Malayan
nationalist fervour never reached the same level of anti-British
feeling as had been generated in India, Egypt or even in
.•n••
Africa. (2) Two distinct causes can be held responsible for this
extraordinary state of affairs in Malaya. Firstly, the nature of
colonial rule was different in Malaya from the other colonies.
"Trade not territory", was the British motto. Secondly, the
fragmentation of Malayan society into different races, viz.,
Chinese, Malay and Indian, had initially thwarted any early
development of national identity. ( 256 ) When nationalist feeling of
any sort did finally emerge, it was expressed alongside communal
loyalties. ( 257 ) The overall result was the absence of extreme
hatred towards colonial rule. (258)
After the Second World War, the British occupation was
characterised by feelings of guilt and moral responsibility
characteristic of a liberal conscience. Since 1945, Britain had
commited itself in principle to a policy of decolonisation and
eventual freedom of Malaya within the Commonwealth. The unwavering
pursuit of this policy, combined with deep insight into the
Malayan psyche ultimately created an amicable and congenial pro-
British atmosphere in independent Malaya.
(254) Rodin Soenarno, "Malay Nationalism, 1900-1945", journal of
South Past Asian History, Vol.1, No.1, March 1960, pp.1-33.
(255) Ibid., p.19.
(256) Ibid., p.29; and Robert 0. Tilman, op.cit., p.128.
(257) Wang Gungwu, op.cit., pp.137-8.
(258) William R. Roff, op.cit., pp.248-256.
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Such was the extent of Malayan faith in British
paternalism that while negotiating the defence agreement, Tuhku
Abdul Rahman told Sir Harold Parker that "he was relying entirely
on the U.K. delegation to educate the Malayan team on these
(defence] problems". (258.8)
If there was one single factor which had influenced the
course of British foreign policy towards Malaya more than any
other, it could only be the communist insurgency. (2) Although
the financial costs of counter-insurgency operations were biting
at times, it proved to be a boon in disguise. The consequences of
the insurgency for pre-independence Anglo-Malayan relations can be
summarised as follows. Firstly, it denied any possibility of a
premature transfer of power; secondly, it made the Malayans more
appreciative of the British presence; (260) thirdly, it gave
Britain sufficient time to prepare future security arrangements;
and finally, it unmistakably identified the national enemy as the
communist threat to law and order, not British rule. Above all,
the insurgency not only watered down inter-communal rivalry, but
also made the Malayans at large and the British more tolerant of
each other, thereby helping to assure the British administration
of stability in the future.*
* The argument in this paragraph was largely formulated during
my informative discussion with Mr. Roland Hunt.
(258a) DFFE 7/494, 487/013, From Singapore to Ministry of
Defence, London, For Parker from Scott, 21 March, 1956.
(259) Robert O
	 op.cit., pp. 127-128.
(260) Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.26.
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In the post-independence period, the insurgency played an
almost equally important role. On the one hand, it made the
Malayan leadership deeply aware of their own precarious situation
both internally and externally; (261) on the other hand, it gave
Britain a genuine cause to retain a sufficient number of armed
forces in Malaya.* It also induced Malayan leaders to accept
British requirements about the retention of naval bases, an air
force and a communication network "for fulfilment of Commonwealth
and international obligations" under the Anglo- Malayan Defence
Agreement. (262)
The flourishing Malayan economy in 1957, was the offspring
of a century and a half of British presence and especially of the
British faith in a "laissez-faire" philosophy. In the course of
the independence negotiations, the extent of British economic
predominance was acknowledged by both parties. An article in the
Round Table, for example, openly accepted that, "most of the
foreign capital in the Federation (in 1957] is British". The
article continued that, "most of the larger rubber estates, the
oil-palm estates, and tin-mines using dredges, and some large
* Sir Frank Cooper clarified the British position on this point
during his discussion with the researcher.
(261) DEFE 7/496, "The Use of U.K./Commonwealth Troops in Aid of
the Emergency after Independence", Note of a meeting held in the
Ministry of Defence on 3rd August 1956.
(262) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., pp.263-4.
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scale industrial establishments, are British".( 263) As Col. H.S.
Lee observed, this meant that in any future relationship, these
financial links would be the most decisive bond. (2) The two
economies were so intertwined that any abrupt disruption would not
only have crippled the Malayan economy but would have harmed the
British side as well. (265) The Malayan leadership was quick to
grasp this fact. It avoided any radical pressure and decided in
favour of permitting a continued British economic presence. (266)
In brief, it can be maintained that these factors, viz.,
one and a half centuries of colonial rule, the distinctive nature
of Malayan nationalism, the high level of British investment in
the Malayan economy, and the communist insurgency, continued to be
the dominant influences shaping future British foreign policy
towards Malaya. However, the influence of a few pressing domestic
problems like the sterling crisis, and of international problems
like the nationalist challenges from the new states in Asia and
Africa, cannot be denied.
The first and foremost source of post-war British anxiety
had been the painful recognition of the decline of sterling. (267)
(263) "Merdeka, Malaya Becomes the Tenth Dominion", Round Table,
Vol.XLVII, 1956-57, p.354.
(264) CO/1030/72, M.C.C. (56) No.1, A Memorandum by Colonel H.S.
Lee, handed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,on 31.1.56.
(265) John F. Cady, The History of Post-War Southeast Asia, Ohio
University Press, Ohio, 1974, p.138.
(266) Data Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., pp.120-122; and Denis Warner,
Reporting South Fast Asia, Melbourne, 1966, p.113.
(267) Patrick Gordon Walker, The Commonwealth, Secker and
Warburg, London, 1962, pp.259-263.
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A refuge from this anxiety was sought behind the protective shield
of the Sterling Area, (268) whose viability and strength had been
identified by successive British statesmen with British status as
a great power. (269) Within the Sterling Area, Malaya had always
occupied a prime position. For example, in 1952-53. Malaya and
Singapore together contributed 61 million pounds to the net
balance of payment surplus with the Dollar Area, a figure which
was 35.2696 of the whole Sterling Area surplus. (270) Therefore, as
late as 1955, the British government acknowledged that their
"financial stake in the Federation was one of the buttresses of
the Sterling Area". (27)
However, it was not economic considerations alone which
brought these two nations together. The part played by strategic
factors also stands second to none. The Malayan leadership in
particular was deeply aware of the constant internal, as well as
external, threats to the nation's security entailed by its
geographical location. C272) While defending AMDA in the
Legislative Assembly, Tunku Abdul Rahman even preferred to be
branded as "a victim of cunning British diplomacy", rather than
sacrifice the survival of his country. (273) At the same time,
(268) P.W. Bell, The Sterling Area in the Post War World,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956, pp.25 and 29.
(269) Sir Oliver Franks.;B-ilta-iyi cold. 
-the-I:tete of 1001, 1 cL FVffetirS:,
1313C Reith Lectures, 195-‘1, o.u. p. LoN_boN, 1956, p. 2.2.
(270) A.J. Stockwell, "British Imperial Strategy", op.cit., p.81.
(271) Ibid., p.87.
(272) CO/1022/88. 31.2.02, J.J. Paskin's Letter to Malcolm
MacDonald, dated 3 November 1953.
(273) Federation of Malaya. Legislative Council Debates, 14 March
1956, Col. 930.
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during the mid-fifties the defence of Australia, New Zealand and
South East Asia was still considered to be primarily a British
responsibility. (2) But in the meantime, the original hole in
imperial defence created by the independence of India had already
been enlarged by the Suez crisis. (27) The Federation of Malaya,
n-•
with its central strategic location, its economic and political
stability, and its staunch anti-communist ideology, consequently
came to be regarded as of crucial significance for British
strategic, planning. (276) The defence of Malaya was regarded in
Britain as part and parcel of the worldwide fight against
communism. (2) For example, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies himself explained that "within the framework of ANZAM
and the Manila Treaty, (wel must build up a really powerful
defensive system with Malaya as its centre and focus".( 	 In
other words, British stakes in Malaya were too high to ignore
the security of the country. This was further confirmed by a rote
from Sir Robert Scott's office, which attributed the importance
of Malaya to three main considerations. <279) According to this
note. Malaya was (a) source of essential raw materials and a very
substantial dollar earner; (b) a country in whith many million
pounds of British capital were invested, and (c) a symbol of
(274) Patrick Gordon Walker, op.cit., p.314.
(275) FO/ 371/129360, A letter from the Ministry of Defence to
G.H.Q. Far East Land Forces, dated 22 February 1957.
(276) David C. Hawkins, op.cit., pp.14717.
(277) A.J. Stockwell, "British Imperial Strategy". op.cit..
(278) Ibid.
(279) FO 371/129342, "The Outlook in Malaya up to 1960". A, note
by the Commissioner General's Office, p.1.
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British influence in the area. (280)
The cumulative effect of all the foregoing factors was that
Britain retained a deep interest and commitment to the security of
the Federation of Malaya even after granting it independence.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that Britain took the otherwise
inexplicable step of concluding the Anglo4lalayan Defence
Agreement (AMDA) with the Federation on 12 October 1957. The
treaty was a concrete yet unparalleled step in the direction of
post-imperial British involvement in the Federation in particular
and in South East Asia in general.
(B) The AngloMalayan Defence Agreement: A Convergence of Mutual 
Interests.
The first and foremost question confronting Britain while
granting independence to Malaya, was how to ensure the future sec-
urity of its former colony. It had been argued earlier in the
House of Commons that "independence without security is a
sham". (281) At the same time, it was a well-known fact that Malayan
"federal forces would be insufficient on their own for the
protection of the country, once independence had been
achieved". (282) Apart from the security of Malaya, there were
other equally compelling factors behind the British desire to
(280) Ibid., p.1.
(281) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.453, 8 July
1948, Co1.615.
(282) J. De V. Allen, A.J. Stockwell and L.R. Wright (eds.), A
Collection of Treaties and Other Documents Affecting the Status of
Malaysia. 1761-1963, Vol.II, Oceana Publications, London, 1981,
p.258.
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conclude a defence agreement. To a large extent, it was true that
"the British, while recognizing the inevitability of
decolonisation", as Chin Kin Wah observed, "were nevertheless
concerned that their stabilising influence in the Malayan area might
-
be undermined by any hasty withdrawal from Malayan bases". (283)
In other words, apart from the future security of Malaya
and the remaining Borneo territories, two other equally powerful
major concerns were operating behind the scenes. The first of
these concerns was the long-avowed policy of gradual
decolonisation.* The Labour government had pledged in 1945 to
develop the colonies "towards self-government within the
Commonwealth", and subsequent Conservative governments had
followed that course with only minor deviations. (2) However, the
progress of decolonisation did not become an urgent matter until
Macmillan's cabinet was forced to reconsider the entire issue
after the Suez debacle in 1957.( 285 ) The Suez crisis had shown
once and for all the precarious and outdated nature of the
* The researcher is grateful to Mr. Roland Hunt for a detailed
discussion of this point.
(283) Chin Kin Wan, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.24.
(284) Dan Horowitz, Attitudes of British Conservatives towards
Decolonization in Africa during the Period of the Macmillan
Government. 1957-1963, An unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to
Oxford University, 1967, pp.32-37.
(285) Ibid., pp.52-57.
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existing global colonial structure. (286) It therefore had an
indirect relevance to Anglo—Malayan relations in so far as it
hastened the process of decolonisation. Nevertheless, the direct
impact of the Suez crisis on AMDA negotiations was only marginal.
It was marginal partly, because an informal structure for a
defence alliance had already been worked out before the final
impact of the Suez crisis had been felt, and partly because the
government had not yet given any concrete shape to its policy of
rapid decolonisation in 1957.(287)
Still, this policy of decolonisation in combination with
the security considerations made Malaya indispensable for every
aspect of British policy. In particular, the need to retain
Malayan bases was acknowledged as early as December 1952.(2B8)
Three years later, the Defence Coordination Committee in the Far
East had again insisted that an essential prerequisite of any
measure of independence for Singapore and Malaya, was "a defenoe
agreement which adequately protected the interests of the ULIC.„
Commonwealth and South East Asia". (289)
A continuing armed presence in South East Asia had farther
advantages for Britain. One of these advantages was that it helped
Britain to discharge its residual responsibilities in the are
further advantage was that it fitted in with the grand vision of a
(286) C.E. Carrington, op.cit., p.79.
(287) Chin Kin Wall, The Five Power Defence, op.cit., p.10.
(288) CO 968/328/101/011, A letter from T.C. Jerome to Calmedal
Office, dated 31 December 1952.
(289) DEFE 7/494, DCC(FE], (55) 32. 20th October 1955. British
Defence Coordination Committee, Far East, a meeting- held mn 1.7th
August 1955, p.1.
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Commonwealth of Nations, in which the British for obvious reasons
had a firm faith in 1957.( 290) These reasons, partly sound and
partly mistaken, were elaborated by Sir Oliver Franksin his BBC
Reith Lectures, 1954. Sir Oliver passionately believed that, "the
-
basic condition for the continuing greatness of Britain is a
vigorous Commonwealth". (291) --E,Aplaining this idea further, he
accorded supreme importance to economic factors and declared that,
"we become a whole, we are a living reality, only in relation to
the markets we supply. Here in the Sterling Area is a great market
already largely ours". "92) Moreover, due to their Commonwealth
connections, the British were able to assert that they "are still
in many respects, the centre of a world-wide Commonwealth and the
mother country and trustee of a large colonial empire". (293)
In brief, the idea of the Commonwealth provided a perfect
context for retaining the British illusion of global power, that
in terms of capability and commitments. (2) Assisted by this
(290) According to DEth 7/949, the regional and Commonwealth
dimensions of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement were outlined by
the Joint Planning Staff Committee, Ministry of Defence on 22
February 1956. The plans regarding Malaya, the Committee
recommended, should cover (a) the Pan-Malayan section of the
Federal and Singapore Forces, (1) the building up of Federal
Forces, and (c) the relationship of ANZAM and SEATO.
(291) Sir Oliver S. Frank5t op.cit., p.52.
(292) Ibid., p.53.
(293) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.535,
1 December 1954, Col. 222.
(294) akh 4/100, COS (57) Chiefs of Staff Committee, '75th meeting,
10 October 1957, Annex JP (57) 118, (Final). (continued overleaf)
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"monumental error", Kenneth Robinson concluded, that British
foreign policy was now significantly vitiated by a "delayed
reaction to the loss of imperial power". C295) Malayan acceptance
of independence within the Commonwealth helped Britain to sustain
the illusion of global power. In return for membership of the
Commonwealth, British acknowledged a duty to provide security for
the new Federation; to do otherwise, in any case, would of course
have been fatal to British prestige. (296) Similar considerations
appeared when Australia and New Zealand sought a British presence
in the region. C297)
The emerging convergence of British and Malayan interests
is symbolised by AMDA, albeit altogether different reasons
weighed with the two sides. On the British side, the desire to
contain communist influence was the major concern. The Malayans in
turn were concerned not to be left alone after independence. As
an editorial article in the Far Eastern Economic Review pointed
out, "without any protection, [Malaya] could become an easy prey
for greedy eyes watching this wealthy peninsula in South Ft
(294) (Continued) This annex, which was entitled, "The FUture
of ANZAM" gives an account of the British view of their global
responsibilities.
(295) Kenneth Robinson, op.cit., pp.11-12.
(296)akh 4/100, COS (57) Chiefs of Staff Committee, 75t7i
meeting, 10th October 1957, "Strategic Facilities in the Colonies
Likely to Achieve Independence", p.2.
(297) T.B. Millar, "Great Britain's Long Recessional: An
Australian Viewpoint", International Journal, Vol.XXIII, No.4,
Autumn 1968, p.554.
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Asia". (298) The editor was not being fanciful in perceiving the
possible Indonesian menace to an independent Malaya. ( 299 ) Apart
from external threats of this kind, there were in addition genuine
fears in Malaya about internal security. In 1957, communist
insurgency was receding, but it could still not be totally
discounted. (300) In the event, however, negative rather than
positive factors were to play the most important role in shaping
the terms and conditions of AMDA.
On the Malayan side, there was a feeling that the
communists had a genuine pretext for labelling their fight as
"anti-imperialist" since they encountered mainly overseas forces.
Once British forces had been replaced by Malayan, however, the
communists would be deprived of any such pretext. But the Malayan
armed forces were only in an embryonic stage and could not cope
with the demanding task of internal and external defence.(3°21
The result, as thin .Kin Wah remarks, was that "While recognising
the political costs of continued use of overseas forces in the
Ethergency and external defence, the TUriku was nonetheless
realistic in facing up to existing deficiencies in local capah-
ility".Chin	 Wah argued, further, that in this way the
country could avoid a heavy defence expenditure which would
(298) "British Defence of Malaya", Far Eastern Econcnic Review.
Vol.XXIII, No.24, December 12, 1957, p.737.
(299) "Malaya's New Constitution", Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol.XXIII, No.3, July 18, 1957, p.65.
(300) Gordon P. Means, op.cit., pp. 285-286 and 292-294.
(301)akh 7/496, "Use of U.K./Commonwealth Troops in Aid Of
Ethergency after Independence", op.cit.
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otherwise be incurred at the heavy cost of social and economic
advancement". (302)
(C) The Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement: Some Impediments.
Inevitably, the prospect of a defence agreement with a
power which was not only its ex-imperial master but also far
superior to it in military strength, created considerable anxiety
for Malayan leaders. (309) It is therefore not surprising that the
Malayans made it clear at the first Constitutional Conference
that, "they were not prepared to accept any unqualified agreement
allowing the forces of any of the Commonwealth countries on their
territories". 04)
This was not simply because they feared being branded as
"an ally of imperialism" by neighbours like Indonesia. 05) It
was, rather, a genuine fear of being dragged into the power
politics of the cold war, with all the consequences that would
have for internal problems of communist insurgency. (306) This fear
was intensified by the involvement of Commonwealth Strategic
Reserve Forces (comprising Australian and New Zealand forces),
which meant that the defence of Malaya could be directly linked
(302) Chin Kin Wah, Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, op.cit.,
p.27; and J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., p.22.
(303) J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., p.22.
(304) DEYE 7/493, "Negotiations on Defence With Malaya and
Singapore", A meeting held at the Ministry of Defence on 16th
February 1956.
(305) Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.26.
(306) Michael Leifer, The Foreign Relations of the New States,
Victoria, Australia, 1973, p.47.
with SEATO. The worst Malayan fear related indeed to the possible
use of their bases and other facilities for SEATO purposes.(307)
These Malayan fears were confirmed by a Report from the
Ministry of Defence. The Report mentioned that there were three
major contested points in the AMDA negotiations around the
question of consultation in the event of war, joining SEATO, and
the use of bAses for a wide variety of purposes. °'
Nevertheless, strategic and economic factors meant that,
Malayan leaders were not in a position to reject British and
Commonwealth assistance. Malayan negotiators, therefore, had to
tread very cautiously. In practice, this meant accepting the
accord with its advantages, but insisting at the same time that
Malayan facilities would only be used for AMDA purposes.
Thus the genuine fears and susceptibilities of a newly
born country, on the one hand, had to be taken into
account, (3°9 ) whilst on the other hand, changing circumstances
within Britain also imposed certain limitations on the forthcoming
treaty. During the first Constitutional Conference, a generous offer
of financial and military aid had already been made by Britain, and
(307) Robert 0. Tilman, op.cit., p.130.
(308) DEFE 7/501, Inward Telegram, From Commissioner General for
the U.K. in South Ft Asia to the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 8 December 1956.
(309) See for example DEFE 7/495, Telegram from the Ministry of
Defence to H.Q. Malaya Command, For Parker from Gough, 11 May
1956. The telegram cautioned the British delegate that the defence
treaty's terms would "scrupulously avoid any appearance of
limiting What would then be their newly born sovereign
independence".
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there was no question of going hack on this promise. But as was
said earlier in the chapter, an unforeseen turn of events in
October 1956 had created the altogether different environment in
which the final terms of AMDA were thrashed out. The Defence Paper
-
which was published shortly afterwards, Cmnd.124: Defence
Outline of Future Policy, 1957, symbolized this altered
environment and indicated the strategy proposed for dealing with
the problems. Indeed, it would seem to be this Paper, rather than
the Suez crisis, which had the most direct influence on AMDA's
final terms and conditions.
As has been argued earlier, although the Suez crisis did
not immediately put the desirability of British overseas
commitments in question, it had nevertheless, "severely undermined
economic strength and international opinion". ( 31-°) The crisis had
also generated an atmosphere of bitter disillusion, dismay and
frustration in Britain. This was nowhere better reflected than in
the Parliamentary debates. George Brown, speaking from the
Opposition benches, had only given vent to the prevailing mood of
Parliament when he referred to "the extraordinary kind of
neutralist emotion which is growing, not least in the party
opposite". "There was", he continued, "in every speech that is made,
in every newspaper that one reads, even the more responsible ones,
an emotion that Suez has shown that all this money has been wasted,
that it has not produced effective results, a feeling of let us
cut it, let us do away with it". He concluded that, "Nothing is of
(310) Paul M. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background
Influences on British EXternal Policy, 1865-1970, Fontana
Paperbacks, 1981, p.373.
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any use, anyway". (311)
But this outburst of frustration did not bring a sudden
U—turn in the conduct of foreign policy. Such a possibility was
strongly ruled out by Lord Reading, the Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs. "I realize that recent events in the Middle Fast
have at least temporarily shaken our position in South Fast Asia",
he wrote to Sir Robert Scott. But in his opinion, the British
should not allow themselves "to be put in a corner and be content
to remain there indefinitely with faces turned penitently to the
wall".(312) Many years were to elapse, as Phi hip Darby noted,
before "the changes the Suez crisis produced in the environment in
which British defence policy had to work itself out" were fully
appreciated. (313)
Without any doubt, Cmnd.124, had earnestly desired to
accomplish a reorientation in strategic and defence thinking in
accordance with the altered environment. After declaring that "the
time has now come to revise, not merely the size but the whole
character of the defence plan", (314) the Paper went on to assert
that, "Britain's influence in the world depends first and foremost
expoyt
on the health of her internal economy and the success of herktrade...
[Therefore] the claims of military expenditure should be
considered in conjunction with the need to maintain the country's
(311) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, VO1.564, 13
February, 1957, Col. 1288-9.
(312) FO 371/12931, Lord Reading's letter to Sir Robert Scott,
dated 3 January 1957.
(313) Phillip Darby, op.cit., p.94.
(314) Cmnd,124: Defence: Outline of Future Policy, H.M.S.O.,
London, 1957, p.1.
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financial and economic strength".(315)
With this aim in mind, the policy makers proposed various
drastic steps, most notably, the termination of national service,
substantial cuts in expenditure on conventional defence,
increasing emphasis upon independent nuclear deterrence and,
finally, the concept of strategic mobility in overseas
defence. (31-6 ) The total result of the proposed changes meant, as
R.S. Crossman put it, that "once we accept the logic of this White
Paper, we cease to be an imperial power".(317)
Here lay a contradiction although a substantial reduction
in defence expenditure was announced, existing overseas responsib-
ilities were to be maintained at their previous level. The
contradiction was nowhere more glaring than in the case of South
Fast Asia, where, "apart from defending her colonies and
protectorates, Britain has agreed to assist in the external
defence of Malaya after she attains independence". (3160 Britain's
regional commitments were also emphasised. By virtue of its
membership of SEATO and ANZAM, Britain, it was announced, had a
duty to "help preserve stability and resist the extension of
communist power in that aore(0.(31-9) How was it possible for the
policy makers to ignore such a seemingly obvious problem as the
(315) Ibid., p.1.
(316) Edward Skloot, "Labour: East of Suez", Orbis, Vol.X, No.3,
Fall 1966, pp.497-950.
(317) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.568, April 16,
1957, Co1.1769.
(318) Cmnd.124, op.cit., p.5.
(319) Ibid., p.5.
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the massive gap which the Paper created between the reduced
capacity of the armed forces and the global level of British
commitments?
The answer proferred by Philip Darby seems to offer at
least a partial solution. "It was assumed", he has argued, "that
the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons and the expansion of
airlift capability would enable a much smaller army to discharge
the same function". (320 ) However, it was on the basis of these two
assumptions -"one mistaken and the other unduly optimistic" as
Darby commented - "that the government planned to retain its
overseas commitments, if not forever, at least for the forseeable
future and at ever decreasing cost". <321)
Whatever the reasons, the first Defence Paper of the
Macmillan government had publicly commitied Britain not only to
the external defence of Malaya after its independence, but also to
participating in the future stability of the region as a whole.
And it had done this whilst simultaneously declaring a reduction
in manpower and an increased reliance on nuclear deterrence. In
retrospect, it can plausibly be maintained that the contradictory
policy enunciated in Cmnd.124, had a threefold impact on the final
shape of AMDA.
Firstly, the generous offer of British aid, as promised
earlier in and.9714: Report on the Federation of Malaya
the.
Constitutional Conference, could not be sustained atL level
previously promised. <322) Throughout the period 1956-57, Britain's
economic situation was getting increasingly desperate, and the
(320) Philip Darby, op.cit., p.120.
(321) Ibid., p.120.
(322) Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence, op.cit., pp.10-11.
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Suez crisis had finally revealed the level of British dependence
on American support. The negotiations on aid to Malaya were
accordingly tough and prolonged. Ultimately, "Britain could only
offer the Malayalabout a quarter of their original demands of
M$775 million for development and M$330 for the armed
forces". (323)
Secondly, the heavy reliance placed on tactical nuclear
weapons and the reduction in manpower made Britain increasingly
dependent on cooperation from Australia and New Zealand for
regional defence. (324) The AMDA negotiators therefore had to
devise a formula whereby the interest of ANZAM partners could be
reconciled with the independent status of Malaya. (32) As a
result, British dependence on Malayan cooperation increased
concomitantly.( 326) Whilst making explicit commitments "to joint
training unit formation, use of facilities within British bases
and assistance in supply equipment", (Annex 1) for the
Federation's Forces,.Britain sought, and was granted the right "to
establish, maintain and use additional bases and facilities" in the
Federation, (Article IV). At the same time, however, it was made
(323) Chin Kin Wah, Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, op.cit.,
p.28.
(324) Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence, op.cit., pp.11-12;
and DEFE 4/100, COS (57), Chiefs of Staff Committee ) 75th Meeting
held on 10 October 1957, OP. C.
(325) Chili kiv0,41.1), 1)efviceoF flalaygiA and, Siviqa,roYe,op.dt.,
P. 131.
(326) CAB 134/1556, C.P.C. (57) 30, (Revise), Colonial Policy
Committee, "FUture Constitutional Development in the Colonies", A
Report by the Chairman of the Official Committee on Colonial
Policy, 6th September 1957, p.7.
.94
clear that, "the Federation shall provide at its expense
alternative accommodation and facilities", in the event of any
change being introduced by the Malayan side. (Article VIII) (327)
Finally, the close involvement of ANZAM partners in SEATO
became a stigma for independent Malaya. (326) Hence, every possible
step was taken to get an assurance of freedom of action from
Britain and through Britain from the other countries contributing
to CSR forces. (329) This assurance was given by Britain in the
declaration that, "I-.M.G. had no desire to impose a worldwide
commitment on Malaya. Secondly, they had no desire to impose on
Malaya a commitment to send her forces overseas. Thirdly, if
Malaya were attacked, H.M.G. had no desire to force their assist-
ance on her against her wishes". (0) In other words, the Malayans
asserted themselves more forcefully than they had originally
intended. As a result, Malaya "won a maximum of security with a
minimum of obligations and it did not compromise on the two basic
policies of rejecting nuclear weapons and refusing to join
(327) Cmnd.263: Proposed Agreement on External Defence and Mutual 
Assistance between Government of United Kingdom and the 
Federation of Malaya, H.M.S.O., London, 1957, pp.1-2.
(328) Chin Kin Wall, Five Power Defence, op.cit., p.12; and DE,th
7/495, Inward Telegram From Commissioner General's Office,
Singapore to Ministry of Defence, 3 May 1956, p.3.
(329) J.M. Gullick, op.cit., p.198.
(330) an, 7/501, 487/013/03, Inward Telegram to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies from Commissioner General for the U.K. in
South East Asia, dated 8th December 1956. The telegram summarises
an informal meeting between Sir Robert Scott and TUnku Abdul
Rahman on 7th December.
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SEATO".(331 ) The safeguard finally incorporated in the treaty was
that the British government should not use the Malayan base
facilities for any other purpose than the defence of Malaya and
the British dependencies, without obtaining prior approval of the
Federation's Government (Article VIII). Finally, the Federation's
Government was to be consulted in case of any major change in the
arrangements (Article IX).(332) The British concession on SEATO,
in the opinion of Willard Hanna, was intended "to placate rather
than to redefine self-imposed British restrictions upon freedom of
a
action".(333)
All these arrangements were made in relation to the
external defence of the Federation of Malaya, but the counter-
insurgency measures required separate attention since questions
relating to jurisdiction and Malayan sovereignty were
involved. (334 ) Cmnd.264, which was an integral part of AMDA
arrangements, was introduced with this intention. "The purpose
of these arrangements", the Command Paper declared, "is on the
one hand, to give effective recognition to the fact that the
conduct of Emergency Operations is now the exclusive responsibility
of the Government of the Federation, and, on the other hand, to
(331) J.B. Dalton, op.cit., p.64.
(332) Ibid., p.2.
(333) Willard A. Hanna, Malaysia: A Federation in Prospect: pt.VII
The Singapore base, American Universities Field Staff Inc.
New York, September, 1962, p.1.
(334) DEEE 7/501, "Command and Control of Security Forces Engaged
on The Emergency After Independence Day"; and DEFE 7/496, "The
Use of U.K./CW Troops in Aid of the Emergency After Independence",
Note of a meeting in the Ministry of Defence on 3rd August 1957.
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safeguard the position and interests of H. M. Government".(335)
Thereafter, the Federation Government's Emergency Operations
Council was to conduct all the counter-insurgency measures and CSR
forces were to be used at the request of the Federation
Government, and only when the Federal forces were not available to
perform the task.(336)
The general reaction to AMDA in both countries was
somewhat different. In Britain, there was a sigh of relief, and
the press generally welcomed the treaty. But in Malaya, it met a
mixed reception. (337 ) The Federation Government was in a jubilant
mood but expressed its feelings in a restrained and cautious
manner. 38) The earlier major criticism came not only from
opposition parties but from the various ranks of the Alliance
itself. For instance, Tan Siew Sin, the future Finance Minister of
the Federation, asserted that for all practical purposes Malaya
would be free only so far as her interests did not clash with
those of Britain. In case of such a clash, Tan's argument was that
Britain's overwhelming presence meant that the British would be
able to, "enforce obedience to their wishes, even though Malaya is
supposed to be free". (339 ) Critics of the defence alliance were
(335) and. 264: Arrangements for the Employment of Overseas
Commonwealth Forces in Emergency Operations in the Federation of
Malaya after Independence, H.M.S.O., London, 1957, p.4.
(336) Ibid., p.2.
(337) "British Defence of Malaya", Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol.XXIII, NO.24, December 12, 1957, pp.737-738.
(338) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.263.
(339) Federation of Malaya, Legislative Assembly Debates, 14th
March 1956, cols.905-6.
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convinced that AMDA was a blot on the independence and sovereignty
of Malaya "34° ) The moderate Prime Minister, Turku Abdul Rahman,
tactfully handled the situation by making the ratification of the
treaty a test of confidence in his government. He made it clear
that under the prevailing circumstances, AMDA was the best
guarantee of security that Malaya could afford. (341 ) "Look around
at our neighbours, those both far and near", he told the Malayan
Parliament, "and tell me if there is any country, other than
Britain, to whom we should turn to defend us". (342) TUriku Abdul
Rahman assured the Parliament that Malaya not only had a
reasonable "say" in AMDA, but that the treaty would be reviewed
after a year if Parliament thought necessary.(343)
In fact, the extent of Malayan "say" in the affairs of
AMDA had already been tested in August 1957. Duncan Sandys, the
Secretary of Defence, while explaining Britain's altered strategy
to Australians, had hinted at the possibility of storing nuclear
weapons on Malayan bases. (344) The Malayan protest was sharp and
vocal, and the Turku himself rejected the possibility of Malaya
being an atomic base for anybody. He emphasised that Malayan
territory would only be used for Commonwealth defence. (345, The
British Government hastily retracted the statement and announced
(340) J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., pp. 23-4
(341) ibid., pp.23-24.
(342) Far Eastern Economic Review, op.cit., December 12 1957,
p.738.
(343) J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., p.21.
(344) DEFE 4/99, COS (57), Chiefs of Staff Committee, 67th
Meeting held on 22 August 1957, p.8.
(345) The Times, August 29, 1957, Cols. d and e.
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that no final decision had been taken by that time.(344)
In retrospect, AMDA proved to be a mixed blessing for
Malaya. On the negative side, argued Chin Kin Wah, "AMDA
institutionalised Malayan dependence on external protection,
delayed the process of psychological decolonization and
facilitated Sukarno's distortion of Malaya's international
identity", (3.47 ) and thus did some disservice to the newly
independent Malaya. But on the other hand, there were some
concrete gains since it provided "a stable external environment
for Malaya", within which the new nation could muster enough
strength to stand on its own feet, and in consequence was able to
assert itself among AMDA partners and the international community
at large. "There was no need for us to enter into any defence
agreement with another country", TUnku Abdul Rahman said in an
interview, because "we felt our agreement with Britain was
sufficient".(348)
For Britain, the major advantage of AMDA was "to
facilitate an orderly process of colonial disengagement from
Malaya rather than to add to a growing cold war front in South
East Asia". (349 ) At this juncture, we witness a convergence of
(346)akh 4/99, COS (57), Chiefs of Staff Committee, 67th
Meeting held on 22 August 1957, p.9.
(347) Chin Kin Wall, Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, op.cit.,
p.2.
(348) J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., p.24. British official records
also support this view. For example see, FO 371/129342, "The
Outlook In Malaya up to 1960", op.cit.,
(349) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.1.
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interests between Malaya and Britain. Quite contrary to their
expectations. Australia and New Zealand (two other associated
partners in AMDA) always regarded AMDA as closely associated with
SEATO. The Malayan leadership was openly critical of any such
link, and British authorities wished to avert such a
possibility. °) The ambiguity of AMDA clauses made it possible
for the four parties to interpret them differently. (35I ) In brief,
for Malaya, AMDA meant that Britain would provide security for
VC mai )11 rI9
Malaya and-----Lsmaller colonies in the region. The British
intended to use it as a structure of regional defence, within
which the future security of these colonies during the
disengagement period could be ensured without any involvement in
cold war politics. c32) In fact, the British military commitment
to AMDA, according to Michael Leifer, "was more directly related
to a former colonial possession, plus responsibility for the
island of Singapore and the territories of North Borneo including
the Protectorate of Brunei, and on the periphery were obligations
in Hong Kong and Fiji " . (353) Although at that time the treaty was
is
critiqed as an "unequal burden treaty", or a "blank-cheque to
Malaya", future events demonstrated the real worth of AA for
Britain.
These future events brought new challenges to the partners,
(350) DEFE 4/99, COS (57), Chiefs of Staff Committee, 66th
Meeting held on 16th August 1957, Annex to J.P. (57)96 (Final).
(351) Chin Kin Wah, Five Power Defence, op.cit., pp.8-12.
(352) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.264.
(353) Michael Leifer, "Retreat and Reappraisal in South East
Asia", in Michael Leifer (ed.), Constraints and Adjustments in
British Foreign Policy, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1972, p.87.
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and AMDA enabled them to protect the new federation of Malaysia
during the trials and tribulations of the Indonesian
"Confrontation" from 1963 to 1966.
II
British Foreign Policy and the Formation of Malaysia, 1961-1963.
As soon as the signing ceremony of AMDA was over, British
foreign policy ventured upon a project which proved to be by far
the most ambitious of its undertakings in the post-independence
history of Malaya. 	 By merging the British Borneo territories,
the colony of Singapore, and the Federation of Malaya into a
single unit, the new federation of Malaysia was created on 16th
September 1963. As the date indicates, the creation of Malaysia
was an achievement which embodied at least three years of
persistent efforts by British diplomats.* In order to gain further
insight into this crowning achievement of British foreign policy,
a minute and in-depth study of the ideas, circumstances and stages
which preceded its completion is essential.
It has been briefly mentioned in the previous section that
the unforeseen turn of events in October 1956 (i.e., the Suez
crisis) had some marginal repercussions on the conduct of the
Anglo-Malayan defence negotiations. However, the full impact of
the Suez crisis on British foreign policy in South East Asia could
* My arguments in this section were greatly clarified by inter-
views with Lord Inchyra, Sir Patrick Dean, Sir Michael Walker,
Mr. Roland Hunt, Sir Frank Cooper and Sir Neil Pritchard. I have
indicated specific indebtedness at the foot of the relevant pages.
(354) Richard Allen, o0.cit., p.156.
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not be ascertained at that time. Only with the passing of years
did the lessons become clear. Two of these lessons are especially
relevant at present. One was the need to accelerate the pace of
decolonisation; the other was the need to retain a military
presence East-of-Suez.* Taken in conjunction, these two policies
marked a radical departure in British foreign policy at
large. (355 ) What concerns us here, however, is the fact that the
policies seem at first sight to be deeply incompatible with one
another. To what extent, we must now inquire, did British foreign
policy in South East Asia succeed in imposing a semblance of
coherence and consistency upon the two policies? Accordingly, in
this part, the formation of Malaysia will be examined within the
contexts of decolonisation and East-of-Suez policy.
(A) Decolonisation and the Formation of Malaysia.
Whereas the Federation of Malaya in 1957 was a product of
the first wave of decolonisation (1946-56), Malaysia in 1963 was
the creation of the second wave decolonisation (1959-67).(3.56)
The first wave was characterised by a slow but steady progress
towards self-government in the colonies. (357) By contrast, the
* I have used the term as a synonym for the region and for
British policy. When a distinction between the two meanings is
required, I have relied on the context to provide it.
(355) Paul Kennedy, op.cit., pp.376 -378.
(356) John Darwin:131-f tel.; ri OC	 _toto is	 o	 M men !l ax Eau c ati
Ltd.., Lo vicLOvi, egg, PP. I1 4)14 2.2.3-5-
(357) Sir Alan Burns, In Defence of Colonies, George Allen and
Unwin, London, 1957, pp.72-88.
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second wave was marked by a rather hasty grant of independ-
ence. (356 ) For example, Goldsworthy observes that " The old ideals
of harmony among ethnic groups, economic viability, a developed
infrastructure of volunteer organisations and demonstrably stable
political institutions were rarely heard of". Instead of all that,
Goldsworthy continues, what mattered in the second wave was, "that
an indigenous political elite, with some degree of local support,
should exist and be willing to take OVer".C359)
In the course of this transition, various existing
policies were entirely abandoned. In the political sphere, for
example, the old idea that the colonies were a trust, and
therefore could not be abandoned without making adequate arrange-
ments for their welfare in future, disappeared as a criterion of
granting independence after 1959.( 360) Secondly, neither the
absence of experienced and firmly entrenched local leadership, nor
the existing low level of political/constitutional maturity of the
territory, could dissuade the mother country from granting
independence.(36I ) Finally, the previous policy of achieving a
non-communal or secular policy in multi-racial societies was also
abandoned. After 1959, the rights of the minorities were
increasingly sacrificed to accommodate the growing militancy of
the majorities. (362)
(358) T.O. Lloyd, The British Empire, 1558-1983, O.U.P., New York,
1984, pp.347-348.
(359) Goldsworthy, op.cit., p.361.
(360) J.M. Lee, op.cit., pp.195-196.
(361) Max Beloff, "Empire and Nation", Government and Opposition,
Vol .9, No.4, Autumn 1974, pp.419-420.
(362) J.M. Lee, op.cit., p.189.
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In the economic sphere, the changes were even more
pronounced. The old doctrine of -economy first' was dropped by the
Labour Party in 1955, and the Conservatives followed the same path
in 1959.(363) Before 1959, only big and economically viable
territories were deemed to be worthy of independence, but under
the new wave, economic viability was no longer a consideration. For
example, in 1956 only Malaya, the Gold Coast and Nigeria were
counted as serious contenders for self-government. 64) From 1959
onwards, by contrast, the membership of the independence-club
became open to all, with the exception of fortresses and isolated
islands.(365) The prime cause of this change "lay not in the
inability of the declining metropolis to sustain their local
rule", argues R.F. Holland, "but in the fact that new operational
modes and challenges had emerged in Which the possession of the
colonies was an expensive...distraction".(366) Within this
perspective, decolonisation was not solely inspired by magnanimity
but indicated, "a growing awareness in London that it was the most
expedient method of protecting their economic interests in
Asia". (36?)
In the strategic sphere also there were indications of
change. Before 1958, strategically important colonies like Aden
and Singapore were supposed to remain under the British Crown for
ever. But afterwards, even these territories were given a chance
(363) John Hatch, op.cit., pp.701-702.
(364)CAB 134/1556, C.P.C. (57)30 (Revise), op.cit., p.6.
(365) J.M. Lee, op.cit., 203-204 and 214.
(366) R.F. Holland, op.cit., p.183.
(367) Arnold Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front, Frederick
A. Praeger, New York, 1966, pp.196 -197.
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to enjoy a limited measure of self-government. There were of
course protests. Thus Sir Hilary Blood, for example, contended
that although, "these fortresses or sea or air staging points",
could he granted a measure of internal self-government, that
measure "should he conditioned by its importance to the Common-
wealth as a whole". (367e. ) This insistence on the links between
external and internal security and related reservations about the
concomitant rights of H.M. Government, were heard less in the
forthcoming independence negotiations.
This radical shift in colonial policy was not a sudden and
abrupt development. In fact, clouds had been gathering on the
horizon since 1955, but the government of the day persisted in its
optimism and ignored the ominous sounds which came from emerging
militant nationalist movements in Asia and Africa.( 36e) The first
Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955 heralded the new era. The
rising tide of Afro-Asian nationalism reached a peak in 1960 when
the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution
calling for the ending of colonialism throughout the world. (369)
These developments made British statesmen painfully aware
of the fact that any attempt to check this tide would involve the
use of force. (370) Fortunately, this was a prospect which did not
(367a) Sir Hilary Blood, The Smaller Territories, Conservative
Commonwealth Series, No.4, 1958, p.190.
(368) Lord Attlee, EMmire into Commonwealth, O.U.P., London, 1961,
p.45.
(369) Commonwealth Survey, Vol .VII, NO.11, 23 May 1961, p.508.
(370) Dan Horowitz, "Attitudes of British Conservatives Towards
Decolonisation in Africa", African Survey, Vo1.69, NO.1, January
1970, pp.9-11.
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appeal to the British government or the British public. "It is not
possible in the latter part of the twentieth century", Lord
Hailsham subsequently declared in the House of Lords, "to justify
or even to maintain the Empire by force - except in complete
isolation.. "(1) As a result, the high noon of nationalism
i.e., 1955-1960, coinciding with the British decision to speed up
decolonisation.
The second ominous sound was the Suez debacle in 1956. It
has already been stressed that the crisis itself did not have any
immediate impact on the course of British policy. In the long
term, , however, the significance of the crisis cannot be over-
estimated. (372) As a result, British perception of foreign policy
suffered two severe jolts. First of all, the myth of the Common-
wealth as a substitute for the vanishing British EMpire, and faith
in its existence as a monolithic entity capable of speaking with one
voice in world affairs, was destroyed for ever. (373 ) Another
favourite theme of British foreign policy, which was the special
relationship with America, was also shattered. ( 374 ) Perhaps the most
painful lesson taught by the Suez crisis was that any "unilateral
excursion on the level of Suez was practically out of the question
for a power that has accepted multi -lateralism in so many other &vets
fo-reipN. poiley."(s/s)
(371) Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, V61.229, 1962,
Col .1234.
(372) B. Vivekanandan, The Shrinking Circle: The Commonwealth in
British Foreign Policy, 1945-1974, Somaiya Publications, Bombay,
1983, pp.216-239.
(373) Ibid., pp.218-227.
(374) Ibid., pp.231-232.
(315) ..114:es 6, ch-ristqpii,	 r.,./.
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On a more general level, the outcome of the crisis
demonstrated that in the late nineteen-fifties, "imperialism (had
become] an obsolete method of projecting influence in the outside
world, (since] Britain lacked the economic power, the military
fire-power, the expansive thrust for maintaining a world system
against the competition of other world powers". (376 ) It was
therefore easy to argue that, "if there was no necessity for
imperialism, then there was no reason for holding the vestige of
empire".(377)
But this was not the impression the government of the day
wished to give either to its allies or to its colonies. (378) Its
concern, rather, was to make clear that decolonisation was not an
abdication due to any inherent weaknesses in British power.(379)
Britain, it asserted,was still capable of playing a role in the
world, and British power had not gone down nearly as much as was
talked about by the press.* For example, Harold Macmillan, the
then Prime Minister, wrote in his memoirs that, "it is a vulgar
* For this section, the researcher is indebted to Sir Patrick
Dean for his willingness to discuss the impact of the Suez crisis
on decolonisation policy.
(376) John Gallagher, op.cit., p.153.
(377) John Gallagher, op.cit., p.152; See also T.O. Lloyd,
op.cit., p.348.
(378) John Darwin, op.cit., p.188.
(379) C.E. Carrington, "Decolonisation: The Last Stage", Inter-
national Affairs, Vol. 38, No.1, January 1962, pp. 29-40.
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but false jibe that the British people by a series of gestures
unique in history abandoned their empire in a fit of frivolity or
impatience". On the contrary, "it was rather their duty",
proclaimed Macmillan, "to bestow self-government on the
colonies". (380 ) At the same time, however, the government gave
some concrete hints which pointed in the direction of
disengagement. It was acknowledged, for instance, that a "wind of
change" was sweeping across the globe. Colonies, however, were not
to be given "premature" independence simply because Britain could
no longer afford to defend them. (381 ) "The United Kingdom stands
to gain no credit for launching a number of immature, unstable and
impoverished units", was the opinion expressed by the Colonial
Policy Committee. The Committee decided that such colonies, and
their "performance as independent countries, would only be an
embarrassment, and (their] chaotic existence would be a temptation
to our enemies". (382 ) Therefore, for Britain, the colonies were
still a commitment to be honoured.* Consequently, the defence and
administration of the colonies were still regarded as a duty and
Britain was still deemed capable of discharging its
* For this part of the thesis, the researcher gratefully
acknowledges her indebtedness to a discussion with Mr. Roland Hunt,
a former Deputy High Commissioner in the Federation of Malaya.
(380) Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way, Macmillan, London,
1972, pp.116-17.
(381) Dan Horowitz, Attitudes of British Conservatives, Ph.D.
thesis, op.cit., p.6.
(382) CAB 134/1556, C.P.C. (57),30 (Revise), op.cit., p.7.
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obligations.(3e3)
On the one hand, then, Britain still desired to honour its
imperial commitments, whilst on the other hand, the increasing
restraints which surrounded this capacity were now beginning to be
acknowledged. The only way out of the impasse Which threatened to
ensue was rapid decolonisation.(38") It was very much felt at that
time, as one senior British diplomat recalled, in conversation
with the present researcher, that in the late fifties and early
sixties, there was a sense of inevitability about the whole
process of decolonisation. It seemed that no one could reverse it,
whether the British liked it or not. At the same time, Anthony
Sampson has rightly drawn attention to the existence of a
controversial tendency which is "the element of pragmatism in
British foreign policy", an element that prevented "any detailed
and advanced programming of decolonisation".( 385) Sampson's view
is supported by Max Beloff, who argues that, "in no time a balance
sheet of the Empire was drawn up and a decision was made to go into
voluntary liquidation". (386 ) Sampson receives further support from
Kirkman, who has argued that Britain met challenges only
pragmatically, in "a series of ad hoc decisions dreamt up to solve
immediate problems, with little thought given to long term
needs". 87) We must now, however, take issue with what may be
regarded as the -standard' interpretation of decolonisation policy
(383) Ibid.
(384) Goldsworthy, op.cit., pp.361-366; John Hatch, op.cit.,
p.701; and J.M. Lee, op.cit., p.32 and p.71.
(385) Anthony Sampson, op.cit., p.311.
(386) Max Beloff, "Empire and Nations", op.cit., pp.418-9.
(387) W.P. Kirkman, op.cit., p.12.
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as offered by an admix of publicists and scholars. Our principal
ground for doing so is to be found in the official documents
recently released. After being sworn in, one of the immediate tasks
undertaken by the Macmillan government was a major review of colonial
policy.() "In his minute of 28 January 1957 (C.P.0 (57) 6), the
Prime Minister has asked", C.r...r--J\10-rmein. 13-r	 Qh0
\418-S the Chairman of the Official Committee on Colonial Policy, uye
reported, "that an estimate should be made of the probable
course of constitutional development in the colonies in the
years ahead". The Prime Minister wished"said the Chairman,
"that this study should set out the economic, political and
strategic considerations for and against the grant of independ-
ence".(389) As this document shows, British statesmen were
developing some coherent and consistent views on colonial
problems, even though the fluid and complex domestic and inter-
national situations required them to keep it flexible and
accommodating.
The document makes clear that an important part of the
policy envisaged was to take into account diverse developments in
the colonies.(390) This willingness to compromise with local
factors was not in itself novel; it goes as far back as 4d, 19th cebtuyy.
It was exemplified by a letter to the Governor of Singapore from
ii 1952
the Colonial Off ice "Since the Colonial Governments are playing
the piper", J.J. Paskin conceded, "it seems that to some extent
(388) CAB 134/1556, C.P.C. (57) 30 (Revised), op.cit.
(389) Ibid., p.1.
(390) John Hatch, op.cit., p.702; and W.P. Kirkman, op.cit.,
pp.12-13, and 202.
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they should call the tune". ( 39I ) By 1957, however, an important
change of mood had occurred. In 1952, Colonial Office welcomed
it in a spirit of self-confidence, by 1957, they reflected more
of fatalism and resignation. Thus under nationalist and
regional pressures, "Britain was forced to handle the transfer
of power within a time scale and a changing international order
over which it had little control". (3923) In the new mood which
now prevailed, if the local leadership could convince the British
authorities that it was capable of taking over the responsibility
of governing, then Britain was only too glad to transfer the
power, provided that no regional complication would arise from
such an action.
The best example of granting independence under pressure
from colonial leadership seems to be Singapore during
1955-63 . c394/5)
 The Borneo territories provided an instance of
granting "premature" independence due to regional pressures. (396)
We must defer a detailed defence of these assertions until later
in this thesis. [See-TT Ise-It-a] For the present, we must consider
the general course of developments in South PAgt Asia at large.
The apparent willingness to decolonise at the earliest
(391) CO 968/328/101/11, J.J. Paskin's letter to J.F. Nicoll,
Governor of Singapore, dated 26.11.52.
(392/3) J.M. Lee, op.cit., pp.202-3.
(394/5) See for example, John Drysdale, Singapore: Struggle 
for Success, George Allen and Unwin, Herts, England, 1984.
(396) R.S. Milne, "Malaysia: A New Federation in the Making",
Asian Survey, Vol.III, No.2, February 1963, p.78; and
B.Simandjuntak, op.cit., pp.126-130.
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appropriate occasion meant that British attention had been
focussed upon South East Asia ever since the Suez debacle.(397)
The demise of Britain's Suez Canal bases in 1956 had undermined
the British hold on South East Asia, a region Which had already
been shorn of its previous strategic glory by the disappearance of
the Raj from India. Moreover, the need for "political adaptation
to the new balance of power in international politics was inten-
sified by a new climate of opinion and awareness of the scarcity of
British resources". (398)
British government, nevertheless, always insisted that it
wouloiLhonour its residual imperial responsibilities, and that made
Britain willing to stay in the region even after decolonisation.
This moral commitment was explicitly and boldly expressed by
subsequent British defence papers. (399) What must now be
considered are the complex policy considerations which lay behind
the very sentiment.
(B) East-of-Suez-Policy and the Formation of Malaysia
Foremost among these policy considerations is British
policy Fist-of-Suez. Accepting the central significance of Ft-
of-Suez, L.D. Martin has rightly stressed that the East-of-Suez
policy played "a more than proportionate part in determining the
(397) Dan Horowitz, Attitudes of British Conservatives,
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, op.cit., p.342.
(398) Ibid., p.342.
(399) Cmnd.124 (1957), Cmnd.363 (1958), Cmnd.662 (1959), Cmnd.952
(1960), Cmnd.1288 (1961) and Cmnd.1639 (1962).
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course of Britain's strategy and the shape of her armed forces". 0400)
In retrospect, it can be added that the policy was the product of a
clash between the British belief in Britain's continuing status as
a world power and the adverse circumstances which posed certain
restrictions on it. (4°1) In the late fifties and early sixties,
British policy makers did not perceive any danger in Europe, the
Atlantic, or even the Mediterranean, but
	 / in the East-of-SUez
region. It was made clear by Viscount Montgomery in the House of
Lords that, "The Atlantic is safe, Europe is safe, the
Mediterranean is safe, the potential danger spots lie someWhere
else, in the Near East, the Middle East and the Far East and in
Africa. It is to those areas that we should direct our
gaze...".(4°2)
In other words, it was in the region Fast-of-Suez that the
major British commitment was required. c4°93 Despite the key
position assigned to that area, there was no coherent or uniform
idea about what the British role should be, prior to 1960. In the
absence of any clear policy on this "discussion was either limited
to particular problems or was conducted in terms of the overseas
(400) L.W. Martin, "British Maritime Policy in 1Yansition".
International Journal, Vol.XXIII, NO.4, Autumn, 1968, p.541.
(401) Leonard Beaton, "Imperial Defence Without EMpire", Inter-
national Journal, Vol.XXIII, No.4, Autumn, 1968, pp.531-540.
(402) Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol .238. 21 Nhrdh
1962, Co1.579.
(403) an, 4/100, C.O.S. (57), Chiefs of Staff Committee,, 69th
Meeting, Minute 2, .21. Aulugt: 1957, Annex to J.P. (57) 94 Final.
"Strategic Facilities In British Territories Likely TO Achieve
Independence".
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role in general".( 404) Successive British governments were content
to make vague, lofty pronouncements about the Fast-of-Suez
region.(40 ) For example, the Minister of Defence, Harold
Watkinson, declared in the House of Commons, that "the Government
have no intention of backing out of our world obligations". He
further added, "I am not ashamed to stand at this box, (and say
that], I am proud that the nation still has some responsibilities
in the world". C.406)
However, it must be added that Cmnd.127 had slightly
reduced this vagueness by emphasising the need for strategic
mobility and a strategic reserve force. As we have seen, the Paper
announced substantial cuts in manpower and conventional armaments
yet vigorously defended a world-wide role for Britain, thereby
creating a dichotomy between ends and means. (407) To an extent, in
Sir John Slessor's opinion (Chief of Air Staff, 1950-1952), the
Paper, "still (tried] to have it both ways, with the inevitable
result that it did not have enough either way". (4°8 ) SUbsequently,
(4e104) Philip Darby, op.cit., p.134.
(405) This ambivalent attitude is remarkably apparent in British
policy regarding SEATO. Consequently, Australia and New Zealand
felt bitterly disappointed. See FO 371/129342, D1051/11,
21191/227/57G, Secret and Personal, a letter from D.J. Lloyd,
office of the CommissionerGeneral for the U.K. in South Fast
Asia, to F.S. Tomlinson, Foreign Office, dated July 19, 1957.
(406) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .635, 28
February 1961, Co1.1509.
(407) Sir John Slessor, "British Defence Policy", Foreign
Affairs, Vol.53, No.4, July 1957, p.551.
(408) Ibid., p.551.
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the Paper was severely criticised for this in a Parliament, and
there were also reports in the press that even the Cabinet was
divided over the Paper.(409) An immediate outcome of this division
within the Cabinet was that a Committee for Future Policy was set
up, for the purpose of forming "an appreciation of the world
situation and the United Kingdom's position and to [make] certain
recommendations for appropriate policies".( 410 ) The Committee's
report, which was submitted in 1960, expressed some reservations
about the overseas role, but on the whole it reaffirmed the pre-
vailing trends. As Philip Derby put it, "Arguments about the value
of the Commonwealth. British obligationsto developing countries, and
her responsibilities to assist the containment of communism went
round and round and each service used them to justify the maintenance
of forces in the area and the largest possible share of the defence
budget".(411)
Thus by the beginning of 1962, East-of-Suez policy had
begun to take a definite shape, but had led at the same time to
confusion and inter-departmental rivalry. The proposed means, i.e.,
strategic mobility, strategic reserve and nuclear deterrence, were
incompatible with the strained domestic economy and worldwide
commitments. (4"40 EVen before the publication of the next White
Paper on Defence, indeed, some grave doubts had been expressed about
the feasibility of the policy. Christopher Mayhew, the future
Minister for Navy,for example, had called into question the basic
(409) Observer, "Macmillan faces Defence Split", 28 July 1957.
(410) Philip Darby, op.cit., p.143.
(411) Ibid., p.144.
(411a) For example, see the Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Commons, Vol.655, 5th March 1962, Cols.210-338.
115
premises of the policy by expressing doubts about the Singapore
connection "If Britain had an internal security role in supporting
Lee Kuan Yew", Mayhew asked, "What would the political repercussion
be? And if Britain was there for the external defence of Malaya and
Singapore, how real was the immediate threat, and did it justify the
expenditure on the Singapore base?"( 412) Denis Healey, the future
Defence Secretary and the single most important figure in British
withdrawal from the East of Suez, doubted whether, in the name of
the East-of-Suez policy, the Government did not intend to retain
some strategically and politically irrelevant commitments.(413)
Although the Opposition ruthlessly criticised the Past-of-
Suez presence, the Government did not show any sign of relenting
in face of this criticism. Though decolonisation was tirelessly
implemented by the new Colonial Secretary, lain Macleod, he came
under severe criticism from his own party's elite section.("1144
To some extent, the pace of decolonisation itself had generated
a counter-reaction in the ruling party, creating a nostalgia for
imperial days which culminated in a strong plea for the retention
of an armed presence East-of-Suez. (415 ) Nigel Fisher's remark
seems pertinent. In the political climate of the 1960's Fisher
observed, "When the wounds of Suez were healing, the 1959 election
(412) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .648,
1 November 1961, Cols.296-7.
(413) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .640. 17 May
1961, Co1.1408.
(414) Anthony Sampson, op.cit., p.62; see also Dan Horowitz,
Attitudes of British Conservatives, Ph.D. thesis, op.cit., 82-107.
(415) Nigel Fisher, lain Macleod, Purnell Book Service Ltd.,
London, 1973, p.170.
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had been won, and a large section of the Parliamentary party was
in a state of post-operative euphoria, and against concessions of
any kind", (416) the East-of-Suez policy found a most congenial
environment for its growth. Although a strong "wind of change" was
forcing Britain to grant political freedom, there was nevertheless
a passionate desire to keep the British flag flying overseas; if
not in the colonies, then on the high seas and the bases around
the world.c4a7)
It is in this context, that we may now appreciate the
appearance of Cmnd.1639, Statement on Defence 1962. The Paper
assured the conservative elites by reaffirming a continuing over-
seas role for British forces in more precise terms. -°' In the
ensuing debate about this White Paper, Lord Carrington, the First
Lord of Admiralty, expressed British concern over the threat to
world peace, "in the emergent nations of Africa and ASia,. Bliktere3
a spark may form into a global blaze which neither East natr Vest
could afford deliberately to bring about". (419 He accordingly
depicted the British presence as a benign and stabilizing fact=
in the world, expressing his firm belief that such a presence was
vital and should not be weakened. Warming to his theme. Lan"
Carrington, went on to deal with strategic mobility. umifi
command and joint service operations, insisting that a
(416) Ibid.
(417) Dan Horowitz, Attitudes of British Conservatives„ Ftka.
thesis, op.cit., pp.117-122.
(418) Cmnd.1639, Statement on Defence: Next Five Years, EMS.aL,
London, February 1962, p.3.
(419) Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. . 21 leardh
1962, Co1.534.
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combination of these would "enable British influence and military
power to continue to exert itself throughtout the world in the
years to come". ('420)
The most surprising feature of this debate was the
comparatively moderate criticism proffered by the Opposition
party. (42i For example, Gordon Walker, the Opposition's spokesman
on defence hardly questioned the policy on East-of-Suez
commitments. Gordon Walker's main concern was about the rising
cost of nuclear weapons and their irrelevance to Britain's
strategic needs. (422) Harold Wilson, the newly elected Leader of
the Opposition also chose to attack the nuclear deterrence rather
than the defence commitments on global scale. 0423) According to
Denis Healey, within the Labour Party, the armed presence was seen
as an essential and inevitable part of the process of
decolonisation.( 4234,0
 Consequently the Paper was more acceptable
to the Opposition than the earlier ones, which had simply upheld
an active armed presence and a "role" in the East-of-Suez region.
What emerges from this Parliamentary response to the new
White Paper Cmnd.1639 is that heavy responsibilities were to be
discharged Fast-of-Suez despite a simultaneous reduction in
British manpower and conventional armaments. The maintenance of
existing responsibilities was justified by appeals to overriding
(420) Ibid., Col .530.
(421) Philip Darby, op.cit.,. p.225.
(422) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.655, 5th
March, 1962, Cols. 57-73.
(423) Ibid., Cols. 221-238.
(423a) Geoffrey Williams and Bruce Reed, Denis Healey and the
Policies of Power, Sidwick and Jackson, London, 1971, p.
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"commitments, alliances, peace-keeping and economic interest". (.424)
The major motive, however, was basically a dogmatic vision of
residual imperial power, with all the attendant duties this entailed
throughout the world. ( 2 ) According to Philip Darby, this
dogmatic vision was supported mainly by three arguments. First of
all, it was a matter of habit: "We were there because we were
there". Secondly, "There was an ingrained sense of responsibility
and an element of straight idealism". And finally, there was the
illusion that Britain was still a world power, with worldwide
interests. (426)
Bearing in mind the British intentions as indicated by the
White Paper and the Parliamentary discussions about it, it is
possible to understand British policy towards South East Asia.
This policy is nowhere more clearly stated than by Harold
Macmillan himself in a long paragraph in his memoirs.
* In the course of an interview with the researcher, Lord
Inchyra also spoke at length about the proceedings of this
conference at Singapore. He attended this conference with Harold
Macmillan on 19th January 1958, while accompanying the Prime
Minister on the Far East visit. This Conference was annually called
by the CommissionerGeneral of the U.K. in South Fast Asia to
discuss various political and strategic problems of the region.
For full reference see, Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm,
Macmillan, London, 1971, pp.396-7.
(424) Philip Darby, op.cit., p.155.
(425) C.E. Carrington, The Liquidation of the British Empire,
op.cit., pp. 75-76.
(426) Philip Darby, op.cit., pp.155-156.
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Macmillan attended the final session of the Conference in
Singapore on 19th January 1958. Reflecting on this occasion.
Macmillan later wrote that "Inspite of the rapid movement towards
independence about to take place throughout the area, none of us
at that Conference had any doubt of the importance of maintaining
the authority and prestige of the United Kingdom by a substantial
military presence. Nor was there any fear that this would he
unwelcome to the successor governments. On the contrary, for many
years to come the emerging territories, such as Malaya, would feel
increased confidence if they could rely on our firm support. Total
evacuation was never contemplated at that time. It would have seemed
an inconceivable and unworthy act of defeatism, to which Britain
could never be reduced". (427)
During a lengthy debate on the Defence White Paper in
1962, these sentiments emerged strongly. Britain's role East-of-
Suez was emphasised with fresh vigour and the "base-strategy" was
defended as the ultimate expression of British global
responsibilities. Lord Carrington explained that "We intend to
concentrate in future on three main bases: one West of Suez in the
United Kingdom... and the other two East-of-Suez, at Aden and
Singapore.... These three main bases will in future be the lynchpin
of our worldwide operations". (428) In the grand base strategy, it
was Singapore which occupied the pivotal role. Thus Duncan Sandys
declared in 1959 that this be was "the pivot of our military
situation in the Far East and we have no thought of changing
It-	 See the 7eTCYCh g e. at PM9.
(427) Harold Macmillan, Ridinq the Storm, op.cit., p.397.
(428) Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol .238, 21 March
1962, pp.537-538.
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it".(429) Sandys' policy was faithfully adhered to by future
Defence Secretaries.
In view of the importance attached to Singapore, it was
not surprising that the proposed federation of Malaysia was
specifically mentioned by this White Paper in connection with
regional stability and security. <° The Paper expressed the hope
that the new federation would mean "a diminished internal security
role [for British forces] but a continuing task in conjunction
with our allies, for the preservation of peace in the area" (431)
The Paper had clearly stated that Britain had a world-wide
role to play and had recognised the necessity for mobility,
equipment and base facilities. But in that case, as the Paper
acknowledged, it was necessary to simplify the command structure
of defence in South East Asia. On this matter, the Paper answered
that "the Government have now decided to introduce a unified
command in the Far East as soon as practicable". (4.32)
From our discussion of the Cmnd.1639, it is easy to see
that the primary concern of the British government was to maintain
its base facilities in Singapore, and that decolonization was a
secondary objective.(	 In fact, the logic behind British policy
had already been spelt out by a Report of the Colonial Policy
Committee in September 1957, within a week of the grant of
(429) Saul Rose, Britain and South Ft Asia, op.cit., p.145.
(430) Cmnd.1639, Statement on Defence, op.cit., p.8.
(431) Ibid., p.9.
(432) Ibid., p.15.
(433) A speech by TUnku Abdul Rahman in the Federal Parliament on
16th October 1961 confirms this view. See J.M. Gullick, op.cit.,
p.44.
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independence to Malaya. o134) "There is no present practical
alternative to Singapore", the Report admitted, "as a base for
deployment of naval and air force in support of ANZAM and SEATO".
The Report confirmed further that, "Singapore cannot be viewed in
isolation from Malaya, and militarily both are complementary.
(Therefore], in the event of a merger between the two territories,
the Uknglo-] Malayan Defence Agreement would be extended to cover
Singapore".(' This intention was finally executed by the
extension of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement on 22 November
1961, when negotiations on the proposed new federation had just
opened.
This precedent was followed in the case of the stream-
lining of the command structure. In fact, from the very beginning,i.e19q6,
the Commander-in-Chief detested "the division of Malaya into two
territories", and much preferred "to regard Malaya as one unit for
their purpose". (6) The need for unity was never forgotten during
th .youghout -nivietten-fifties
the independence negotiationsipetween Her Majesty's Government and
the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore.(407)
(434)CAB 134/1556, C.P.C. (57) 30 (Revise), op.cit., p.7.
(435) Ibid.; This stand was evidently supported by the Chiefs
of Staff Committee. See akh 4/100, COS (57), 69th Meeting held
on 27th August 1957, "Strategic Facilities in British Territories
Likely to Achieve Independence", Annex to J.P. (57) 94 (Final).
(436)CO 968/328/101/011, A letter from the Governor of Singapore
to Colonial Office, dated October 1952.
(437)CO 1022/88, 31,2,02. A letter from J.J. Paskin to Malcolm
MacDonald, the Commissioner General for U.K. in Southeast Asia,
3rd November, 1953.
122
February 1962, Sir Francis Festing, Commander-
in-Chief Far East Land Forces, - :---z—visited South East Asia and
advised that "the timing of the defence administrative changes be
dictated by approaching political changes in the Malaysia
area".(430) He argued that "the political difficulties of defence
-
reform in the area would delay the unification (of the command]
until at least after the formation of Malaysia". (439 ) By contrast,
Mr. Harold Watkinson, the British Defence Minister, did not regard
the formation of Malaysia as a prerequisite and announced during
his visit to the region in April 1962, that "the Chief of the
unified command will be appointed soon".( 440) Finally, the unified
Far East Command was born on 28th November 1962, with its head-
quarters at Singapore.
Two definite conclusions can be drawn from the events
surrounding the creation of this Unified Command. It is clear, in
the first place, that Britain was not thinking in terms of total
withdrawal in the near future. The Cmnd.1639 had already paved the
way for a continued British presence in East-of-Suez, and Britain
was determined to play the -big power' role. (441 ) Secondly, the
creation of a larger federation was already a foregone conclusion,
and the existence of the unified command structure was considered
vital for the protection of the new federation. (2)
(438) "Unified Command", Far Eastern Economic Review, VOl.XXXVI,
No.3, April 19, 1962, p.123.
(439) Ibid.
(440) Ibid.
MU Philip Darby, op.cit., p.177.
(442) an, 5/78, COS (57) 226, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 17th
October 1957, "Command Organization in the (Continued overleaf).
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On the basis of the above considerations, it can be
concluded that although the British Government had bowed to the
fate of decolonisation, a nostalgia for the imperial past had
lingered on in their thinking. (443 ) This attitude was charged with
a highly emotional and moralistic sentiment, since, as Macmillan
had admitted earlier that the total withdrawal NoloAci have. been
"an unworthy act of defeatism". (444) However, Macmillan's statement
gives us a fairly deep insight into the two powerful currents
flowing underneath British thinking, the engagement and
disengagement, i.e., faith in the British role and the consequent
necessity for a continued military presence, on the one hand, and,
on the other, an acceptance of necessity to decolonise. C.E.
Carrington an ardent supporter of the first view, concluded an
article by asking, "Has the world grown so big, or is it that we
have grown so small that our experts should now advise us to
reject the whole and concentrate on a part?" In his opinion
Britain was "still something more than an offshore island in
&rope". (445/6) But the equally important considerations of
decolonisation had also governed the final shape of British policy
at large.
Above all, it should now be amply clear that British
foreign policy in South East Asia was shaped by two diametrically
opposed concepts. These two concepts were a policy of retaining
armed forces and rapid decolonisation. The formation of Malaysia
(From overleaf) Far Ft". A note from BDCC (FE, (57)18).
(443) Paul Kennedy, op.cit., pp .375-376.
(444) Harold Macmillan, Ridinor the Storm, op.cit., p.397.
(445/6) C.E. Carrington, "Decolonisation, the Last Stage",
op.cit., p.40.
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in 1963 is the best illustration of how these contradictory
policies nevertheless worked in a fairly coherent way, and even
had certain advantages for British diplomacy.* The Malaysia
Agreement not only made possible the early independence of
Singapore, but also enabled Britain to retain the use of the
Singapore base. (4476) At this stage, a convergence of mutual
Anglo-Malayan interests emerge. It is to this aspect of
-Malaysia' that we turn our attention in the next section.
(C) Malaysia: Convergence of Anglo-Malayan Interests, 1957-1963.
The peaceful transfer of power, followed by the ensuing
period of political stability and racial harmony, further enhance'
the credibility of the Federation of Malaya as a lynchpin in the
British strategy of decolonisation.( 4°19) However, one major
obstacle, viz, communist insurgency, was still a menace, and three
years passed before the Federation Government could announce the
restoration of normal conditions. As a result, neither the
Federation of Malaya nor the British Government showed any open
willingness to propose the idea of a greater Malaysia before 1960,
even though the desirability of such a federation had been talked
* For the line of argument in this section, the researcher
is indebted to a lengthy interView with Mr. Roland Hunt.
(447/8) C*Yi_vi cl.: 2 094 , M ALAY-Si/I ; Prreero,nt to .itid.eci. betotehthe
u tea Kinpiown of Grezt t •ritcti and Nerrthrrn Vre./A.het, the, fiedLottfias
rviathy a, , North_ UT-vità
	 cts4._ Sinattro-rdi_
LovIdokl, Jiffy 196 71 Article :E.
(-149)
	 FO 371/ 12.9 32. 1 tl The O	 aetAtiep---,	 Malaya (Ap to 19 Cb; 41%61.
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about in Britain as early as 1942.(45°)
This idea had acquired a new lease of life after the
Federation of Malaya was born and AMDA negotiated. The treaty
provided a framework within which decolonisation was made possible
without any consequential loss of British prestige. (451) However,
a multitude of factors, generated by two powerful forces, viz., a
desire to play a key role East-of-Suez and at the same time to
decolonise, were apparently at work behind the British desire to
achieve an extended federation, (452) incorporating the Borneo
Territories, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya*
Amongst these factors, prevailing circumstances and recent
developments in the region, as well as those in Malaya and
Singapore, exerted a marked influence over the outcome.(453)
Although the separation of Singapore from the mainland was
* This argument was substantiated by a discussion with Lord
Inchyra, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office,
1956-60. He had accompanied Macmillan during his visit to the Far
East in January, 1958.
(450) Cmnd.6724: Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of policy
on future constitution, H. M.5.0. London, January 1946, p.3.
(451) John F. Cady, op.cit., p.157; and Dato Abdullah Ahmad,
op.cit., p.
(452) D.P. Singhal, "United States of Malaysia", Asian Survey,
Vol.I., No.8, October 1961, pp.15-20; and Chin Kin Wah, The Defence
of Malaysia and Singapore, op.cit., p.
(453) EMily -Wka, "Singapore and the Federation: Problems of
Merger", Asian Survey, Vol .1, No.11, November 1962, pp.17-25.
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impractical, owing to its strategic location, the colony was kept
separate from Malaya in 1946.( 45 ) SUbsequently, while granting
internal self-government to Singapore in 1959, the British
Government kept internal and external security in their own
hands. (455 ) "Neither the political cost (defined by internal
developments in Singapore) nor British economic restraints were
sufficiently high for a re-evaluation of the strategic benefits
yielded by Singapore".(4.56)
These benefits were seen by the British Government at the
time as vital to its whole strategic position, not only in South
East Asia, but also in the Pacific region. As explained by a former
diplomat, Britain had major stakes in the area in maintaining
military bases in Singapore. In fact, the defence of New Zealand
and Australia was considered to start at Singapore. Moreover, the
defence of Malaya was inseparable from that of Singapore, and
British forces therefore needed Singapore bases in order to
coordinate their strategy in the region. Its strategic location,
and the fact that it offered "the only dry dock between Japan and
Sydney large enough to hold an air-craft carrier",(457) invariably
meant that Singapore was the key to defence operations in the
area. Yet if the colony was a vital strategic point, it was also a
(454) op.eit., p.41.
-This roh-cy was dryw La in the. LelTile,' cLoeUmehtS. Sit, for .bcaw‘ple,
(455)IDEFE 4/100, C.O.S. (57), Chiefs of Staff Committee, 69th
Meeting held on 27th August 1957, Annex to J.P. (57) 94, Final
p.4.
(456) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.41.
(457) C.J. Bartlett, The Long Retreat, Macmillan, London, 1972,
p.162.
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op.cit.,
political hot bed, and the British government was rather alarmed
at the prospect of communist oriented parties gaining any strong-
hold in the political arena.*
The fear that communists might try to spread into the soft
under-belly of Asia played by far the largest part in the
formation of Malaysia. (458) However, the new federation was never
supposed to be inspired by animosity towards China. Since a
crucial distinction between the containment of communism and
containment of the People's Republic of China was drawn at an
early stage both by TUriku Abdul Rahman and Harold Macmillan.(4591
The communist threat in South East Asia was perceived partly as
guerilla movement and partly as the successful capture of
political power by parliamentary methods. In this context, the
fear of a large Chinese population in South Fast Asia, with a
stranglehold on the economy, was seen as a prominent threat to the
balance of power in the region. 460) British fear that communists
might upset the app lecart was aggravated by regional developments,
as was clear in the speech of Mt. R.L. Peel, the President of the
British Association of Malaya. He categorically asserted that,
"The recent events in Vietnam and Laos had underlined the urgency
of a Greater Malaysia. One of the major purposes of the Federation
* During his discussion, Mt. H.T. Bourdillon, a former Deputy
High Commissioner to Singapore, 1959-61, talked at great length
about the highly volatile state of Singapore at that time.
(458) J.F. Cady, op.cit., pp.157-158.
(459) Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm,
p.409.
(460) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., pp.126-8.
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was to form some sort of shield against the further advance of
communism in the area". (46I ) In the creation of Malaysia, the
British and Malayan leadership perceived an opportunity to balance
the Chinese population of Singapore against the non-Chinese popula-
tion of Sarawak and North Borneo. (462 ) In Malaya, fear and contempt
of Chinese communists holding political power were expressed by the
Malayan Minister of the Interior in the Malayan Parliament. In his
speech in October 1961, he declared that, "We must do something to
prevent the communists dominating this country. That is why, today,
we are discussing this question of merger".(463)
In the meantime, the political situation in Singapore had
become explosive. 64) Seen in retrospect, Singapore was a
difficult baby and needed a firm but gentle hand to guide it
towards freedom. (465 ) Its size, location and demography ruled out
any prospect of it ever getting independence on its own. But the
ML
idea of incorporating it with Malaya did not appeal tolTUnku until
(461) Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.XXXVIII, No.2, July 12,
1962, p.63.
(462) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., pp.60 and 66. The
numerical pre-dominance of the Chinese population would not
have been so great in Malaysia, as Table 5 on the next page
demonstrates.
(463) T.E. Smith, "Proposals for Malaysia", World Today, Vol.18,
No.5, May 1962, p.196.
(464) Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and
Malaya, 1945-1963, Faber and Faber, London, 1973, pp.142-154.
(465) Willam P. Maddox, "Singapore: A Problem Child", Foreign
Affairs, Vol.40, No.3 ', April, 1962, pp.479-489.
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a later date. (466 ) "Times have changed", TUnku told the Malayan
Table 5 
Racial Composition in Singapore-4Malaya and the Borneo Territories
Population
Racial Groups Singapore
and Malaya
The Borneo
Territories
Malaysia
-
Percentage
Malaysians and
Indigenous races 3,322,000 872,953 4,194,953 46.6
Chinese 3,425,000 355,491 3,780,491 42.0
All Others 977,000 54,383 1,031,383 11.4
Total 7,724,000 1,282,827 9,006,827 100.00
Source: B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.132.
Parliament in 1961, "and so must our outlook".( 467) The TUnku had
considered the idea of such a greater federation in 1957, but had
dropped it because of "strong arguments against the early
admission of Singapore to the Federation". (468 ) It was not Singa-
pore but thelhols-Malay:4 populated territories of Borneo, i.e.,
Sabah and Sarawak, which ultimately convinced the Malayan Prime
(466) Tunku Abdul Rahman spoke about Malaysia publicly at a lunch
at the Foreign Correspondents Association in Singapore on 27th May
1961.
(467) Parliamentary Debates, Federation of Malaya, Dewan ra'ayat,
16th October 1961, Col. 1592.
(468) "Proposals for Malaysia", World Today, op.cit., p.194.
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Minister of the desirability of such a federation. (4)
If Singapore was not acceptable to Tunku Abdul Rahman,
why did the Borneo Territories make such a different impact on him?
The answer lies in the desire of Britain at the time to decolon-
ise.(.470) No one could see these territories remaining under
British rule forever and a federation appeared to be the best
solution to the regional problem. (47" Although local consent was
essential for implementation of the merger, Britain naturally
enjoyed a special position, since it had the "power of persuasion,
direction, control or even force at its disposal". (472) The Borneo
territories, for their part, were not insensitive to the
(469) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., pp.56-76; Harold
Macmillan, At the End of the Day, op.cit., p.249.
(470) CAB 134/1551, C.P.C. (57) 27, "Future Development in the
Colonies", a Report sUbmitted to Official Colonial Policy
Committee in June 1957. The Report favoured self-government for
these colonies in the near future.
(471) CAB 134/1556, C.P.C. (57) 34, 29th November 1957, a
memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies sUbmitted
to Colonial Policy Committee on the Borneo Territories. This
memorandum suggested a federation of all three Borneo Territories
including Brunei. The federation would have enabled these
territories to withstand pressure from Malaya, Singapore or
Indonesia. Unfortunately, the plan never even took off due to the
reluctance of the Sultan of Brunei.
(472) Ursula K. Hicks, (ed.), Federalism and Economic Growth in
Underdeveloped Countries; A Symposium, Allen and Unwin, London,
1961, p.59.
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possibility of a federation, although e tIh stale. British
Government thought the idea of a merger somewhat premature. 794)
This reluctance is understandable in view of the enormous gap
which existed between the Borneo territories and the Federation in
terms of political and economic development. One of the two
territories, Sarawak, had come under direct British rule only
after the Second World War, and consequently lacked even the basic
infrastructure of local self-government.(475)
The close proximity of these territories to Indonesia,
however, meant that the Federation of Malaya could not ignore
their future.(476) What finally convinced TUnku Abdul Rahman
was the continued presence of British armed protection under the
Anglo4lalayan Defence Agreement. In case there should be any
regional opposition to the merger, AMDA could be invoked. With
this assurance in mind, TUnku thought these independent
territories might join Indonesia, and that it would be better if
they could instead be persuaded to join Malaysia. Once he grasped
the relevance of AMDA to British decolonisation, he became
confident of the success of Malaysia. Since he saw the logic
of incorporating the Borneo Territories, he had no ground for
(473/4) James. P. Ongkili, The Borneo Response to Malaysia, 1961-
1963. Donald Moore Press, Singapore, 1967, p.23.
(475) G.P. Means, "Malaysia - A New Federation in South East
Asia", Pacific Affairs, VO1.36, No.2, Summer, 1963, p.148.
(476) J.M. Gullick, op.cit., p41.
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rejecting the same logic in the case of Singapore.* In an article
on "The Leftovers of the EMpire", The Economist, argued the case
for Malaysia in a similar light. "A possible federation, which
would solve the difficult problem of Singapore, (would] be one
between the independent Federation of Malaya and the British
territories of North Borneo and Singapore, whose big Chinese
population would not then outweigh the Malays". The paper warned
that, "If this is not done, Indonesia will probably ultimately
stretch out her hand for these states". (477 ) These were prophetic
words in 1958.
The most active and enthusiastic support for the merger
came from within Singapore itself.( 478) In 1958, The People's
Action Party led by Lee Kuan Yew had secured a victory by pledging
to achieve full freedom within two years. Any delay in this matter
would have severely damaged his reputation vis-a-vis the
Communists and radicals. (479 ) A Communist government in Singapore,
* For the argument in this section, the researcher acknowledges
the invaluable guidance rendered by Sir Neil Pritchard in a
lengthy Interview. Sir Neil who was acting Deputy Under Secretary
of State Commonwealth Relations Office in 1961-63, had an intimate
knowledge of the problems of merger.
(477) The Economist, January 4, 1958.
(478) Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger, Government Printing
Office, Singapore, 1963, pp.4-8.
(479) "Future of Malaysia in balance", Guardian, 11 September 1962.
Moreover, Paul C. Bradley, "Leftist Fissure in Singapore Politics",
Western Political Quarterly, June 1965, Part 1, pp.292-388, gives
the most vivid account of the prevailing circumstances.
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however, would have been a nightmare for both Britain and the
Federation of Malaya.
Lee KUan Yew himself accepted the strategic importance of
Singapore and also acknowledged the inherent weakness of its
political structure. (480) He was reported in The Guardian as
saying that, "Singapore, with its predominantly Chinese population
would, if independent on its own, become -South East Asia's
Israel' with every hand turned against it".(481)
(D) Malaysia: Divergence of Anglo-Malayan Interests, 1957-1963.
As has been shown in the previous section, a keen British
desire to play a role Fast-of-Suez and the inevitability of
decolonisation had brought a convergence of interest with the
Federation of Malaya. It will be recalled, however, that "Malayan
and British interests in the scheme were, of course, very nearly
complementary, (although] they were not entirely identical".(462/
Owing to differences about timetable and procedure the two
countries had some clash of opinion during the negotiations. Thus,
whereas we witness a convergence on the proposal of Malaysia, we
see a divergence on the question of how and When to proceed
towards it.
In the course of a prolonged negotiating period, the
British showed keen concern for the political and strategic
aspects of the situ&-lion.c'483) The political aspect, guided by the
policy of rapid decolonisation, necessitated a merger with
(480) Lee KUan Yew, op.cit., p.5.
(481) Guardian, op.cit., 11 September, 1962.
(482) Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.43.
(483), B. Simandiuntak, op.cit.,pp.141-152,
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honour. (484) The desire for an honourable merger is intelligible
in terms of the British wish to decolonise without giving the
impression of being forced out of the area. Britain also wished to
avoid creating the impression of pushing the two reluctant colonies
into the federation,
	 otherwise the Borneo peoples would be
justified in feeling that they had been cast adrift rather
hurriedly. (485 ) To ensure their future status within Malaysia, and
to provide certain safeguards against any discrimination, there-
fore became a major concern of British negotiators.(486)
Turning now from the political aspects to the strategic
one, it was essential that the merger should not result in the
curtailment of any of Britain's existing rights under AMDA to
operate in the region. (487) In short, Britain sought to avoid any
alteration in the situation relating to the base facilities in
Singapore under the extended terms of A1IDA.(480)
Harold Macmillan clearly identified defence as the major
consideration facing Britain. "First arose the vital question of
defence". Macmillan recorded in his memoirs, "involving the rights
and responsibilities of both Britain and her Chief Commonwealth
partners in the area - Australia and New Zealand. There was also
involved the interests of other SEATO allies, primarily the United
(484) CAB 134/1556, C.P.C. (57) 37, op.cit. The Paper had already
contended that British "prestige and influence will naturally
suffer by our premature withdrawal".
(485) Ibid., p.53.
(486) John Bastin andWobrh Winks, op.cit., pp.410-411.
(467) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., pp.266-267.
(438) J.M. Gullick, op.cit., p.44.
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States".(489) In other words, "Initially, the British faced a
dilemma between the greater stability which Malaysia promised and
the uncertainty of effective control over the Singapore bases as a
consequence of unification".(490) The future of the base in
Singapore, then, was the central issue, and the British Government
wanted to maintain the status quo despite the proposed
merger.(491)
For the leaders of future Malaysia, however, acceptance of
any direct link with SEATO was anathema. But at the same time, the
economic and strategic advantages of the British armed presence
carried enough weight to counter-balance any Malayan insistence on
their -sovereignty' over these bases. (.492 ) An article in the
Far Eastern Economic Review summed up the economic and political
advantages of the continued British presence ;11 the Singapore base
as the provision of "direct employment for 40,000 people and a
livelihood for 120,000 out of a total population of 1.7
millions."(490)
Moreover, there were genuine fears that "sudden with-
drawal of British military forces will leave a power vacuum" in
the region. (494 ) Hence both Malaya and Singapore were quite under-
(489) Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, op.cit., p.248.
(490) Chin Kin Wah, Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.53.
(491) Sunday Times, 1 October, 1961.
(492) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.265.
(493) K.S.C. Pillai, "Malaysia, Crucial Phase", Far Eastern
Economic Review, Vol.XXXVII, No. 19 July 1962, p.117.
(494) Ibid., p.119.
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standably not keen on seeing Britain leave the bases.(495)
Consequently, in the course of negotiations on the extension of
AMDA to cover Malaysia, no major obstacle was evident except the
question of using the Singapore bases for SEATO purposes.
Tunku Abdul Rahman himself made it clear that he would not
"attach too much importance to SEATO". In case of a communist
threat, he said, "We have to make use of everything to fight
it". <96)
Once again, in order to avoid a stalemate, the old formula
of ambiguity and flexibility was adopted. (497 ) Britain was allowed
"to maintain the bases and other facilities.., for the purpose of
assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence
and for the preservation of peace in South East Asia".(498)
Inclusion of the words "preservation of peace in South
East Asia", clearly allowed Britain to use the bases for SEATO
purposes if required. (499 ) But the Federation Government referred
to its right to be consulted in such matters. Tun Razak, the
Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation, declared that "the
sovereignty of the base lies with us. The British Government cannot
make use of the base without consulting us". (500)
(495) Ibid.
(496) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.265.
(497) Robert 0. Tilman, op.cit., p.130.
(498) Cmnd. 1563: Federation of Malaysia: Joint Statement by the
Governments of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya,
H.M.S.O., London, November, 1961.
(499) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .650, 28
November 1961. Co1.244.
(500) Straits Times, 1 December 1961.
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Contrary to British apprehensions, the issue of the
Singapore base did not prove to be an insurmountable problem. It
is significant, however, that an agreement was signed on this
aspect well in advance of others. In November 1961, when AMDA was
formally extended to cover Malaysia, the negotiations to ascertain
the views of the Borneo people had not even started. The speed
c------'with which the future arrangements for the bases were
settled clearly reflected the degree of priority assigned to the
East-of-Suez role by both parties.(5°I)
However, if British diplomats were swift and firm in
dealing with the question of bases, the same speed was nowhere in
sight when negotations started on the future status of the Borneo
people within Malaysia. (5‘32) Here Britain was cautious, being
completely in favour of restraints and patience, as a letter from
the British Prime Minister to his counterpart in Malaya reveals.
"I had learned caution from some unhappy examples of ill-prepared
schemes of Federation", warned Macmillan's cautious note eand
that, "I certainly do not want a shot gun wedding". cs03' Indeed.
the merger of Borneo Territories with unequal partners in a
bigger unit was a far more complicated issue which involved iiMIIMBIM
fears and anxieties, as well as cultural and racial pride.
conflicting economic ambitions, and above all the equality of
status as citizens of the federation.( 504) Bearing inaind the
problems, it was not surprising that the British Government "felt
bound to express apprehensions about the wisdom of a speedy shot-
(501) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.296.
(502) J.A.C. Mackie, op.cit., p.43.
(503) Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, op.cit.. p.249.
(504) J.M. Gullick, op.cit., p.177.
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gun marriage inspite of the noble intentions on the Malayan
Side". (0)
The British Government, having initiated the merger
negotiation on behalf of the Borneo territories, was apprehensive
about the fact that in these territories, which were under British
rule, the level of political maturity was low in comparison to the
Federation of Malaya. (6) In the absence of any developed
representative infrastructure, the Cobbold Commission was
appointed to ascertain the opinion of the Borneo people on the
proposed merger. The Commission, While welcoming the idea of
Malaysia, warned against any future "takeover of the Borneo
territories by the Federation". O7) There were genuine fears of
racial, economic and religious discrimination by Malays, and the
leaders of Borneo, therefore, urged the Government to incorporate
some safeguards against "any discrimination" in the future
constitution of Malaysia. <08)
Keeping in sight the Cobbald Commission's recommendations,
the British Government devised the idea of a trial period to be
incorporated into the agreement on Malaysia so that, "the
prospective partners would have a chance to test the workings of
the plan in practice and the right to ask for modifications before
finally committing themselves". ( 5°9) In addition, the British
(505) "Malayan Talks at Chequers", The Guardian, 28 July 1962.
(506) James P. Ongkili, The Borneo Response, op.cit., p.63.
ernhei. I19q:
(507),Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and
Sarawak , H.	 Lo ria 0-1 7 lip u St i962.;
(508) "Malaysia: A Good Omen", Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol.XXXVII, No.7, 16 August 1962, p.2.
(509) "Hitch in talks on Malaysia", The Guardian, 25 July, 1962.
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Government proposed to include special clauses against
discrimination on the points of (a) immigration; (b) the right to
opt out; (c) the civil service; (d) the language and religion of
the minorities. (10)
On the other hand, the Federation Government, in the name
of internal security and the future integrity of Malaysia, was
reluctant not only to compromise on these points but even to argue
on the proposed timetable. '•' Quite contrary to British belief
in not rushing the Malaysia plan, the argument of the Federation's
Prime Minister was that any undue delay would only provide
"communists [with] the weapons they need for infiltration and
subversion with the ultimate object of capturing these
territories", and he firmly added at this point, "we cannot afford
to wait... (since] time is not on our side".( 512) The Malayan
Government was apprehensive at the possibility of these territ-
ories being "gobbled up by China", and decided, as the Guardian
commented, that "better a friendly ride from a western horse than
the gaping jaws of an eastern crocodile".(51-3)
With these two opposed views on either side, the talks on
Malaysia ran into trouble on 28 July 1962. At this juncture.
intervention from Singapore compelled the two reluctant
negotiating parties to compromise on certain points. Lee Kin Yew
claimed, as was reported by the Far Fhstern Economic Review. that.
"you may be sure that had there been no Singapore considerations.
it might have been five or seven years until the Federation of
(510) ern ?it:L.179(1,	 _ 	 p.cit., pp.56-57.
(511) Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, op.cit.. p.254.
(512) "Malaysia in balance", The Observer, 25 July, 1962.
(513) "Malaysia talks at Chequers", The Guardian, 28 July 1962.
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Malaysia could come into being".(-) This decisive intervention
from Lee KUan Yew came in the form of a proposal that Singapore
and the Federation of Malaya should join Malaysia at that point
and that the Borneo territories might come into it later. This
prospect, which alarmed both governments for different reasons,
was acceptable to TUnku only in extreme circumstances, and wholly
unacceptable to Britain because of its destabilizing influence on
the territories. However, both parties came to a speedy agreement
in principle on 1 August 1962 and left the details to be worked
out later on by an Inter-Governmental Committee.(z15)
In the course of the present writer's discussion of Anglo-
Malayan differences during the Malaysia negotiations with former
diplomats who had first-hand experience of South East Asia,
certain issues emerged very clearly. On the question of "patient
Britain, impatient Malaysia", it could be argued that Britain did
not in fact wish to hurry up, since that would have created a
wrong impression about its intention. At the same time, it had
already experienced some dismal failures with planned federations.
In the Malaysian case haste was justified by future events, as
Indonesia decided to confront Malaysia even before it came into
formal existence. One senior diplomat, whilst summing up the
story, accepted that "in the beginning Malaya was not interested
in Malaysia. But after some time, Tunku thought that in case of
decolonisation, it would be better if these colonies came into
Malaysia, rather than join any other country. Once Malaya got
(514) "Timing and Circumstance", Far Pastern Economic Review,
Vol.XXXVII, No.7, 16 August 1962, p.291.
(515) "Malaysia: Hurrying to the Altar", Financial Times, 2
August 1962.
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interested, there was no stopping at that. In fact the fear of
Indonesia was in the background. We (British) never took
Indonesian threats seriously, but Malays always did. In the end,
it was proved that they were right and we were wrong".* In the
following year, even before the birth of Malaysia, British forces
were already engaged in protecting it against the Indonesian
-confrontation'. The irony of the situation was that "the process
of decolonisation initiated by Britain had become hateful to an
anti-colonial Government".(516) It is this situation which will
be the focus of analysis in the next chapter.
* The researcher was asked by the diplomat concerned not to
disclose his identity.
(516) S. Nihal Singh, Malayasia - A Commentary, Barnes and Noble,
New York, 1971, p.100.
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CHAPTER IV
British Foreign Policy towards Malaysia 1963-1965.
It has been argued in the preceding chapter that the
combination of two policies, viz. decolonisation and a desire to
play a special role East-of-Suez region, was the most powerful
influence shaping British foreign policy in Asia and Africa in
in general, and in South East Asia in particular, during the first
half of the nineteerrsixties.* The creation of the federation of
.1
	
g*
Malaysia was the biggest success achievedkthe policy of
decolonisation without any consequential loss of British prestige
in the region. But there was another side to the story, which was
that between them decolonisation and the Fast-of-Suez presence
implicated Britain in an unforseen regional entanglement. Although
it never became an overwhelming burden, this entanglement created
an awkward situation for Britain. Our task in this chapter is to
examine closely this situation, in which we confront the curious
spectacle of British forces fighting a quasi-war against a half-
hidden and half-exposed enemy for nearly three and a half years.
* Discussions with Sir Arthur de la Mare, Assistant Under
Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1965-67, and British High
Commissioner in Singapore, 1968-70; Sir Neil Pritchard, Deputy
Under Secretary of State, C.R.O., 1963-1967; Sir J.R.A.
Bottomley, Deputy High Commissioner to Malaysia, 1963-1966; and
Sir Frank Cooper, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Air Ministry,
1962-64 and Assistant under Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence,
1964,-68, have assisted in the formulation of the major arguments
in this chapter.
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The oddest aspect of the situation was that British forces were
fighting for the protection of territories to which Britain had
already granted freedom.
More generally, we are concerned with the contradiction
that had openly emerged between the policy of decolonisation and
the simultaneous retention of a substantial armed presence East-
of-Suez. This contradiction is particularly well illustrated by
developments in South PAst Asia, where Britain, "though increas-
ingly reconciled to colonial disengagement, yet tenaciously
[upheld] its peace keeping role".(517)
In order to set the scene for the analysis of this paradox
in British foreign policy, however, it will be useful to begin by
examining the regional developments which gave concrete shape to
British responses. In the first section, we will accordingly
examine two major developments, namely, the Borneo crisis in
December 1962 and the opposition to the proposed federation of
Malaysia prior to the beginning of Indonesian -confrontation'.
The Background to British Foreign Policy towards Malaysia, 1963
The British illusion of peace was shattered by the Brunei
rebellion on 8th December 1962.(518) The implicit connection
between M. Azhari, the rebel-leader and the Indonesian government
the.
made the event important from/regional point of view. (However,
(517) Chin Kin Wall, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.59.
(518) Mat Saleh, "The Brunei Affair", Eastern World, Vol.XVII,
No.3, March 1963, pp.9-10, and "Malaysian Discord", FAstern World
Vol. XVII, No.2, February 1963, p.8.
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Indonesian-Malaysian relations are discussed in detail later).
In response to the Sultan of Brunei's request, British forces
quelled the rebellion.( 519) The British response was quick and
decisive, and even the severest critics of the Government's defence
policy were forced to give due credit to the Brunei operation. (20)
Denis Healey, the Opposition's spokesman on Defence, whilst
comparing the operation with the Suez experience, admitted that, in
Borneo "(the British] were carrying out (their] overseas
responsibilities with panache and efficiency".(52I)
(a) The Borneo crisis and the Fast-of-Suez debate, 1963
With hindsight, the significance of the Borneo crisis
proved to be manifold. First of all, it demonstrated to friends
and foes alike that Britain meant business; it was prepared to
take necessary risks, and had sufficient power to carry on the
tasks involved in honouring its obligations.( 522) A debate in the
British Parliament on the Brunei operation contained approving
references to the depth of Britain's commitment to maintaining
its image as a peace-keeping power in South East Asia.(523)
(519) Willard A. Hanna, The Formation of Malaysia, op.cit.,
pp. 139-140.
(520) T.E. Smith, "Progress towards Malaysia and the Brunei
Revolt", World Today, Vol. XIX, No.1, January 1963, pp. 6-8.
(521) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 673, 4 March
1963, Co1.46.
(522)B. Vivekanandan, op.cit.. p.135 and T.E. Smith, "The Brunei
Revolt: Background and Consequences", World today, Vol.XIX, No. 4,
April 1963, pp.135-138.
(523) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .670, 28
January 1963, Col. 582.
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On the other hand, the Opposition party exploited the
opportunity by pointing out the Europe vs. Asia dilemma. The front
bench of the Opposition, favouring pro-European policies, attacked
the decision to move B.A.O.R. from Europe in case of emergency
and warned against "removing the spear-head" of the Strategic
Reserve. Mr. Wigg4, from the Opposition benches, asked the
Defence Minister, what would be the Government's policy "if it
were necessary in the immediate future to reinforce the Rhine
Army?" (524) The Secretary of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, did not
view it as removing the spear-head but only "using the Strategic
Reserve for the precise purpose for which it was designed".(525)
This debate had a deep influence on the subsequent debate
on the Defence Paper Cmnd.1936 in 1963. It also highlighted two
things in particular. Firstly, it ascertained British willingness
to operate in far off places, and secondly, it exposed the extent
to which the British army was overstretched in its attempt to cover
Europe and Asia simultaneously over a long period.
The debate on Cmnd.1936 became a major turning point in
the East-of-Suez policy. For the first time, serious doubts were
raised about the feasibility of pursuing a global peace keeping
role with strained economic resources. While seeking parliamentary
approval for Cmnd.1936, the Defence Minister felt confident enough
to broach the dilemma faced by the Government at that time. "To
keep our forces Ft-of-Suez is of course, a costly burden", he
admitted, and then briefly indicated the alternatives: "if we are
to take them out of Aden or Singapore, I think that our critics
(524) Ibid., Col. 582.
(525) Ibid., Col. 581.
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ought to say so openly ... either they must cut our overseas role
to reinforce Europe or reintroduce conscription". (26)
The debate centred around the old dilemma, mentioned
above, of Europe vs. Asia, a dilemma which British decision-makers
had been facing ever since the beginning of the twentieth century.
Over the past sixty years, their diplomacy had sought to maintain
a balance, in order to avoid choosing one alternative at the cost
of other. But by the beginning of the nineteen sixties such an
evasion was no longer possible, as the fore-mentioned statement of
Peter Thorneycroft has shown already. The British were chained
to South East Asia by SEATO and AMDA, and the Brunei revolt had
shown the practical implications of overseas operations, both in
terms of manpower and money.
The Government accepted the criticism of the Oppostion
that maintenance of overseas forces, "certainly is a policy which
costs money and places a very heavy strain indeed upon our
resources". (527) On the other hand, there was no question of
relinquishing such a role. "If our defence policy is to become an
extension of our foreign policy", John Profumo, the Secretary of
State for War, observed, "we simply cannot afford to abandon any
of these (three] essentials". C528)
By the beginning of 1963, then, the British commitment to
South East Asia had been acknowledged, worked out, and firmly
(526) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 673, 5 March
1963, Col. 533.
(527) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 673, 4 March
1963, Col. 154.
(528) Ibid., Col. 154. These three esentials were the defence of
Britain, NATO commitments and the Commonwealth-connections.
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entrenched within three major Defence Papers, i.e. Cmnd.127 (1957),
Cmnd.1939 (1962) and Cmnd.1963 (1963). The Brunei rebellion had
further exposed the extent of the threat to peace in the
region. (529) By 1963, therefore, Britain was more convinced than
ever that its forces were essential for maintaining peace and
deterring any aggression against its allies in the region. At the
same time, however, there was a deepening awareness of the cost
involved in such overseas operations, and the severe strains it
created for the armed forces.
We may now return to the proposition advanced earlier.
This was that the armed presence entailed by the East-of-Suez
policy meant that the British presence itself became a source of
regional instability. As a result, the proposed federation i.e.,
Malaysia itself became the target of criticism among its
neighbours. It is this aspect of the situation which must now
be examined.
(b) Malaysia: A "Neo-Colonialist Plot"? 
The main criticism of the proposed federation of Malaysia
originated from two sources. One, the external source, was
Indonesia; the other, the internal source, was the major
opposition parties within the proposed federation itself. The
internal criticism was sharper before the formation of the
federation. (530) It caused some pangs of anxiety to the Colonial
Office at that time, but subsided after the birth of Malaysia. By
contrast, the external criticism was primarily verbal so long as
the creation of Malaysia was not a certainty, but soon turned
(529) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.11.
(530) Arnold C. Brackman, op.cit., pp.42-53.
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into a potential threat, taking the form of subversion, propaganda,
diplomatic hostility, and armed incursions into the territory of
Malaysia. (531 ) Indonesian hostility came to an end only with the
demise of the existing power structure and change of leadership
in Jakarta in 1965-1966.
In its most threatening form, the internal criticism
emanated from Barisan Sosialis, which was the major opposition
party in Singapore. (32) Apart from that, the PMIP and the
Socialist Front, (the radical right wing and left wing parties
respectively in the Federation of Malaya), also attacked the idea
of merger. In Sarawak, the SUPP became the most outspoken critic
of the proposed merger.(533) Given the high level of communist
infiltration within the rank and file of SUPP, this opposition did
not take British administrators by surprise. (534) The government
had been well aware of this threat for a longtime.(535)
In 1957, for example, Lennox Boyd, the Secretary of State for
the Colonies had reported to his colleagues that in Sarawak the
(531) Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Malaysia and Indonesia",
FAstern World, Vol.XIV, NO. 11, November 1963, pp.13-16.
(532) Paul C. Bradley, op.cit., pp.302-3.
(533) J.P. Ongkili, The Borneo Responses to Malaysia, 1961-1963,
Donald Moore Press, Singapore, 1967, gives a detailed account of
Borneo's resistance and acceptance of Malaysia.
(534)See for example, The Danger Within, A History of Cland-
estine Communist Operations in Sarawak, Kuching, Sarawak,
Government Printing Office, 1963, and A. Brackman, op.cit.,
pp.62-67.
(535) CAB134/1556, C.P.C. (57) 34, op.cit., para 4.
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communists had already infiltrated the Chinese schools. However,
he assured them that those threats were being contained, although
he warned his colleagues that the events outside, i.e., in Malaya
or Singapore might increase the danger of subversion. (536) Since
the purpose of Malaysia was to counteract any such possibility,
the proposed federation came under fierce attack from SUPP at the
very beginning. For identical reasons, the most vehement attack
came from the Barisan Sosialis, which regarded Malaysia as "a
British inspired idea".( 537) Not satisfied with this, the party
charged the Singapore Government with "selling out" their citizen-
ship rights to Malaya.(538) On the whole, the major thrust of this
internal opposition to the proposed federation may be divided into
two lines of attack. First was the charge of disenfranchisement of
the Singapore people, together with a demand for the right of self-
determination of the people of Borneo.(539) Secondly, Malaysia
was said to be merely a British neo-imperialist plot to "consol-
idate its economic and military hold on the region".( 540 ) The
continued presence of British bases was seen as a blot on indep-
endence, ( 54'i ) and some radical parties in Malaya even advocated
incorporation of some Indonesian territories to counter-balance
the overwhelming Chinese population of Singapore.(542)
(536) Ibid.
(537) Brackman, op.cit., pp. 49-52.
(538) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrantasi, op.cit. , pp.45-48, and Richard
Allen, op.cit., p.155.
(539) S. Nihal Singh, op.cit., p.11.
(540) K.S.C. Pillai, "Malaysia: A Crucial Phase", op.cit., p.121.
(541) Brackman, op.cit., pp. 69-73.
(542) Ibid., p.43.
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The British response to these developments in Singapore
and the Borneo territories was somewhat varied. In the case of the
Borneo territories, Britain had already decided in favour of the
merger and the Cobbold Commission's Report was almost a foregone
conclusion. But at the same time, British diplomats were keen to
incorporate "safeguards" against racial, cultural and lingual
discrimination in the forthcoming federation's constitution. To an
extent, the relative backwardness of the Borneo territories
justified this anxiety on the part of British paternalists.
Their attitude towards the Chinese population was in total
contrast to their paternalism towards the Borneo people. Here, due
to the economic advantages enjoyed by the Chinese people,(43)
British policy aimed at curtailing the Chinese ambition to exercise
political and economic power over the Malay and Borneo peoples in
the forthcoming federation. An extract from the Cobbold
Commission's report illustrates this point. "In the absence of
some projects like Malaysia, the Chinese with their rapidly
(543) For example see, Margaret Clark Roff, The Politics of 
Belonging: Political Changes in Sabah and Sarawak, O.U.P., Kuala
Lumpur, 1974. Her observation regarding Chinese predominance in
Sarawakuas that, "the Chinese community of Sarawak has grown to
garn6g
thirty percent of the total population, arid/to control the bulk of
thd.
commerce and trade", (p.31.). In/case of North Boren°, Margaret
Roff's argumentwas that, "Bulk of the wealth was created and enjoyed
by the Chinese, while the Native people's were protected from
modernization by regimes of avowva4y benevolent intent". (p.41)
Demographically also Chinese were the single largest
homogenous group in these territories. Divisions in North Borneo
(footnote (543) continued on next page.)
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census reports clearly demonstrate this situation as the Table
given below clearly demonstrates.
Table 5 
The Division of Population of North Borneo and Sarawak
- into Different Ethnic Communities, 1960 
North Borneo	 Sarawak
Dusun
	
145,229	 Malays -	 129,300
MUrut
	
22,138	 Melanany	 44,661
Bajans
	
59,710	 Sea Dayaks	 237,741
Other
	
Land Dyaks	 57,619
Indigenous 59,421
Other
Chinese	 104,542	 Indigenous	 37,931
EUropeans	 1,896	 Chinese	 229,154
Others	 41,485	 Others	 8,123
Source: North Borneo Report on the Census of Population Taken on
10th August 1960. Government Printers, Jesselton, 1961; and
Sarawak Report on the Census of Population Taken on 15th June 1960,
Government Printers, Kuching, 1962.
However, when we reconsider the statement made in Chapter
III on p.133, of our thesis, it appears to be misleading. In fact,
the earlier statement holds grounds only in a slightly modified
form. It is worth mentioning that these various ethnic groups,
were. •beithe y 'Odiay i no-r. Chinese
either. The optimistic leadership of Malaya considered them closer
to -Malays'. Therefore, the non-Chinese rather than -Malay'
population of the Borneo Territories was supposed to counter-
balance the adverse effects of inclusion of Singaporean Chinese.
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increasing population and their long established predominance over
the other races in education, could expect, when independence
came, to be in an unassailable position in Sarawak". (544)
The British response to the opposition parties in Singapore
was even tougher. The Colonial Office shunned them completely, and
-
Lee KUan Yew, the Chief Minister of Singapore, was given the status
of sole representative.' 54'5 ) In Singapore, politically hostile
government would have jeopardized Britain's vital strategic
interests in. base facilities. Secondly, sharing the Malay appre-
hension, British experiences over the last century had convinced
them of the desirability of erecting some barrier against the
total domination of the future Malaysian economy by Chinese
y\ entrepriSe. This was Why a helping hand was readily extended to Lee
KUan Yew and his PAP, who were satisfied with only a limited
amount of economic and educational "autonomy" for Singapore, and
were ready to fop° federal citizenship. Moreover, for the PAP
the British base in Singapore was more than welcome for strategic
and economic reasons.
These internal misgivings about Malaysia soon died down
when the agreement was formally signed in July 1963. But the
Indonesian hostility did not show any sign of abating with the
passing of time. On the contrary, there seemed to be an almost
uncanny connection between the growth of Indonesian hostility and
the prospect of the creation of Malaysia.,s46,
(544) Crrn ha- I1 4, 01.)	 P R,
(545) John Drysdale, op.cit., pp.295-6.
(546) J.A.C. Mackie, "Indonesia: A Background to Confrontation",
World Today, Vol.XX, No.4, April 1964, pp. 136-47.
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For example, whereas in the beginning only the PKI leadership had
issued threats against the forthcoming federation, on 20 January
1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio made it clear
that "his Government was compelled to adopt a policy of confront-
ation against Malaya, because that country was at present
representing itself as an accomplice of neo-colonialism and neo-
imperialism pursuing a hostile policy towards Indonesia".(547)
The Indonesian charges of "imperialists at work" in South
East Asia had deep roots in the history of Indonesia's political
ideology. In fact, as early as 1948 the PKI had adopted a
resolution urging its members "towards the formation of a broad
based national front in the development of a two stage revolution-
ary process ... as well as total confrontation of the
imperialists". (54a ) Against this ideological background, their
later outburst against Malaysia did not fall like a bolt from the
the blue upon British diplomats.
However, as was just said, until 1963 criticism came not
from official quarters but from the PKI. Thus in 1962, for example,
the Party had denounced Malaysia as a "form of neo-colonialism which
would have strengthened the position of the imperialists in South
East Asia in implementing their SEATO activities". (549 ) Official
criticism of Malaya was voiced only in the following year,1963.(550)
(547) Justus M.Van der Kroef, "Indonesia, Malaysia and the Borneo
Crisis", Asian Survey, VOl.III, No.4, April 1963, p.174.
(548) Justus M.Van der Kroef, Communism in South East Asia,
Macmillan, London, 1981, p.33.
(549) Justus M.Van der Kroef, "Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Borneo Crisis", op.cit., p.174.
(550) Ibid., p.173.
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Before the supression of the ill fated Brunei rebellion in December
1962, the Indonesian Government had guarded their criticism,
expressing their opposition mainly through nonofficial channels.
In brief, before 1963 the Indonesian strategy seemed to be one "of
exploiting any opportunity that might arise within Borneo or
Singapore to forestall the creation of Malaysia, rather than of
(open] commitment to preventing it".4551)
Indonesian hositility to Malaysia became a grave threat
as soon as firm action in Brunei further confirmed the depth of
British commitment.( 552) The Indonesian Government immediately
made their intentions clear by declaring "a possibility of
physical conflict", with Malaysia. 4s53) The Indonesian policy
was a "combination of a war of nerves", as Mackie has observed,
with "a probing action to discover weaknesses that could be
exploited". It consisted, Mackie said, of "a series of ambiguous
threats to TUnku and signals of moral support and encouragement to
dissident elements within Malaysia". 4554) But gradually, it emerged
that it was not Malaya, but Malaysia, - in other words, the British
presence - that was the major target of Indonesian hostility.(55)
This was subsequently made clear by the Indonesian Defence
Minister, General Nasution, who told a meeting on 6 August 1963,
(551) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.124.
(552) B. Simandiuntak, op.cit., pp.160-161.
(553) "Tripartite Conference on Malaysia", Eastern World,
Vol.XVII, No. 8, August 1963, pp. 16-17.
(554) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.124.
(555) "British made Malaysia - Barrier to International Peace and
Progress", New Forces Build a New World, Department of Foreign
Affairs, Jakarta, 1964, op.cit., pp.43-4.
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that "Malaysia, economically and militarily, will be dominated
eventually by a non-Malay power, and will become a source of
subversion against Indonesia".( 56) His Government, therefore, was
bound to confront it. It was also made clear on many occasions by
Indonesian leaders that both the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement
and the uninterrupted economic links between Britain and Malaysia
were a legacy of the imperial past. This was one of the sourcesof
their deepest suspicions.(557)
Indonesian misgivings seem to have been based on false
assumptions. Given the well-administered programme of decolonis-
ation, it is not obvious why the British bases should have caused
such fury in Indonesia. (8) In support of the Indonesian position,
two further arguments advanced by non-Indonesian commentators are
worth consideration. Firstly, it has been maintained that President
Sukarno of Indonesia, blinded by extreme nationalist ideology, was
prone to perceive every event in black and white.( 559) Secondly,
being the leader of the non-aligned movement in the region,
Sukarno's policy of gaining popularity by kicking the decaying
imperialist power was quite understandable. ( 560 ) Thus in the
aftermath of the Bandung Conference (1955),for example, he felt
(556) Hamilton P. Armstrong, "The Troubled Birth of Malaysia",
Foreign Affairs, Vol.41, No.4, July 1963, p.692.
(557) Gordon P. Means, op.cit., p.324; See also Justus M.Van der
Kroef, "Malaysia and Indonesia", op.cit., pp.14-15.
(558) A.Brackman, op.cit., p.196.
(559)G. MtVKAhin, "Malaysia and Indonesia", Pacific Affairs,
Vol.XXXVII, No.3, Fall, 1964, p.260.
(560) Saul Rose, op.cit., p.289; and Douglas Hyde, Confrontation
in the East, Bodley Head, London, 1965, p.33.
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duty bound to condemn any foreign bases in the vicinity of
Indonesia. (561 ) As Mackie has Observed, --it-these conflicting
positions contained "a grain of truth and a rather large grain of
fantasy".(562) It is therefore necessary to examine both the Indon-
esian and the Anglo-Malaysian sides of the arguments in some detail.
First of all, let us take the Indonesian charge that
British bases were a threat to their security. This distrust was
generated by some disturbing Indonesian experiences of the British
armed presence, especially in Singapore. (63) It is a well known
fact that in February 1958, a rebellious PPRI-Permesta group
seriously threatened the Indonesian government. It was Anglo-
American help that was channelled to the rebels via Singapore and
North Borneo, both of which were under British sovereignty at that
time. 64) Not only the British, but even TUnku and his government
were suspected of giving "covert moral and material support to the
rebels in Sumatra", in the above mentioned insurrection.(s65)
Contrary to Anglo-Malaysian assertion, it seems as if
Indonesian fears were not just a flight of imagination. The
Cmnd.1939 (1962) had made it clear that Britain intended to stay
(561) Willard A. Hanna, The Formation of Malaysia: A New Factor
in World Politics, American University Field Staff Inc., New York,
1964, p.4.
(562) J.A.0 Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.125.
(563) Gordon P. Means, op.cit., p.324.
(564)GMe.T. Kahin, "Indonesia and Malaysia", Pacific Affairs,
op.cit., pp.262-263; See also Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's
Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives", Asian Survey,
Vol.IX, No.6, June, 1964, p.907.
(565)G-.Ma. Kahin, op.cit., p.263.
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in the area and would play an active and major role in maintaining
regional stability and security. Accordingly, retention of the
Singapore bases was accorded top priority in negotiations over the
creation of the federation. Henceforth, it was natural that it
should be the "British bases in Singapore that Nasution feared,
not the pathetic little Malaysian defence forces". (66)
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be argued
that to a certain extent it was the British presence, rather than
Malaysian ambitions, that made Sukarno deeply suspicious. (67) His
suspicions were to be further reinforced by the turn of events in
South East Asia in the near future. Before the agreement creating
Malaysia was finally signed on 8 July 1963, the Indonesian
President, by building up psychological and diplomatic pressure on
Tunku Abdul Rahman, managed to get Malaya to sign the Manila
Accord on 11 June 1963. The Accord pledged its signatories to
maintain the "stability and security of the area from subversion
in any form". (68)
In the light of this declaration, there was some truth
behind the Indonesian President's allegation that TUnku Abdul
Rahman had violated the Manila Accord by signing the Malaysia
agreement on 8th July 1963, since doing so contravened the
Accord's provision that "foreign bases [even] temporary in nature
should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert
(566) "Base Motives?" Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.XLII,
NO.4, October 24, 1963, p.179.
(567) S. Nihal Singh, op.cit., pp.66-67.
(568) Malaya-Philipines Relations, 31 August 1957 to 15 
September 1963, Department of Information, Kuala Lumpur, Appendix
VIII, para.11, p.29.
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the national independence of any of these three countries".(569)
Certainly, in Sukarno's opinion the Malayan leadership was guilty
of violating the spirit of the Manila Accord. The Malaysia agree-
ment had committed Kuala Lumpur to serving the particular interests
of Britain. <° Moreover, Sukarno believed that the British
diplomats were active behind the curtains. (571 ) Duncan Sandys was
therefore cast in Jakarta, as the "villain of the peace ...
who had put pressure on the Tunku to sabotage the Manila Agree-
ment".(572)
Bearing in mind earlier experiences of this kind, the
formidable British armed presence in South East Asia, which was
kept there in accordance with the East-of-Suez policy, gave the
Indonesian President genuine reasons for raising the cry
"imperialists at bay". (573 ) Cn their part, the Anglo-Malaysians
attempted to dismiss these charges as merely the jaundiced views
of a diehard nationalist leader. The reality was not quite as
simple as either side wished to believe, and its complex nature
therefore demands further attention.
For the Malayan leaders, the British armed presence was
not a threat to the stability and peace of the region; rather, it
was the best guarantee against regional instability. (574) Here
(569) Ibid., p.29.
(570) "British Made Malaysia", op.cit., p.43.
(571) Justus M.Van der Kroef, "Malaysia and Indonesia", op.cit.,
p.15.
(572) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.174.
(573) S. Nihal Singh, op.cit., pp.66-67.
(574) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., pp.171 -177.
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again, it was the immense help rendered by Britain in fighting the
insurgency, the benign experience of British colonial rule, the
willing and smooth transfer of sovereignty, and finally, Britain's
earnest desire to help the infant state, that convinced the Malayan
leaders that a British armed presence was not inimical to regional
peace and security. "The degree of anti-colonialism in their
outlook", argued Saul Rose, "corresponded to the intensity of the
independence struggle."(575)
The Malayans feared that, in the absence of British armed
protection, the surging waves of communism might engulf the new
federation. (576 ) For Tunku Abdul Rahman, it was not only the
opposition parties in Singapore but the communist advance in the
Borneo territories which was particularly disturbing. He expressed
his concern later on in an article in Foreign Affairs. "I felt
that time was running out", wrote Tunku, "and that the communist
menace had to be swiftly met, otherwise free Malaya would again be
in danger".(577ASuch Malaysian fears were justified, given the
twelve years of communist insurgency, a delicate racial balance,
an economically dominant Chinese community, (57e) and the
problems of establishing authority in new territories with a
recent background of colonial administration. These were harsh
realities, and no one could have denied it.
(575) Saul Rose, op.cit., p.283.
(576) Straits Times, 8 February, 1963.
(57718) Tunku Abdul Rahman, "Malaysia: A Key Area", Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 43, No.4, July 1965, p.661.
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In marked contrast, Indonesia's history as a dominant
regional power, the bitter memories of colonial rule, the
successful armed struggle to win independence, the recent
successes at diplomatic level and in the Afro-Asian world, and
the possession of a large number of armed forces, made Indonesians
more intolerant towards the presence of an imperial power.(579)
Unlike tthe Malayans, the Indonesian President did not
regard communism as an increasingly malignant force. For him, it
was imperialism rather than communism that was the natural enemy.
Although, the Chinese population had a substantial economic
position in Indonesia, they did not enjoy a demographic or
political predominance there. Finally, the PKI was a legitimate
and dominant political party supporting Sukarno against
conservative elements, viz, the army and radical Islamic groups.
The PKI did not pose any obvious threat to the existing political
structure in Indonesia at this stage. ( 6°) SUbsequent developments
were of course to reveal P.K.I. in a different light.
In brief, it can be maintained that their divergent
colonial experiences, prevailing domestic circumstances, and the
difference in personality of their leadership made Malaysia and
Indonesia view the British bases in Singapore in entirely
(579)Gr-Ma. Kahin, op.cit., pp. 206-261, and Frances L. Sterner,-
"Malaysia and North Borneo Territories", Asian Survey, Vol.III,
No.11, November 1963, p.527, and Hashim Bin Ambia, "The Malaysia-
Indonesia Dispute", Eastern World, Vol.XIX, NO.1, January 1965,
pp.12-13.
(580) Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The
Politics of Domestication", American Political Science Review,
Vol. 56, No.4, December 1962, pp.915-926.
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different perspectives. (8t) Owing to its domestic circumstances,
the Malayan leadership did not consider that continued links with
an ex-imperial power compromised its independence, whereas the
extrovert and assertive character of the confident Indonesian
leaders rendered any such links anathema. alt at the same time,
due to their close proximity, neither state could avoid being
alarmed by the other's perception of the world situation. To the
dismay of the British Colonial Office, TUnku Abdul Rahman yielded
to Indonesian desire for a U.N. ascertainment mission. <2) The
British view was that the Cobbold Commission had already performed
a similar task. The subsequent tussle between Indonesian and
British authorities over arrangements for a UN mission in August
1963 further highlights the depth of mutual suspicion between
these two nations. <)
It can be further argued that the Indonesian President's
anti-British policy had gradually developed over the years. This
can be very successfully demonstrated by comparing two statements
of President Sukarno, made in 1949 and in 1963 respectively. During
an informal talk with Malcolm MacDonald in 1949, Sukarno was quoted
as saying, "You see, we make no claim to your colonies even though
all the rest of Borneo is Indonesian and they still remain under
foreign imperial rule". It was because, he said. Britain had been
following the policy of "granting freedom progressively to all its
dependencies". (&4)
(581) Saul Rose, op.cit., pp.282-284.
(582) Ibid., p.283; See also Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.46.
(583) Gordon P. Means, op.cit., p.317.
(584) Malcolm MacDonald, Titans arid Others, Collins, London 1972,
p.143.
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This statement may be compared with SUkarno's conversation
with M.G. Kahin on 20 July 1963, which presents his opinion of
Britain in a totally different way. "It is just like the Dutch at
Malino", he commented upon the British method of ascertaining the
Borneo peoples' views on the proposed merger with Malaya and Sing-
apore, "What the British have done is merely to assemble some of
the chieftains and ask them whether they want Malaysia. Of course
because of their relationship with the British they naturally
e"
say yes". (58.5 ) His later experiences of the British conduct of
decolonisation, and their continued maintenance of an armed pres-
ence, destroyed his faith in British integrity in South East Asia.*
These hostile verbal attacks on "Malaysia" had gradually
been stepped up to the level of border incursions and clandestine
activities by the time the Malaysia agreement was signed in London
on eth July 1963.(586) The Indonesian Government publicly declared
their policy of "Confrontation" with Malaysia by every possible
means. On 6th August 1963, General Nasution, their Defence
Minister, referred to "rebels" in North Borneo territories and
said that "it is no longer a secret that we give them military
training and war equipment to drive the colonialists out of North
Kalimantan". (87)
* However, influence of certain other factors in the background,
like the looming crisis in West Irian, his growing friendship with
Peking and his own reliance on PKI for support, cannot be denied.
(585) G-.M4T. Kahin, op.cit., p.262.
(586) Justus M.Van der Kroef, "Communism and Guerilla War in
Sarawak", World Today, Vol. 20, NO.2, February 1964, p.58.
(587) Frances L. Sterner, op.cit., p.533.
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This Indonesian hostility was a diplomatic as well as a
military menace, and British authorities had to counteract it on
variety of levels. In fact, Indonesia never stepped up the
hostility to a provocative level until Malaysia became a certainty.
It was ironical that when the actual confrontation took place, it
was the government of Malaysia, and not Britain, which was in
charge of affairs. But that did not make much difference to Indon7-
esian opinion about the identity of the real 'culprit', and their
charges of 'neo-imperialism' were pursued with renewed vigour.
In brief, the Indonesian charges against Malaysia may be
summed up under four headings. Firstly, Malaysia was "a neo-
colonialist puppet created by the British and imposed upon the
people against their will". Secondly, "it posed a threat to
Indonesian security and to the peace of the whole of the South
PAst Asia region". Thirdly, "the continuation of imperialist and
neo-colonialist influence in South East Asia was doomed on
historical grounds ..." Finally, "Indonesia was insultingly
disregarded and humiliated by the manner of Malaysia's
formation". m8e) Britain was branded as the real 'culprit' once
again, when the Indonesian government published their charges
against Malaysia for international propaganda purposes in a
bulletin entitled "British made Malaysia".(s89)
Thus we see that with the birth of Malaysia, a new phase
of confrontation had started. It was the Government of the
Federation of Malaysia, rather than Britain, which was at the helm
of affairs now. For all practical purposes, however, the creation
(588) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.201.
(589) "British made Malaysia", op.cit., pp.43-45.
164
of Malaysia had hardly brought any change in British
responsibility in the area. °' We turn our attention to this
aspect of the situation in the next section.
II
British Responses to Indonesian Confrontation, 1963-65
Despite Britain's best efforts to avoid any involvement,
it was deeply caught up in this regional "war of nerves", since
"responsibility", as David Walder has argued, "does not end at
midnight on the day of independence celebrations".( 591).NO longer
a sovereign power in the area, Britain nevertheless became an
active participant and bore the major brunt of the conflict. C2)
In fact, the Indonesian cry of "crush Malaysia" was primarily
directed against the British military and commercial presence in
the region. m93) "This explains why", wrote the Far Eastern
Economic Review, "it was the British who had their embassy sacked
as a tribute to their latest act of decolonisation rather than the
Malaysians". (4) On the very eve of the birth of the federation,
(590) Frances L. Sterner, op.cit., p.530.
(591) David Walder, "Our Allies: Their Problems and Outlook:
Malaysia", Journal of Royal United Services Institute, VOl.CX,
No.638, May 1965, p.105.
(592) J. Kennedy, op.cit., p.313. Also according to, Dato Abdullah
Ahmad, "The British Suffered more than Malaysia". op.cit., p.48.
(593) Extract from the speech of Mr. Suwardjo Tjondonegro, Deputy
Foreign Minister of Indonesia, in the U.N. Security Council
session on 9th September 1964, here quoted from J.M. Gullick,
Malaysia and Its Neighbours, op.cit., p.144.
(594) "Base Motives?" Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.XLII,
No.4, October 24, 1963, p.179.
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extremely violent youth demonstrators damaged the British &bossy
building in Jakarta. They caused an estimated loss of $46,500 and
there were rumours that British firms operating in the country
might be taken over by the Indonesian Government. ( 595 ) These
rumours were ultimately proved to be correct, since the firms
were in fact appropriated without compensation in 1964.
At the onset of the second stage of confrontation, British
policy makers faced a formidable task on the military as well as
on the diplomatic level. Here, once again, the East-of-Suez policy
played a decisive role in the formulation of British diplomatic and
military responses to the issue of Indonesian confrontation. (96)
As Lawrence Martin observed, "it was undoubtedly the "East-of-Suez
commitment, (which] played a probably more than proportionate part
in determining the course of Britain's strategy". (597 ) Before
undertaking the analysis of British diplomatic and military
responses, however, a brief survey of the contemporary debate on
the East-of-Suez policy will give us a better understanding of the
background conditions.*
* Arguments in this section were largely formulated during the
researcher's discussions with Sir Michael C. Walker, Sir Arthur
de la Mare and Sir R.J.A. Bottomley.
(595) The Times, "Indonesian Threat to British Companies",
18 September, 1963.
(596) Chin Kin Wall, Five Power Defence, op.cit., p.12.
(597) L.W. Martin, "British Maritime Policy in Transition",
International Journal, Vol.XXIII, No.4, Autumn, 1968, p.541.
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(A) FSst-of-Suez policy, 1963-65 
Although there had been some dissenting murmurs from the
back benches at the time, in comparison with every other issue in
foreign policy, the idea of a "special role" in the East-of-Suez
region had enjoyed unequivocal and nonpartisan support in
Britain.(598, Following the long established tradition, Cmnd 2270:
Statement of Defence (1964) duly cautioned against a revolutionary
change in the Afro-Asian World and confirmed that, "it is for us
both an interest and a responsibility to help (this change) to take
place with a minimum of violence".( 99) The emphasis placed by the
Paper on the East-of-Suez role both as "an interest and a
responsibility" was nowhere better illustrated than in the case of
South East Asia. (600) The onset of confrontation and subsequent
developments in the region had already confirmed the British belief
that the real threat to peace lay in the Ft-of-Suez region.
Therefore, in Darby's opinion, "almost over-night Britain had
become not only a world power again but the midwife of Africa and
Asia and the vanguard of an international police force".(60I)
But there was another side to the story. Both the Borneo
crisis and the confrontation had highlighted an aspect of the
policy which had so far been side-stepped by arguments about
(598) Leonard Beaton, "Imperial Defence without the apire",
International Journal, Vol.XXII, No.4, Autumn 1968, pp. 531-539.
(599) Cmnd.2270: Statement on Defence, H.M.S.O., London,
January,1964, para. 8.
(600) T.B. Millar, "Great Britain's Long Recessionp..1;
International Journal, VOL XXIII, No.4, Autumn 1968, p.552.
(601) Philip Darby, op.cit., p.241.
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national interests and responsibility. 602 Although the issue of
overstretching the armed forces, along with the dilemma of Europe
vs. East-of-Suez, had been broached during the earlier debates, it
was the recent British involvement in confrontation which finally
opened the floodgate of criticism. A leader in The Times on 31
January 1964, while referring to the involvement in confrontation,
noted with anxiety that "suddenly the stage has grown too big" to
be covered by merely theatrical army techniques any longer. (603)
In the event, the answer devised by the Government, with full
endorsement by the Opposition, was that the Strategic Reserve
would be transferred from Germany to the East-of-Suez region in
case of an emergency. According to the calculation of Harold
Wilson, the Leader of the Opposition, "if Britain was to exercise
its full influence in the world, 1000 men east of Suez were
preferable to another 1000 in Germany". (604)
So far as the economic viability of the East-of-Suez policy
was concerned, no one dared to question that in 1964, although
expenditure there had increased from about £175 millions in 1959
to over £300 million in 1964.( 605) The reason for this reticence
was that in 1964, Britain's overseas role was no longer seen as
posing a choice between the EEC and the Commonwealth. It was now
seen instead in terms of national interest and responsibility.
However, the debate faltered when it came to deciding the methods
(602) Michael Howard, "Britain's Strategic Problem, East of
Suez", International Affairs, Vol.42, NO.2, April 1966, p.181.
(603) The Times, "At Full Stretch", 31 January 1964.
(604) Philip Darby, op.cit., p.240.
(605) P.A. Reynolds, op.cit., p.413.
168
of discharging this responsibility. (606) In this regard, nuclear
deterrence came under heavy attack from the Opposition. The Leader
of the Opposition could not believe that "the Government want [this]
deterrence against a non-nuclear power. [In his opinion] Cyprus and
Borneo, Aden and Hongkong had shown the utter irrelevance of the
so-called deterrence to the kind of problems we face today". (60?)
In the course of this debate on defence three major points
emerged regarding the British presence in the East-of-Suez region.
First and foremost, this was now accepted on all sides as the top
priority area. (606) Secondly, any defence operation in this region
was acknowledged to be costly in terms both of money and manpower.
Thirdly and finally, the debate made clear that Britain was
willing to accept its residual imperial responsibilities by
providing for the security and stability of the region. In the
course of winding up the debate on defence, the Prime Minister,
Alec Douglas Home, expressed his profound satisfaction about the
state of affairs. He told the House that, "on any prudent
calculation, we can at present meet our commitments. [But at the
same time] we have been and are in the process of reducing our
commitments all along the line as our colonial territories become
independent nations".(6°9,
(606) Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, op.cit., pp.157-160.
(607) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .687, January
16, 1964, Cols.439-440.
(608) Commonwealth Survey, Vol.10, No.14, 7 July, 1964. pp.682-
683.
(609) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .687. January
16, 1964, Col. 440.
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Before publication of Cmnd.2770, British support for
Malaysia during 1963 had been determined, decisive and unequi-
vocal.(610) Issuing a clear warning to Indonesia, as early as
Noli.e..mbey 1963, R.A. Butler, the Foreign Secretary, declared that
"come what may, we intend to support Malaysia ... Britain did not X
wish", he said "to make things difficult", but added firmly that
"nothing will prevent us from backing the growth and independence
of Malaysia...H.(611)
The unconditional willingness of Britain to stand by
Malaysia reflected a sense of honour and a genuine concern for the
stability of the region. (62) It was believed that any premature
withdrawal would result in a loss of credibility which might make
it "impossible for (Britain) to retain her vital naval bases in
Singapore". 34) Indeed, at the critical juncture When the
survival of Malaysia was at stake, maintenance of the Singapore
bases became a cardinal point of the East-of-Suez policy.*
* During a discussion, one senior British diplomat explained that
because of his long association with the Foreign Office, Anthony
Eden had developed the notion of "port and fort", which became a
central theme of East-of-Suez policy during the nineteen sixties.
(610) B. Vivekanandan, op.cit., pp.136-137.
(611) R.A. Butler, "Foreign Affairs: The British Position", A
speech delivered at the Foreign Press Association, London,
November 26, 1963. Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol.XX1X, NO.5,
1tc..0771xy 1 1 1953, p.140.
(612) Ibid.
(613/4) Clare Hollingworth, "Britian's Role in Malaysia",
The Guardian, December 10, 1963.
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Before advancing any further in our analysis of British
policy in the East-of-Suez region, attention must be given to a
domestic development in British politics. After a break of twelve
years, Labour --- won the General Election held in October 1964.
This seemed bound to have impact on British foreign policy.
Although an almost complete consensus had prevailed on the decol-
onisation issue, nuclear deterrence had been rejected by Labour
during their years in Opposition. A further point of tension had
risen in the form of the rising cost of overseas defence in
general. Matters were naturally not improved by the fact that the
Labour Government, having been out of power for a long period, did
not feel a strong sense of commitment to existing policies in the
field of foreign affairs.( 61s) On the important issue - Britain's
role Ft-of-Suez - even the best efforts of the Labour leader-
ship seemed hardly able to contain the strong pressures building
up within the party for a radical change of policy. (617)
It appeared inevitable that the storm prophesised by Denis Healey
on 22 February 1963, would now burst. "The major problem of the
next Labour Government", Healey had warned, "was going to be
to decide whether there were any real British interests overseas
which were both politically and militarily possible to protect
(615) Charles Stevenson, "Labour's Defence Policy: Promises and
Performance", Journal of Royal United Services Institute,
Vol.CXI, NO.641, February 1966, p.52.
(616) Harold Wilson, "Britain 1965: Foreign Affairs", Vital
Speeches of the Day. Vol.XXXI, NO.7, January 15th 1965, pp.204-288.
(617) Charles Stevenson, op.cit., p.56; See also P.A. Reynolds,
"The Future of British Foreign Policy", International Studies,
Vol .VII NO.1, January 1966, pp.401-2.
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by force".( 618) Although this radical critique of the existing
policy was almost forgotten during the following twelve months, a
powerful undercurrent of opinion questioning the desirability of
the overseas role was always discernible in talk about the
financial burden it caused, (619) even though prevailing
circumstances at home and abroad prevented any such discussion
from surfacing in public. (620)
When viewed against the previous radical positions of
Labour MP's before the General Elections, the minor revisions of
the policy made by the party in office were something of an anti-
climax. So far as nuclear deterrence is concerned, the Government
immediately reversed its previous position and adopted the nuclear
deterrence as an integral part of British defence strategy. (621)
On the East-of-Suez issue, however, it was decided to postpone any
such overnight volte-face. Following the Attlee government in its
attitude towards decolonisation, the new government duly proclaimed
itself as a champion of the anti-imperialist cause. (622) The famil-
iar anti-imperialist sentiments were aired, in a revolt intensified
by the party's election pledges to give priority to welfare policies
(618) Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, op.cit., p.156.
(619) L.W. Martin, op.cit., p.543..
(620) Michael Howard, "Britain's Strategic Problems, East of
Suez", International Affairs, VO1.42, NO.2, April 1966, pp.181-182.
(621) Kenneth Younger, "British Interests and British Foreign
Policy", Political Quarterly, VOL No. October-December 1967, pp.339.
(622) P.A. Reynold$J "The Future of British Foreign Policy",
op.cit., pp.401-2.
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over old imperialist notions about overseas empire, etc.(623)
Finally, in Wilson's own case, an ardent socialist training seemed
to combine with a romantic bent of mind to make him a Prime
Minister eminently suited to the historic task of bringing Britain
back to &rope after a lapse of three centuries. 24) In the
event, however, Labour policy East-of-Suez showed surprisingly
little departure from the existing course during the first eight
months in office. (62) Thereaftez a major re-examination of
Britain's overseas role was undertaken, but further comments on
this development must be postponed for the time being.
Once in power, Wilson himself rapidly came to appreciate
the influence of "all the factors which had earlier influenced
the conservatives - the sense of duty to the new states of Asia
and Africa, the concept of Britain as a world power, the American
notion of a world security system with tacit line of responsi-
bility, the Ft-of-Suez role as a continuing justification for
Britain's special relationship with the United States". (626) The
same considerations weighed with his Cabinet, as soon as the new
government had assumed its responsibilities. Accordingly, the
Government lost no time in assuring its allies of a continuity of
policies. For example, during a debate on foreign policy the Prime
Minister himself declared that, "Whatever we may do in the field of
(623) Dan Horowitz, Attitudes of British Conservatives, Ph.D.
thesis, op.cit., p.6.
(624) Philip Darby, op.cit., pp.283-284.
(625) Charles Stevenson, op.cit., p.57.
(626) Philip Darby, op.cit., p.284 and Anthony Verrier, "British
Defence Policy under Labour", Foreign Affairs, Vol .42 No.1,
January 1964, p.282.
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cost-effectiveness, value for money and a straight review of
expenditure, we cannot afford to relinquish our world role, our
role which, for shorthand purposes, is sometimes called our Fit-
of-Suez role". (627)
But at the same time, there were definite indications that
a major revision of the policy would be made in the near future. (62e)
The 1965 defence Paper vividly portrayed the aMbivalences, which
characterized this transitional phase of British foreign policy.
It was as if the Government was gathering all its energy before
launching a major offensive against the dogmas of established
policy. In retrospect, the significance of the Paper may be
bAk
viewed as the initiation of the East-of-Suez debate. On the 9ther)(
hand, it openly accepted the "overstretched and dangerously under
equipped" conditions of the forces, (629) while on the other hand
it observed that, "It is neither wise nor economical to use
military force to seek to protect national economic interests in
the modern world". (630) However, the Paper did not pursue these
sensitive issues in any detail. Instead, it broke off at this point
and ventured upon the more immediate concern of seeking the co-
operation of Britain's allies in its worldwide role, "since we serve
interests which are theirs as well as ours".(631)
(627) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .704, 16
December 1964, Cols. 423-4.
(628) Leon Brittan and others, "A Smaller Stage, Britain's Place 
in the World", Bow Group Publications Ltd., London, December 1965.
See also P.A. Reynolds, op.cit., pp.403-412.
(629) Cmnd.2592: Statement on Defence, H.M.S.O. London 1965 para.5.
(630) Ibid., para.8.
(631) Ibid., para.17.
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With the Defence Paper and the subsequent debate in
Parliament in mind, a few major signs of the impending change
can easily be identified. (632) Firstly, the Government had
recognized the overstretched and underequipped state of the armed
forces; secondly, the allies were entreated to share the defence
burden; ( 633 ) and finally, it was acknowledged that the old gun-boat
style of diplomacy had become dangerous in the thermo-nuclear age.
In spite of these realisations, priority was still given to the
East-of-Suez role, a fact which was reflected in the manner of
distribution of the armed forces around the globe. The total
number of British and Gurkha troops committed to the East-of-Suez
was over 72,000, a figure which exceedsithose committed to any
ou tsicte. the. IL K.
other single defence theatrT(634)
In brief, it can be argued that during 1963-65, the East-
of-Suez policy had compelled the British Government to commit itself
to overseas operations. At the same time, it had shown the extent of
the dangers involved in such operations. These dangers were partic-
(632) George Thomson, "British Foreign Policy", International
Spectator, VO1.19, No.5, 8 March 1965, pp.311-324.
(633) Ibid., pp.316-317.
(634) Distribution of British armed forces:-
United Kingdom	 246,000.
Germany (Berlin included) 	 62,000
Mediterranean	 23,000
East of Suez	 58,000 plus
14,000 Gurkhas
Out of the total Fast-of-Suez forces, those committed to the
Malaysian theatre, including Gurkhas, numbered 50,000.
Source: Cmnd:2592; op.cit., para.17.
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ularly evident in the case of the British involvement in the Borneo
territories during the Indonesian confrontation of 1963-1966.
(B) British Diplomacy during the confrontation period
The Indonesian charges of "neo-colonialism" had created a
certain number of impediments to British diplomacy in South East
Asia. (635) Nevertheless, those impediments did not deter Britain from
discharging its obligations towards an ally and a fellow Common-
wealth country. (636) "The Indonesian threat to Malaysia in 1963",
argued Mackie, "probably had more influence in cementing the
British commitment than mere intellectual conviction would ever
have had".( 637) A nonpartisan, unqualified support for the
Malaysian cause was adopted in the British Parliament. For
example, Alec Douglas Home himself took the opportunity to declare
an unconditional and unwavering British commitment to Malaysian
territorial integrity. "I believe the role we are carrying out is
an honourable one, for we seek nothing", stated the Prime
Minsiter. He further clarified Britain's intentions by stating
that "There is no self-aggrandisement, no defence of some old
imperial interest or anything of that kind. We are there under a
treaty honourably entered into , and we will carry it out". (636)
In the course of the same debate, the Leader of the Opposition
likewise lost no time in declaring the Oppostion's policy. "I do
not want there to be any misunderstanding about this", stated
Harold Wilson, concluding his statement by saying that, "We whole-
(635) Francis L. Sterner, op.cit., p.531.
(636) Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.40.
(637) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.44.
(638) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .617, 16
January 1964, Col .552.
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heartedly back the pledge of full support to Malaysia". (639)
Apart from unconditional support for Malaysia, however, an
earnest desire to find a peaceful solution to the problem was
never forsaken in Britain. (640) A military solution was ruled out
since it was acknowledged that the confrontation was primarily a
political problem. (64I ) As the British Prime Minister himself made
clear, "We can carry out our defence obligations [to Malaysia] but
we must seek by all means open to us to try to find a political
settlement". (642) The desire for a political settlement of the
problem did not, however, bring any respite for Britain in South
Ft Asia. On the contrary, the continuation of military pressure
was considered to be an integral part of the political strategy
for bringing Indonesia to the negotiating table. (6
	 It was
acknowledged in the House of Commons that "the prospects of a
political solution would not be furthered by the abandonment of
our military responsibilities".(644)
Consequently, Britain embarked upon extensive lobbying
around the world for the Malaysian cause and attempted to
isolate Indonesia in the international forum. The first British
(639) Ibid., Co1.427.
(640) Michael Leifer, "Anglo-American Differences over Malaysia",
World Today, Vol.XX, No.4, April 1964, pp.566-71.
(641) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .687, 16
January 1964, Co1.551.
(642) ibid., p.427.
(643) Commonwealth Survey, Vold° NO.22 27 October, 1964 p.1044.
(644) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .693, April 22,
1964, Co1.1292.
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step was the request to its allies in Europe and Asia to push the
Indonesians towards negotiations partly by suspending financial aid
and partly by curtailing their trade and commerce with Jakarta. The
British Defence Minister , Peter Thorneycroft urged his counterparts
at a NATO meeting, "not to add to our difficulties by lending aid or
comfort to those attacking us or our partners". (6
	 In the British
opinion, American support for Malaysia vis-a-vis Indonesia would have
tilted the balance in favour of *
 Kuala Lumpur. The British Government
was, therefore, urged by members of the House of Commons "to impress
on Mr. Kennedy the need for a guarantee that full support must be
given to Malaysia".(646)
British efforts in this direction met with success when,
in December 1963, US aid was "frozen" because of "Indonesian
intentions towards Malaysia and Britain". ( 647) The International
Monetary Fund was also reported to be "temporarily suspending" its
$50 million standby credit at the same time. (6.4) Undoubtedly these
e
economic embarn s influenced Indonesian decisions to resume negotia-
tions in later years. "Deprivation of our $250 million expected aid
from the west", testified Mackie, "removed the main prop of the
earlier stabilization scheme"( 649) of SUkarno's regime.
Besides exerting a financial squeeze. British diplomacy
(645)"US Aid for Indonesia Frozen", Financial Times, September
26, 1963.
(646) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, "Malaysia and
Indonesia", Vb1.687, 23 January, 1964, Co1.1276.
(647) "US Aid for Indonesia Frozen", Financial Times, September
26, 1963.
(648) Ibid.
(649) Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.220.
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had secured another dazzling victory towards the end of 1964. In
December 1964, as a result of successful British diplomatic
bargaining. Malaysia was installed as a member of the Security
Council for one year. As Michael Leifer remarks, "This fulfilled
the second half of a gentlemen's agreement between Britain and the
Soviet Union.. "(60) By adroit diplomatic bargaining, Britain was
able to exploit the growing coolness between the Soviet Union and
Indonesia caused by	 the latter's warm relations with Peking.
The unexpected Indonesian outburst against the United Nations,
followed by subsequent withdrawal, further isolated her from both
the Afro-Asian countries and the West. (6t) Simultaneously, this
move also fanned the flames of criticism against President SUkarno
and the PKI even among the moderates in Indonesia. As a result the
diplomatic bargaining strength of Malaysia was greatly enhanced in
later years.
Beyond bringing indirect economic and diplomatic pressure
to bear on Indonesia, Britain could do little else in the field of
direct diplomacy. In any event, British action would have given
its adversaries a pretext for raising the cry of "neo-imperialists"
at work. C62)
Britain was in a well nigh impossible position, since the
Indonesians insisted upon the withdrawal of British forces as a
precondition for starting negotiations. This stand was not dropped
by the Indonesian Government until mid 1966. As late as November
(650)Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Diplomacy of
Confrontation", World Today, Vol .21. N6.6, June 1965, p.257.
(651) Ibid. p.257.
(652) S. Nihal singh, op.cit., p.127, and Far Pastern Economic
Review, Vol.XLIX, NO.2, July 8, 1962, p.43.
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1965, Dr. SUbandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, told the
British ambassador in Jakarta that, "any outstanding issues could
only be settled on the basis of Indonesia's confrontation pol-
icy".(653) In their turn, the Malaysians demanded suspension of all
Indonesian subversive activities in the Borneo territories. (6)
Stalemate characterized the Tokyo Summit in June 1964.( 655) In
Indonesian eyes, they themselves were not aggressors since there
was no "Malaysia" in existence; and for the Malaysians any British
withdrawal at that stage was a "sheer folly" and a "suicidal act". (656)
In a diplomatic stalemate, in Which the British armed
presence was the bone of discord, no other alternative was avail-
able to Britain except to pass the diplomatic initiative to the
Malaysians. (6) In this connection, Indonesian charges of "neo-
colonialism", and Malaysian sensitivity about their independent
status, played a decisive role in British acceptance of a secondary
place behind the Malaysians.( 658) On various occasions, the Malay-
sian leadership made it clear that the fight against Indonesia was
(653) Michael Leifer, "Some Southeast Asian Attitudes", Inter-
national Affairs, Vol.42, No.3, July 1964, p.683.
(654) Commonwealth Survey, Vol.10, No.14, 7 July 1964, p.683.
(655) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.225 and Leifer,
"Some South East Asian Attitudes", op.cit.. pp.252-253.
(656) ainku Abdul Rahman, "Malaysia, A Key Area", Foreign Affairs 
Vol.48, No.4, July 1965, p.668.
(657) "A Peace of Nerves", Pastern World, Vol.XIX, NO.2, February
1965, pp.5-6, and Fenner Berockway, "Malaysia-Indonesia Dispute:
Urgent need for a peaceful settlement", Eastern World, Vol.XIX,
NO.7, July 1965, pp.7 and 16.
(658) S. Nihal Singh, op.cit., p.117.
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solely their own responsibility, and that British forces were in
Borneo under an agreement and only as an ally. "Underlying Razak's
elaboration was a reluctance to accede to any unilateral re-
definition of the Indonesian threat which Britain might be tempted •
to make". (659 ) Anglo-Malaysian friction during the confrontation
will be examined in detail in the next chapter. At this point, we
turn our attention to British military operations and the role
played by Ft-of-Suez policy in the formation of these
strategic responses.
(C) British military policy during the confrontation, 1963-65 
At the onset of the confrontation, Britain was in a
militarily sound position. The East-of-Suez policy had enabled it
to maintain a sufficient number of armed forces in the area. (660)
Following the dictates of the base strategy, Singapore was one of
the best equipped naval bases in the world. Moreover, Chin Kin Wah
confirmed that "the manpower of the British Far East Fleet had
been increased from 8,500 to 13,000 over the past three
years". (661) Last but not least, there were indications of a sub-
stantial increase in naval strength. For example, on 8 September
1964, there were reports that "British military reinforcements
were being sent to the Far East as a precautionary measure". (662)
British policy makers,with the hindsight gained during
counter-insurgency operations, decided in favour of a defensive
(659) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.98.
(660) A. Brackman, op.cit., p.206.
(661) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.86.
(662) Commonwealth Survey, Vol.10, NO.22, 29 October 1964, p.1042
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policy, (663) but a strong military build-up to demonstrate British
preponderance over Indonesian forces was also favoured. (664) In
the following years, therefore, successive Defence Papers faith-
fully adhered to the idea of a preponderant armed presence in the
Fast-of-Suez area. Britain's earnest intentions of honouring its
treaty obligations were emphasised, and in consequence a further
build-up of naval and ground strength in South East Asia follow-
(66) By the beginning of 1965, despite a change of government
there were reports that "the bulk of Britain's fleet, some seventy
ships, including a commando brush fire ship and air-craft
carrier", (666) had been moved into Southeast Asian waters.According
to another report, "an overall presence of 50,000 British armed
personnel was engaged in Malaysian defence and it was the largest
naval concentration in the Far East since the Korean War". (667)
The British policy of keeping a large and formidable
amount of forces in Southeast Asia was seen as the best way of
exercising influence as a big power in the region. (6) Therefore
it did not cause any offence even among the critics of the Ft-of-
Suez role when the Cmnd.2592 (1965) showed that the distribution of
(663) J. Kennedy, op.cit., p.314.
(664) David Walder, op.cit., p.107
(665) A. Bradman, op.cit., p.214.
(666) Alex Josey, "Asia's twilight war: Waiting for Sukarno", New
Statesman, Vol.69, January 15, 1965, p.66.
(667) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.98 and Brackman, op.cit., p.242.
(668) Philip Derby, op.cit., p.240, and B. Vivekanandan, op.cit.,
pp.134-136.
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forces was highly inclined in favour of the Malaysian region. (669)
Although the stationing of such a large number of forces in
the area meant that Britain could have mounted an all-out attack,
yet the nature of the conflict was incompatible with such a
policy. (670) In practice, however, such a drastic step was not felt
to be necessary, since "Sukarno was not even trying to win the
war". (671) In any case, it was clearly understood by both the
Indonesian army and the British commanders that any major conflict
would only serve the communists' end. As a result, Brackman found
evidence of a consensus between these two adversaries "to keep the
conflict within manageable proportions". (672) The Indonesian strategy
was merely a "pin-prick" in the form of border incursions, help to
the dissidents, and other symbolic gestures. In response, "the
British and Gurkha troops put great stress on mobility, constantly
patrolling the remote jungle paths and harrying the intruders,
whenever they found them ..."(673)
However, at times there was a strong temptation to punish
the intruders, although any such possibility was turned down at
higher levels of decision making. In case of an emergency, it was
advised that any offensive in action should only be taken with
three precautions. First of all, "any such retaliation should be
(669) Cmnd.2592: Statement on Defence, H.M.S.O., London, 1965,
para. 17.
(670) J.A.C. Weller, "British Weapons and Tactics in Malaysia",
Military Review, Vol.46, NO.11, November 1966, pp.17-24.
(671) David Walder, op.cit., p.107.
(672) A. Brackman, op.cit., p.207.
(673) J.A.C.Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.211; and J.A.C. Weller,
op.cit., p.23.
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appropriate to the size and nature of the provocative actions.
Secondly, the UN should have prior information and other Common-
wealth countries should approve of it. Thirdly, and finally, all
other channels should have been exhausted before any such action
be considered". (674) In the event, however, Britain did not have
to deal with the possibility of Indonesian escalation provoking
decisive counter action.
Indonesian conduct can be attributed to certain political
and strategic factors. Politically, confrontation was more a PEI
gambit, and the army did not have the same enthusiasm. (6)
Strategically, the overall superiority of British forces deterred
Indonesians from launching any substantial offensive. (676) The
British forces, on their part, were well rehearsed in counter-
insurgency operations and concentrated their energy, therefore,
on winning "the hearts and minds" of the Borneo people.
General Walker, the British commander of the counter-
confrontation operations in the Borneo Territories, summed up
British strategy in six points. "Unified operations, timely and
accurate information, speed, mobility and flexibility, security of
the bases and domination of the jungle",(677) guided military
(674) "Britain's Dilemma in Malaysia", New Statesman, VO1.69, 8
January 1965, p.29.
(675) Justus M.Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism and the
Changing Balance of Power", Pacific Affairs, Vol.XXXVII, No.4,
Winter, 1964-65, pp.357-360.
(676) General Walter Walker, "How Borneo was won: The Untold
Story of an Asian Victory", Round Table, Vol.LIX. NO.232, October
1968, pp.9-20.
(677) Ibid., p.11.
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operations. More significantly, the General placed a high premium
on the civilian aspect of the strategy of "winning the hearts and
minds of the people", and especially those of the indigenous
people. ( 678) This strategy, although tedious and painfully slow in
comparison to direct military combat, brought valuable long term
rewards. The intruders from Indonesia found themselves unable to
merge with the local Borneo population. At the same time, the
strict guidelines of defensive warfare restricted British troops
to chasing the enemy across the border and thereby protracted the
conflict by giving the "enemy" a breathing space.
Meanwhile, the protracted confrontation was taking its
toll on the British EXchequer. According to a confession made by
Peter Thorneycroft in the House of Commons, "the extra cost of
operations by British forces in Eastern Malaysia is estimated at
nearly £3.5 million up to 31 March 1964".( 679 ) But these figures
were disputed by the members, and only the Speaker's intervention
prevented them from being rejected. According to The Times, "the
Borneo operations were costing Britain an estimated £1 million per
week". ( 680 ) Still, the Government did not show any sign of crack-
ing-up under the economic pressure, and the Defence Minister merely
resigned himself to the situation by insisting that it was not an
"unreasonable sum for honouring an obligation to an ally". '->
But at the same time, the overwhelming cost of these
operations, coupled with the unpredictable nature of Indonesian
(678) Ibid., p.11.
(679) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, January 16, 1964,
Vol.693, Co1.1291.
(680) Ibid., Col. 1292.
(681) Ibid., Col. 1292. •
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policy, presented a bleak prospect for British policy planners.
The threat from Indonesia to the new federation was so high in the
first half of 1964 that, "To a parliamentary question seeking
elucidation on the reduction of British strength in Borneo as a
result of recent antipodean offers of aid, Thorneycroft had curtly
replied, -None". ( 682 ) In the forthcoming months, a further spate
of Indonesian border incursions not only in Borneo, but now also
in Singapore and the Malay peninsula, (6) engaged British forces
to an almost dangerous level.c684)
Only a strong plea from the Malaysians that an over-
whelming response would make Sukarno find it difficult to
negotiate, now restrained British forces from retaliating in a
tit-for-tat manner. (6) The middle of 1964 witnessed the most
frustrating months for British policy in the diplomatic as well as
in the military field. Any escalation was ruled out, and according
to British commanders in the area, "in the absence of a political
solution, the confrontation could have continued for ten
years''. (686)
At the same time, this stalemate was no consolation for
the British military commanders, and no relaxation in border
vigilance could be considered. The Defence Minister himself, Peter
(682) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.72.
(683) Straits Times, 18th August 1964.
(684) Commonwealth Survey, Vol.10, NO.16, September 1964, p.1043.
(685) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., pp.95-96.
(686) Ibid., p.93.
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Thorneycroft, admitted that "the prospect of a political solution
would not be furthered by the abandonment of our military respon-
sibility".(687)
In brief, prior to the change of Government at home in
October 1964, British policy towards Indonesia was basically "to
keep the enemy under pressure and off balance, and to impress upon
it the possible consequences of further escalation".(688)
Accordingly, British forces adopted a purely defensive posture in
the field and in diplomatic circles, and Britain faithfully backed
the Malaysian stand. Moreover, due to the Indonesian tactic of
psychological warfare, British policy was to make sure that the
credit for any victory should go to the Malaysians. Even the
Malaysian Prime Minister accepted that, "You British are acting
quite admirably". "I do not know what we would do without you",
said Turku, "and you do it all so discreetly in the background,
without claiming any credit".(689)
The major significant factor behind the British decision
in favour of a continued armed presence in the East-of-Suez was
the fluctuating course of confrontation. (690) Therefore, a good
part of 1965 witnessed almost no change in foreign policy, since
it was felt at the AngloUS summit that a "continued British
(687) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .693, 22 April,
1964, Co1.1292.
(688) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.96.
(689) Daniel Wolfstone's interview with TUnku Abdul Rahman,
published in Far Eastern Ecomonic Review, Vol.XLIII, NO.8, May 21,
1964. p.371.
(690) Commonwealth Survey, Vol.10, No.25, 8 December 1964,p.1195.
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presence East of Suez, especially in the light of military
assistance to Malaysia", seemed to be crucial for regional
stability. (69t) This position had already been confirmed in the
Defence Paper, Cmnd.2590, and the subsequent debates in Parliament
only reiterated the earlier stand. For example, Denis Healey, the
new Defence Secretary, made it clear that such a presence aimed at
the "maintenance of peace and stability in the parts of the world,
where the sudden withdrawal of colonial rule has too often left
the local people unable to maintain stability without some sort of
external aid". (692) This sense of responsibility and apprehension v/
about creating a vacuum in the area were the major motivations
behind the British presence in the East-of-Suez area. (69)
But at the same time, albeit on a smaller scale, the war
was putting considerable strains on British economic and military
resources. The Prime Minister, later on in a statement on 28 June
1966, gave the figures for the economic cost of the confrontation.
Wilson told the members of the House that "Britain incurred an
extra cost of £5 million and provided military aid to Malaysian
Government totalling £22.5 million since 1963, in addition to
economic aid of £12.7 million".(594) Considering the existing
state of affairs, such a large scale operation was a most
unwelcome prospect for Britain.
Moreover, anxieties were prevalent among the Government
and the Opposition alike regarding the possible spillover of the
(691) Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, op.cit., p.171.
(692) Commonwealth Survey, Vol .11, NO.6, 16 March, 1965, p.247.
(693) Michael Howard, "Britain's Strategic Problem, op.cit., p.183.
(694) Commonwealth Survey, VOL 12, NO.18, 2 September 1966,
p.921.
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war. Philip Noel Baker asked the Prime Minister during question
time about the possibilities of peaceful negotiations. "We should
certainly welcome any step which can be taken", Harold Wilson
assured him in his answer, "Whether by the United Nations or by the
direct meditation of an Asian Power to end this quite
senseless confrontation". (695) On the other hand, unequivocal
support for Malaysia was again reiterated. "Malaysia is very much
in our thoughts ... we will stand by Malaysia and fulfil our
obligations .,to her as long as she is under pressure". (696)
In the meantime, the "war of nerves" was going on, with
no visible hope of its termination in the near future. The policy
of firm military and diplomatic support to Malaysia was faithfully
adhered to in Britain. In anticipation of Indonesian frustration
after leaving the United Nations in December 1964, Britain was
.induced to Increase military strength and psychological pressure
on the adversary. (6) This strategy was an outcome of the policy
of "maximizing psychological" pressure, along with that of
"dramatizing the East of Suez policy, which was followed by the
new Labour Government". (698) For all practical purposes, (except
occasional temptations to take offensive actions) in the months
prior to the communist coup in Indonesia British strategy confined
itself to constant border vigilance, and to a secondary position
behind the Malaysians in the negotiations.
(695) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, VO1.713, 27 May
1965, Col. 836.
(696) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, "Debate on
Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs", Vol.713 1 June 1965, Co1.1556.
(697) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.263.
(698) Ibid., p.263.
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On the diplomatic front, since the middle of 1964,
following upon British "sabre-rattling" and the consequential
Malaysia concern, the initiative had totally passed to the
Malaysian leadership. Here Malaysians had secured two brilliant
diplomatic successes. The first was the debate in the Security
Council on 9th to 17th September 1964, and the other was at the
Second Afro-Asian Conference at Algiers in 1965. President SUkarno's
extreme policy of declaring a ruthless war against the new
"colonialist imperialist" forces isolated him from moderate opinion
in world affairs. <699) The credit for this must go not so much to
Malaysian diplomacy as to the ill fated extremist approaches of the
Indonesian Government in trying to divide the world into two hostile
camps. This policy was hard to swallow for the non-aligned
nations.( 700) To an extent, the excellent British diplomatic policy
of lying low and playing a subsidiary role behind the Malaysian
leadership effectively falsified Indonesian propaganda.
A similar argument was applicable on the negotiation side.
Here Indonesians were never able to chalk out a clear and precise
strategy, instead of merely airing anti-British sentiments. For
example, when pressed hard to state exactly their demands in 1964,
their answer was that they objected only to the "continuation of
British neo-colonialist influence. Why can't TUnku show more
independence of Britain" they asked. "and cooperate with us?" <02.)
This argument appeared ridiculous, given the fact that the
British were closely following the Malaysian guidelines in the
field and were conducting their military operations under the
(699) Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.58.
(700) Ibid., p.59.
(701) Mackie, op . cit . , p. 2.71.
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Joint Defence Council, chaired by the Prime Minister of Malaysia.
Moreover, their oft-repeated desire to find a peaceful settlement
of the problem was well known. The British military presence
naturally gave the Indonesians a pretext to call them imperialists
and "neo-colonialist". But this hostility was counter-balanced by
Britain's skilful diplomacy in keeping the Malaysians to the
forefront. Moreover, the British never allowed any conflict in
Anglo-Malaysian relations to influence the conduct of their
counter-confrontation operations.
Irp,Oprief, it can be argued that British foreign policy
towards Malaysia during the confrontation, and more particularly
in 1965, was governed by two major principles. These two principles
were an unquestioned support for Malaysia and a strong desire to
seek a peaceful solution of the problem. (702) This policy,
characterised by firmness and restraint, continued uninterrupted
until the communist coup in Indonesia in October 1965.(703)
Although the confrontation did not finally come to an end until
June 1966, once the keystone of the policy - i.e., Sukarno and the
PKI - had been removed, that policy lost all cohesion and sense of
direction. Moreover, after the communist coup in October 1965, the
confrontation for all practical purposes had dissolved into a spent
force. This development exerted a decisive influence upon Anglo-
Malaysian relations, and subsequently contributed to the British
decision to withdraw from South East Asia in 1967.
The beginning of this downturn in the British attitude
,SIngo-fore
towards Malaysia can be dAted. oyi thQ, sarerraticYn of/August
6.-1 ,	 55r)
(703) T.B. Millar, "Great Britain's Lang Recession&;' op, eft-, P&57.
r-
(702) B. Vivekanandan, op.cit., pp.134-141.
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1965.( 704) The Federation was broken "behind our back", as Denis
Healey complained.(7°5) A desire to terminate the British involve-
ment in Malaysian defence was only postponed because "there was no
political solution as long as Sukarno was in power in Indon-
esia".(706) But once Sukarno had been disgraced, the last barrier
against the currents of divergent interests and perceptions had
collapsed as well. A new era, heralding the downturn in the British
foreign policy towards its hitherto close ally, Malaysia, had
begun. To this aspect of foreign policy we turn attention in the
following chapter.
(704) Data Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.119.
(705) Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, op.cit., p.206.
(706) Ibid., p.206.
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CHAPTER V
British Foreign Policy towards Malaysia, 1965-1967.
It was said earlier that after October 1965, there was a
rapid deterioration in the relationship between Britain and
Malaysia. From being a close ally and a guarantor of external
security, Britain first of all retreated into the role of a
passive onlooker, and then ultimately withdrew altogether from the
region.* This major change in British foreign policy occurred
within the relatively short period of two and a half years. In
this final chapter we shall analyse in greater detail the various
considerations which brought about this upheaval. For this
purpose, it is necessary to begin by looking at the major
differences of opinion which had exacerbated conflicts and
tensions between Britain and Malaysia prior to the communist coup
in Indonesia, an event which paved the way for the subsequent
breach. These conflicts and tensions are nowhere more evident than
in the case of disagreements over Singapore and the Borneo
territories. We will consider each of these differences in turn.
* The arguments in this chapter were clarified and developed
during informal discussions with Sir Arthur de la Mare, Sir
Michael C. Walker, Sir Neil Pritchard and Sir J.R.A. Bottomley.
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Anglo4lalaysian Differences Prior to the Communist Coup in
Indonesia
In the case of Singapore, its central geographic location,
booming economy, racial composition, radical politics and naval
bases meant that it had always occupied a crucial position in the
regional balance of power. Singapore had always played a vital
role, in particular, in diplomatic bargaining. Above all,
possession of the bases had been the major concern of British
strategic planners since the heyday of the empire. 07) This was
especially so in the context of decolonisation and East-of-Suez
policy in the nineteen-sixties, when access to the naval bases of
Singapore had been accorded top priority in London. (708> The
merger of Singapore and its later separation from Malaysia are
worth mentioning here because they generated new complications
for British foreign policy towards Malaysia.
Before the birth of Malaysia. Singapore itself had hastened
the process of merger. ( 7°9 ) "In no uncertain terms, Lee XUan Yew
drove home the truth to Tunku that the possibilities of Singapore
(communists) overwhelming the Federation should not be dismissed
(707)W.David .McIntyre, "The Strategic significance of Singapore
1917-1942: The Naval Base and the Commonwealth," Journal of South-
east Asian History, Vol.X, No.1, March 1969, pp.69-94: and James
Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's 
Eastern EMpire, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.
(708) Cmnd.1639, op.cit., p.2.
(709) ' Priming and Circumstances," Far 'Pastern Economic Review,
Vol. XXXVII, NO. 7, August 16, 1962, p.291.
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altogether". (71°) After the merger, the radical leadership of
Singapore clashed with the conservative and ultra-militant fact-
ions within the ruling Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur,(72-1)
which made British diplomats apprehensive about the survival of
the federation. But the first severe jolt to British faith in
Malaysia was the separation of Singapore from the federation on
9th August, 1965, without any prior knowledge of, or consultation
with, the government in London. (7i2) To a large extent, the
Malaysian government had always been suspicious of British part-
iality towards Lee KUan Yew's government. (73-3 ) Britain's strong
commitment to maintaining the internal cohesion of the federation,
coupled with its anchor role as provider of Malaysian security,
made TUnku and his government keep the whole episode a mystery.(714)
"I had to keep it secret", TUnku confided later on during an
informal interview. Secrecy was so essential for him that he
consulted only four Malaysian ministers, "So that the British
would not get wind of What I was about to do. (Because] if they had
known they would have done their worst to frustrate my plan".(715)
(710) B. Simandjuntak, op.cit., p.296.
(711) Michael Leifer, "Singapore in Malaysia: The Politics of
Federation," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol .6, NO.2,
September 1965, pp.54-60; and also see, J.N. Palmer, "Malaysia
1965: Challenging the Terms of 1957", Asian Survey, Vol.VI, No2,
February 1966, pp.111-117.
(712) P.J. Boyce, "Singapore as a Sovereign State", op. cit., p.263.
(713) Michael Leifer, "Singapore in Malaysia", op.cit., pp.65-66;
and Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., pp.123-4.
(715) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.296.
(716) Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.85.
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But at the same time, Britain had been "a principal party
to the negotiations," and was, therefore, inevitably involved in
"the political squabbling that was to bedevil the Federation."(717)
Occasional rebuffs to Malaysian sentiments could consequently
hardly be avoided. Moreover, any British attempt to bring these
two antagonists together was deeply resented by the Malaysian
leadership. c718 ) For instance, in April, 1965, Lord Head, the
British High Commissioner to Kuala Lumpur, suggested finding a
seat for PAP in the federal cabinet. His proposal aimed at forming
a national coalition, "in the face of Indonesian confrontation."
As Leifer observes, however, "To the TUnku, this was tantamount to
asking him to accept a Trojan horse."( 719) Against this background,
Malaysian attempts to conceal the separation from British diplomats
generated hardly any surprise.* More significantly, however, the
last minute requests of the British High Commissioner to TUnku Abdul
* During one of the interviews. I was told by the British
diplomats concerned that the Malaysian Government was reluctant to
give any precise information about the separation. The whole
atmosphere was choked with rumours and uncertainty prior to the
separation of Singapore.
(717) Michael Leifer,`*Atlide the Straits of Johore", Modern Asian
Studies, Vol.1, No.3, 1967, p.284.
(718) Michael Leifer, "Singapore in Malaysia", op.cit., p.66;
and see also Alex Josey, "Expelled from Malaysia", New Statesman,
16th July, 1965. p.74.
(719) Michael Leifer, "Some South FAqt Asian Attitudes",
op.cit., p.224.
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Rahman were firmly turned down by the Malaysian Prime Minister (720>
In the opinion of Chin Kin Wah, "If secrecy was essential
for smooth severance of Singapore, (then] the timing was
providential."( 72I) Caught during a summer break, the British
Government could not assemble quickly to counteract the crisis.
Although the British Prime Minister had warned Turku about the ill
consequences of any bodily harm to Lee KUan Yew at the Commonwealth
Summit in July 1965,( 722) the actual act of separation deeply hurt
the pride of the closest ally of Malaysia. (23 It was consideredih
the. Writ ish 'cvrcle.S
as the first sign of a breach of faith.P72g) -
Harold Wilson himself considered this event to be the major
turning point in Anglo-Malaysian relations. "Difficulties began to
arise last August", he later told Duncan Sandys in the House of
Commons, "when Singapore was pushed out of the Malaysian
federation without consultation with us."(72)
Duncan Sandys' dismay was justified given the fact that
British forces were still patrolling in the Borneo jungle, and
continuation of confrontation was President Sukarno's major hope
(720) John Drysdale, op.cit., pp.393; and Peter J. Boyce,
"Singapore as a Sovereign State", op.cit., p.263.
(721) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., pp.105.
(722) Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, op.cit., p.131.
(723) Ibid., p.130.
(724) Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, op.cit., p.206; Malaysian
scholars also share this opinion. See J. Saravanamuttu,
op.cit., p.75, and Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., pp.119-120 and 123.
(725) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .730. 20 June,
1966, Co1.1588.
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of satisfying the power-hungry hounds of the PKI. The internal
break up of the federation made the British stand on Malaysia look
somewhat ridiculous. (726) The immediate reaction, as Denis Healey,
British Secretary of Defence, later admitted, was to pull out of
Malaysian affairs altogether since the federation was "broken
behind our backs." (727)
But the prevailing regional circumstances counselled against
any rash decision. (728) Britain accordingly decided to swallow the
bitter pill sand tried to redress the damaged relationship for the
sake of counter-confrontation measures. (729)
The initial British response was to advise both Singapore
and Malaysia to apply restraints, rather than inflaming the danger
by any more emotional reaction.' ) On its part. Britain assured
both countries of continued British assistance as long as it was
required, and provided that the facilities promised under the
extended Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement remained unchanged.(731)
P7E--
If British diplomacy in the lseparation period was directed
to keeping the Federation intact, its task in the post-separation
period was compounded by the three-fold change caused by this
upheaval. As a result of the separation, Britain became involved,
"first, in the problematic hiatus in defence which ensued; second,
(726) John Bastin and Robin W. Winks, op.cit., p.448.
(727) Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, op.cit., p.206.
(728) Alex Josey, "Singapore: Must Britain Stay?," New Statesman,
Vol.70, 20 August 1965, p.242.
(729) The Times, 16th August 1965.
(730) Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-70, op.cit., p.131.
(731) Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia, the Diplomacy of
Confrontation," World Today, Vol.21, No.6, June 1965, p.251.
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in the post-separation squabbles between the local powers; and
third, in the manner in which disengagement from Borneo was
effected". (732)
The first problem caused enormous anxiety in London, although
both countries lost no time in assuring Britain of their unaltered
commitments to AMDA and to providing Britain with the necessary
facilities. (733 ) As a matter of fact, Annex B of the Separation
Agreement furnished sufficient ground for maintaining a status quo
for British strategic operations in the region. C') Nevertheless,
until a stable pattern emerged after some uncertain months, a
sense of deep anxiety prevailed in London. What annoyed Britain
most was the post-separation "squabblings", and the resultant
confusion between the two neighbours over defence operations.(735)
Both Malaysia and Singapore had acknowledged this insepar-
ability, and accordingly set up a Joint Defence Council. At the same
time, however, the reverse was true about their internal security.
Their mutual apprehension clouded the prospect of charting out a
(732) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, op.cit.,
pp.111-119.
(733) Michael Leifer, "Some Southeast Asian Attitudes", op.cit.,
pp.225-6.
(734) "An Agreement relating to the Separation of Singapore from
Malaysia as an independent and sovereign State", Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, Foreign Affairs - Malaysia, Vol.1,
Nos. 1 and 2, 1966.
(735)For a brief but informative analysis of post-separation
problems, see Lau Teik Soon, "Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Crisis
of Adjustment, 1965-68," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol.X,
No.1, March 1969, pp.155-176.
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strategy against their common enemy. (736 ) In fact, the newly
acquired sovereign status of Singapore as a partner in AMDA
exacerbated Malaysian fears of the base facilities either being
locked up or being misused by Lee KUan YeW. C737) The Malaysian
leaders lost no time in warning him against any such misdeeds.(738)
Although the mutuality of their external defence ruled out any
such danger, their different outlooks on political and economic
matters complicated the situation for Britain.(739)
The situation was made even worse by Indonesian efforts to
exploit their mutual differences. (740 ) In fact, from immediately
after the separation until the Communist coup in October 1965,
both the neighbours were involved in an incessant, acrimonious
battle over the use of bases, (74a ) which did not bode well for
British defence and foreign policy. Yet another severe jolt to
British pride originated from Singapore, when Lee Kuan Yew, for
diplomatic reasons, asserted at the United Nations that he could
ask Britain to leave the bases within twenty four hours. (2) His
claim was later on accepted by the British Foreign Secretary.(743)
(736) Ibid., p.163-166.
(737) Lau Teik Soon, op.cit., p.173.
(738) Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.96.
(739) Michael Leifer, "Some Southeast Asian Attitudes", op.cit.,
pp.225-6; and Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Agreement, op.cit.,p.13.
(740) Lau Teik Soon, op.cit., pp.172-174.
(741) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., pp.111-119.
(742) Chan Heng Chee, "Singapore's Foreign Policy, 1965-1968,
Journal of Southeast Asian History, VOl.X, NO.1, March 1969,p.184.
(743) The Times, 2 September 1965.
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The third problem closely related to the separation was the
concomitant restlessness in the Borneo territories. (744) EVen
before the separation of Singapore, these colonies had caused some
friction between Malaysia and Britain.(74'5) As we saw earlier, a
sense of responsibility made the British insist upon incorporating
certain safeguards against Malay or Chinese discrimination.
Moreover, the civil administration in Sabah and Sarawak remained
primarily European. Malaysian discomfort over the Borneo
territories prose mainly from the European-dominated civil
service, and the extent of its popularity amongst the local
people. (746 ) Secondly, the continued British armed presence and
their counter-confrontation operations enhanced the local people's
faith in British protection and power. Consequently, in Eastern
Malaysia, "often British troops were regarded as actually being
the government".(747)
The Alliance leadership felt increasingly uncomfortable
over the existing situation in East Malaysia. (748) In the wake of
Singapore's separation, Turku Abdul Rahman took the opportunity to
stabilize the precarious situation. On the one hand, the
Indonesians were still talking about a "referendum" in Sabah and
(744) Margaret Clark Roff, op.cit., pp.92-96, and pp.153-155.
(745) Peter J. Boyce, "Singapore as a Sovereign State", op.cit.,
p.261; and Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.124.
(746) Chin Kin wah The Defence of Malaysia and Sinaapore, op.cit.,
122; and The Fabian Tract, No.365 "Britain and South East Asia",
op.cit., p.8.
(747) Fabian Tract, "Britain in South East Asia", op.cit., p.9.
(748) David C. Hawkins, "Britain and Malaysia", op.cit., p.556.
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Sarawak as a pre-condition for calling off their confrontation . (7"19)
Whilst on the other hand, the strong British presence was proving
congenial to anti-Malay sentiments. (75°) Although secession had
never been mooted, Tunku was so concerned that he warned against
the 5e40.5sion since it would mean withdrawal of the defence
guarantees from AMDA partners. (75I ) In the event, TUnku's visit on
17th August 1965, ended in the resignation of "rebel" Donald
Stephens, the ex-Chief Minister of Sabah, frrm the Federal Cabinet.
Although the British government did not agree entirely with his
view, to ha taken =, issue with Turku would have further weakened
the federation. Therefore, in the interest of maintaining a unified
front, Britain decided to maintain silence over Borneo affairs.(72)
"This British silence following TUnku's forthright statement was
helpful", confirmed one Malaysian diplomat, since, "it appeared
to have strengthened the central Government's hand in the eyes of
the people of Sabah and Sarawak".(753)
This brief survey of the situation in the Borneo territ-
ories and Singapore reveals the fragility of the Anglo-Malaysian
relationship, which occasionally came under pressure between August
1965 and October 1965. But apart from this pressure, there were
(749) "Seokarno's Peace Moves", Statement by Malaysian Permanent
Secretary for External Affairs, 10 March 1965, here quoted from
Peter Boyce, op.cit., p.105.
(750) David C. Hawkins, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.27.
(751) Straits Times, 23 August, 1965.
(752) Peter J. Boyce, "Singapore as a Sovereign State", op.cit.,
p.261.
(753) Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.124.
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other instances of back-biting from either side during the
confrontation. The "economic" aspect of the relationship is the
hest illustration of this stormy side.
1
In the course of surveying the stormy side of Anglo-Malay-
partmultorly -Lhe d fference$ 071 ecorlo yvlie yelattOnS
sian relationsjtiuring the confrontation, it will be useful to
remember that their two economies were very closely interdependent.
For example, as late as 1958. British investment-was estimated to
be worth £650 million, (£200 million in plantations, £150 million
in mines, and £300 million in commerce and industry). (754) More-
over, Britain was the biggest exporter of technology and trained
manpower to Malay a, and in return Malay Ian exports to the U.K.
were considerably higher than to any other country. (755) But at
the same time there were heavy strains generated by the
regional political instability, an instability which was further
aggravated by the precarious financial conditions in Britain. As a
7
result, after 1957, there occuqed a gradual but steady decline in
the British position as trade partner of Malaya. The British
predominance in Malayan trade waS gradually
	
broken by the
United States and Japan. It is shown by the two tables given
on the next page.
(754) J.M. Gullick, op.cit., p.199.
(755) Lim Chong Yah, "West Malaysian External Trade, 1947-1965",
in T. Morgan and N. Spoelstra (eds.), Economic Interdependence in
South East Asia, Published for International Economics and Economic
Development, The University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1969, p.216.
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Table 1
Direction of Malayan Exports By Destination, 1958-1963 (%) 
Country 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Singapore
_
23.8 23.0 21.5 19.8 19.8 20.0
United 18.5 13.3 13.0 11.9 9.3 8.3
Kingdom
United States 10.6 11.5 10.3 12.6 14.5 14.4
Japan 9.4 12.8 12.6 14.5 13.8 14.7
West Germany 5.0 5.8 7.7 8.6 4.2 4.3
U.S.S.R. 3.9 8.2 3.7 6.0 8.5 7.7
Total 71.2 74.6 68.8 73.4 70.1 69.4
Source: J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., p.32.
Main Source
Table 2
(%)of Malayan:Nnort$,1958-1963,
Country 1958 1963
United Kingdom 25.0 21.0
Thailand 11.0 9.0
Indonesia 13.8 8.3
Singapore 8.4 9.3
Japan 5.7 9.9
Total 63.9 57.5
Source:	 J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., p.35.
The first sign of new strains emerged during the negotiations
on the proposed federation's constitution. Considering the
economic backwardness of the Borneo territories, Britain offered a
generous amount of $1,500,000 a year for the next five years, but
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at the same time imposed the condition that the Malaysian
Government's contribution should be the same over a similar
period. (76)
In the course of further negotiations, and particularly on
the issue of sharing the cost of military expenditure on counter-
confrontation measures, the Malayans felt - as Tun Razak was
quoted in the Financial Times - that British has "a special
responsibility and should bear the greater burden of this
cost."	 At the same time, however, the tightening grip of
economic adversity on British helping hands made this difficult.
As a result, the Malayan demands appeared to be considerably
higher than seemed reasonable in London. (78) The unavoidable
deadlock and the resultant disappointment made Tun Razak, the
deputy Prime Minister, somewhat bitter. On 17th May 1963, the
Financial Times quoted him as saying that he had not got from
London what he wanted.(759)
With the escalation of Indonesian hostilities, Anglo-
Malaysian economic relations came under increased pressure.
Throughout this period, leaders in Kuala Lumpur felt that a subst-
antial amount of British aid for fighting the confrontation would
enable them to proceed with their own development programmes. (760)
(756) The Times, "Plans for Malaysia's Constitution," 27.2.1963.
(757) Financial Times, "Malaya to float loan in London."
17.5.1963.
(758) Financial Times, "U.K. - Malayan Talks on Malaysian Defence
Costs", 10.5.1963.
(759) Ibid.
(760) Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.XLVI, No.2, October 1964,
p.62
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The implication of their argument was that confrontation was
primarily against "British Malaysia," not "Malay Malaysia," Britain
should therefore bear the major cost of counter-confrontation
operations. (761) Tan Slew Sin, the Finance Minister, categorically
stated that the Malaysians would, "seek financial aid from friendly
countries like Britain. This we intend to do for countering the
confrontation". He further added that, "we also feel that Britain
has a moral obligation to help."(762) This feeling of having a
moral claim on British aid proved to be somewhat irksome to the
donor, given the Indonesian charges of neo-imperialism.
Apart from the question of aid, the Anglo-Malaysian
differences on economic affairs were accentuated by Singapore
prior to the separation. On one occasion, when Britain refused to
grant new export contracts to Singapore due to the cotton-lobby at
home, the dispute soon developed into Kuala Lumpur vs. the State
of Singapore, and Britain was caught in the middle. (763 ) According
to Dr. Goh Keng Swee, Finance Minister of Singapore,the dispute was
basically between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. To a certain extent,
constitutional anomalies were also responsible for creating such an
unfortunate state of affairs.4764)
At the height of confrontation, the Malaysian government
was caught up in a vicious dilemma of defence vs. development.
Hence its dependence on British financial support also had increased
4he.
concomitantly. On the one hand,kMalaysian government reluctantly
(761) Dato Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.41.
(762) Ibid.
(763) Harvey Stockwin, "Broken Threads in Malaysia," Far Eastern
Economic Review, Vol.XLVIII, NO.3, April 15, 1965, p.118.
(764) Ibid., p.119.
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increased the allocation for defence. On the other hand, the
expenditure on development programme had to be increased after the
merger of the Borneo territories. According to Van der Kroef, "In
1965, an amount of M$237.7 million was allocated for defence
alone, which was a net increase of 14.5% over the previous
year". 76 In overall terms, the combined expenditure on defence
and security had risen three times the amount spent in 1960.(766)
But this rise in defence expenditure could not be allowed
at the expense of development programmes. The former Borneo
territories required a substantial amount of investment on their
development at this stage in order to catch up with rest of the
country. The first Malaysia plan (1966-1970) devised a total
public expenditure on development of M$4,550 millions.( 767) This
was not a phenomenal sum given the underdeveloped conditions of
certain parts of Malaysia.
While devising this first plan, the Malaysian government
had hoped to raise 42% of the required amount from foreign sources.
Britain was very highly placed in this regard in Kuala Lumpur.
These high expectations in Kuala Lumpur and the economic crisis in
Britain very soon led to the inevitable clash in May and June 1966.
Apart from these economic wranglings, some differences on
political fronts also occasionally surfaced. For example, in
(765) Justus M. Van der Kroef, Communism in Sincapore and Malay-
sia: A Contemporary Survey, Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967, p.238.
(766) Ibid., p.239, According to the author, "the total defence
and internal security appropriations for 1965 came to M$589
millions, equivalent to about 7.4% of Malaysia's G.N.P.".
(767) Ibid.
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January 1965, Fred MUlley, the Minister of War, after visiting
East Malaysia (former Borneo territories] issued a statement that
talks of Indonesian escalation were "a gross exaggeration." He
even expressed doubts about the declared Indonesian intentions
towards the Borneo territories. (768) This statement caused a storm
in Kuala Lumpur and Tun Razak protested against any British inter-
vention in this sphere. Although Fred Mulley subsequently withdrew
his statement, the incident left the Malaysians apprehensive about
the new Labour government's intentions. Only the publication of
Defence paper, Cmnd.2592, reassured them.
The Defence Review
Before reaching any conclusion about the growing dis-
parity between Anglo-Malaysian viewpoints, we need to consider
another background aspect of British foreign policy. The debate on
East-of-Suez policy for all practical purposes had started when
the government decided to embark upon the defence review in the
middle of 1965.(769) More significantly, however, Harold Wilson
acknowledged that this involved a "review of defence roles, not
merely of defence costs. "° The government had already
announced intended cuts in the defence budget of £400 million by
1969-70. Although this aim was partially to be achieved by economy
measures, "the only way to close the gap finally and with
certainty" would have been, wrote Denis Healey in Survival, "to
look at the whole range of our commitments as well..."(77i)
(768) Straits Times, 22 January 1965.
(769) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .714. Oral
Answers, 1 June 1965, Cols. 1505-1506.
(770) Ibid.
(771) Denis Healey, "Britain's Defence Review", op.cit., p.231.
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With hindsight, it can be argued that this defence review
delayed any immediate revision of AMDA in the aftermath of Singa-
pore's separation from the federation. In fact, George Brown, the
Affairs
WaSte'r of Eco.rotn iv, declined to give any definite answer on the
future status of the Singapore bases "until we have made further
progress with the defence review, and have had detailed discussions
with Singapore and our other allies. "(772) When pressed harder by
Edward Heath, he simply referred to the Separation Agreement's Annex
B, as a satisfactory arrangement for present purposes. (773) This
attitude was certainly part and parcel of a policy of postponing any
major decision prior to completion of the defence review.
While the defence review was taking place, the government
decided to solicit the allies' support regarding the sharing of
financial burdens in the East-of-Suez region. On 17th December
1965, Wilson was reported "to have reached agreement in principle
with President Johnson that Britain's role East-of-Suez would be
integrated within a general Anglo-American defensive system in
South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean." (774) However, subsequent
talks which aimed at putting these decisions into practice proved
to be inconclusive. (775 ) In a similar manner, the British Defence
Secretary's plea to the Australian Government, "for a fair sharing
(772) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .718, 28
October 1965, Co1.350-1.
(773) Ibid., p.351.
(774) Derek McDougall, "The Wilson Government and the British
Defence Commitment in Malaysia and Singapore," Journal of South
East Asian Studies, Vol.9, NO.3, 1971, p.232.
(775) Ibid., p.223.
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of the burden,"( 776) also did not elicit the desired response.
Hence, at the close of 1965, British decision-makers were
confronted with very grim prospects. The allies' assurance was not
as forthcoming as was desired in view of the British sacrifices,
nor were political and economic pressures at home showing any sign
of abating. At the same time, "the thanklessness of the role and the
higher economic cost," were pushing Britain towards Europe.
The British Government, thus badly caught up in South Fast
Asian affairs, had only one straw to clutch at. The Communist
coup in Indonesia in October 1965, the subsequent blood-bath, and
the emergence of the army as the dominant political force, ensured
the "destruction of PKI and a radical shift in the balance of
power in Indonesia." (778 ) The prospect of an easing off of the
confrontation brought the precarious side of Anglo-Malaysian
relations to the forefront. The consequences of this will be
examined in the next section.
(776) Age, 3.2.1966.
(777) Leonard Beaton, "Imperial Defence without the Etpire",
op.cit., pp.539.
(778) Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.308; See also, Dorothy Woodman,
"The Mystery of Indonesia", New Statesman, 8 October, 1965, pp.507-8.
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II
Anglo-Malaysian Differences after the Communist Coup in Indonesia
It has been argued earlier that the Communist coup and
subsequent developments in Indonesia undoubtedly marked a
watershed in the regional affairs of South-East Asia. (779 ) For
Britain and Malaysia the fall-out from these events brought deep
and far reaching consequences. For the first time, these two
countries faced the prospect of conducting their relations without
any common external enemy. It is worth mentioning in this context
that, prior to the onset of confrontation, a similar part was
played by communism in the form of insurgency during 1948-1960,
and by the communism-oriented opposition parties during 1961-63.
Although some minor incidents had occur in the past, as recorded
in the preceding section, yet the presence of an external threat
prevented these minor differences from developing into major
disputes between Britain and Malaysia.
After October 1965, this external factor no longer posed
a grave danger. Therefore, the Anglo-Malaysian consensus on
political and military strategy started to show some signs of
the_
cracking. (760) Contrary to general expectations, howeverlcommon
external threat did not recede overnight, but took another three-
quarters of a year before its existence could safely be
discounted. ('761) During this period, although there were no sudden
(779) Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: the Changing Face
of Confrontation," World Today, Vol .22, No.9, September 1966,
pp.395-405.
(780) J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., p.75.
(781) Michael Leifer, "Some Southeast Asian Attitudes", op.cit.,
pp.219-20.
211
eruptions, a steady growth in minor differences finally developed
into open criticism in Kuala Lumpur and London. By the middle of
1966, Malaysian brick-batting had reached such a critical stage
that Duncan Sandys' statement in the House of Commons could be
taken to be an echo of general disappointment with Malaysian
policy. "In view of the very heavy sacrifices which Britain has
made to help Malaysia defend herself against Indonesia," lamented
the dismayed ex-Secretary of State for the Colonies, "Is it not
very sad that at this moment, when confrontation is coming to an
end, we should receive nothing but reproaches and criticism from
Kuala Lumpur?"(782)
In the light of Duncan Sandys' observations, June 1966 may
be regarded as the culminating point of tension and mutual distrust
between London and Kuala Lumpur. This situation did not of course
develop over night. It may be traced back to the Communist coup
and the developments consequent upon it. Until April 1966,
however, the uncertainty surrounding Indonesian politics at large
had meant that Malaysian opposition to British policies did not
find significant vocal expression. (783 ) It was only during the two
months between April and June 1966 that mutual differences could
no longer be kept behind closed doors. In this section the nature
of these differences will be closely scrutinized.
This new downturn in the Anglo-Malaysian relationship was
(782) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, VO1.730, 28 June,
1966, Co1.1588.
(783) Robert 0. Tilman, op.cit., p.158.
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characterized by a growing disillusionment on either side.(784)
The role played by a combination of external and internal factors
cannot be ignored. The external factors were the end of the
Sukarno era and the waning of the confrontation; the defence
review of East-of-Suez policy was the most important internal
factor, since it was the defence review which now ruled supreme in
British diplomatic calculations. On Malaysia's part, the
Indonesian factor was almost solely responsible for bringing about
a new coolness towards Britain. C785 ) The overall significance of
these factors can best be considered in terms of their
implications for three major problems. The first problem was how
to respond to events in Indonesia, and more especially, how to
take up the peace initiative. The second was how much economic and
military support should be given to Malaysia in the post-communist
coup era; and finally, there was the problem of how to adjust to
the presence of Singapore in its new role as a third partner in
AMA.
Let us consider first the question of devising a joint
strategy for negotiations after the political changes in
Indonesia. Here, certain precedents had been well established ever
since the beginning of the confrontation. As late as June 1965,
Harold Wilson had expounded the precedents in the House of
Commons. "Any initiative on our part," observed the Prime
Minister, "would be regarded by the Indonesians as an admission
(784) "What are we doing there?" Economist, August 14, 1965; and
The Times, August 10, 1965.
(785) Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia, Changing Face of
Confrontation," op.cit., p.395.
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that Malaysia... is something less than fully independent". He
categorically added, "We are partners of Malaysia and we seek no
separate deal with those guilty of aggression against
Malaysia". (786)
The first departure from this avowed position occurred on
27th November 1965, when the British Foreign Secretary spoke
publicly about the possibility of bringing confrontation to an end
with Indonesian help. (787 ) The boldness of this proposal was
obvious since it was not a joint Anglo-Malaysian offer. Quite
reasonably, Kuala Lumpur openly accused Britain of making peace
with Indonesia behind their back, and promptly denied that Britain
had any legitimate claims in this sphere.* It was asserted that
since Malaysians were the aggrieved party, they "were the only
legitimate negotiators with Indonesia. Britain's duty", said the
Tunku, "was to honour AMDA as long as confrontation lasted".(788)
Certainly the sentiments expressed by Kuala Lumpur were in harmony
with British policy as expounded by Wilson just a few months earlier.
If we consider the background of the British departure from
its own avowed policy on negotiations with Indonesia, then the
contemporary debate on Fast-of--Suez policy emerges as the
* My interpretation of this point was greatly clarified by
discussions which Sir Arthur de la Mare and Sir Neil Pritchard
very kindly agreed to have with me.
(786) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.713, 1 June
1965, Co1.1640.
(787) The Times, 3 December, 1965.
(788) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.118.
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principal motivation. By this time the government had openly
recognised the gap between the commitments and the capability of
the British nation. For example, 	 , Harold
Wilson had confessed in the House of Commons on 1 June 1965 that,
"we have accumulated a total of roles, which are far beyond the
reasonable economic capacity of this country". (789 ) The relevant
departments had expressed their concern over the situation in
South East Asia, where confrontation had entailed the involvement
of the largest proportion of British overseas forces. (79°) By the
middle of 1965, the situation had strained British manpower to such
an extent, as Wilson himself acknowledged, that any further increase
would have meant postponing the "Trooping the Colour" ceremony at
home. This account was confirmed by Denis Healey in an article in
Survival. "If President Sukarno decided on all-out war against
Malaysia, instead of the harrassing operations he has been engaged
in for the last two years", said Healey, "then we would have to
draw on almost the Whole of our available combat manpower in all
the services all over the world".(791-)
It was not only their over-stretched manpower, but the
financial burden of East-of-Suez operations, Which were almost
exhausting the armed forces' overall resources. c792 ) In proportion
to the heavy involvement of the armed forces, "the annual
budgetary cost of the East-of-Suez commitments", as summed up by
Kenneth Younger, "was $330 million out of a total for all overseas
(789) Fabian Tract, "Britain and South Fast Asia", op.cit., p.1.
(790) Hugh Hanning, op.cit., pp.253-259.
(791) Denis Healey, "Britain's Defence Review", op.cit., pp.234.
(792) Hugh Nanning, op.cit., p.253-255.
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commitments of $587 million".4793)
Within the framework of this critical situation, the
British government's earlier policy of welcoming "any step to end
this quite senseless confrontation", 4794) was given a fresh incen-
tive by the internal events in Indonesia in the latter part of
1965. The peace offer made to Indonesia on 27th November (mentioned
earlier on p.214] seems fully intelligible within this context.
However, the Malaysian perception of Indonesian develop-
ments did not coincide with the British one, at this stage. They
were not yet ready to put out any peace-feelers since Sukarno was
still exercising some substantial powers. 4795 ) Secondly, by
snubbing British attempts, they were at the same time making it
clear to the Singapore leaders that the political initiative lay
exclusively with them. The subsequent peace offers made by Singa-
pore were always aborted because of sharp protest from Kuala Lumpur.
A similar incident took place in April 1966, when the Wilson
government, after being fully convinced of the Suharto regime's
credibility, "signalled British willingness to offer Indonesia
emergency economic aid as an inducement to end confrontation".(796)
Once more Britain was forced to play second fiddle to Malaysia due
(793) Kenneth Younger, "Reflections on the Defence Review",
Political Quarterly, Vol. 37, July-September 1966, p.256; These
figures were also supported by the Fabian Tract, NO.365, op.cit, p.1.
(794) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .713, 27 May
1965, Co1.836.
(795) Asian Almanac, Vol.3, No.48, May 29-June 4, 1966, p.1555.
(796) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, op.cit.,
p.119. [Britain offered .£1 million in the form of economic aid to
Indonesia.]
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to a sharp protest from Kuala Lumpur, and the dove was killed in
the nest. Even at this late stage, Malaysia did not believe in the
possibility of Suharto's asserting himself vis-a-vis President
Sukarno. (797) The Malaysian Prime Minister was quoted as saying,
"All this talk of Indonesia wanting to make peace is sheer
hypocrisy ... with one breath she talks of peace and in the next
she talks of intensifying the confrontation". (?98)
Apart from their differences on Indonesian developments,
Anglo-Malaysian relations were heavily strained on two other
accounts. The first was over financial aid, and the second was
over the status of Singapore as an independent country and partner
of AMDA.(799) It has already been argued in the previous section
that even prior to the Communist coup in Indonesia, these finan-
cial wranglings had been part and parcel of the recent tensions.
However, recent developments in Indonesia had added a new
dimension to the AngloMalaysian relationship by removing any
unifying factor and by opening up new possibilities of reducing
their mutual interdependence.
For British policy makers, this situation created an unique
opportunity to shed some of their burden in South East Asia. (800)•
Hence, London showed an almost premature haste in making peace
with Indonesia in the second half of 1965. More significantly,
however, the forthcoming Defence Paper, Cmnd.2901, (1966)
(797) Asian Almanac, Vol.3, No. 48, May 29-June 4, 1966, p.1555
and Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Changing Face of
Confrontation", op.cit., p.398.
(798) Michael Leifer, ibid., p.399.
(799) Lau Teik Soon, op.cit., pp.160-163.
(800) Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, op.cit., p.221.
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pledged the government to assign 65 of G.N.P. to defence, instead
of the existing 7%,. Moreover, "this 6% share of GNP was meant to
be achieved at a constant price at 1964 level by the year 1969-
70".(8°1 ) These proposed cuts in defence expenditure compelled
Britain to welcome any prospect of peace in South East Asia. But
at the same time, the cuts created a feeling of distrust among
Malaysians. They thought that under domestic pressure Britain
might harm their interests, either by making a premature separate
peace, or else by forcing them to accept an unfavourable
settlement of confrontation with Indonesia.
On the financial side, however, the implications of the
Communist coup and the British defence review were considerably
different. As the prospect of an ultimate removal of the external
threat increased, the Malaysian leadership, not without good
reason, feared that the old argument of "moral responsibility"
would no longer hold good with the Wilson Government. Hence Kuala
Lumpur was determined to receive a generous amount of financial
aid for its defence purposes before a formal termination of
Indonesian hostilities. The British desire to reduce their armed
forces in the region also gave the Malaysian leadership fresh
incentive to build up their own armed forces. (802) Here again,
financial aid from London featured as an indispensable part of
this programme.
With these aggravated Malaysian expectations in the
background, Anglo-Malaysian financial relations were severely
(801) Cmnd:2901, Statement on Defence, H.M.S.O. London, February
1966, p.1.
(802) Norman J. Palmer, "Malaysia, Changing A Little to Keep
Pace," Asian Survey, Vol.VII, No.2, February 1969. p.135.
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jolted by another powerful factor. The independent state of
Singapore finally created an explosive situation in June 1966.
The result was that the Anglo- ,Malaysian relationship hit the
lowest mai-Kin its history.
Singapore had always been a problem child for both its
natural and its foster parents. After August 1965, as an adult,
this tiny country introduced a whole range of new complications
into both these relationships. ($03) The part played by Singapore
was so significant that in answer to Duncan Sandys' question,
Harold Wilson recognised Singapore as a major factor and said
that, "there is always a suspicion on the part of one party that
we are leaning over in support of another party". 04)
Besides this dimension, the East-of-Suez policy was also
playing a part in aggravating the tensions arising out of the
mutual suspicions and misunderstandings between Kuala Lumpur and
Singapore. It has been mentioned that Britain had decided to
postpone any review of AMDA arrangements until the completion of
its review of defence at home. But political and strategic
expediency warranted a review as soon as Singapore became an
independent country. 0305 ) This indecisive attitude in London
created confusion and brought to the surface an acrimonious battle
(803) Peter C. Boyce, "Singapore as a Sovereign State", op.cit.,
pp.259-271.
(804) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .730,
28 June 1966, Co1.1588.
(805) Chan Heng Chee, op.cit., pp.184-185.
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over the status of bases between Singapore and Malaysia. (006) This
unnecessary wrangling further exacerbated British discomfort over
the problem of devising a common strategy of counter-confrontation
measures. After watching the state of affairs between Malaysia and
Singapore for almost a year, the British Government decided to
intervene. Accordingly, Britain attempted to apply financial
pressure to Malaysia, in order to bring the two neighbouring
partners of AMDA closer to each other. (607 ) Against the background
of Malaysian hopes of getting generous economic aid from Britain
and their fears and apprehensions that Britain might take sides
with Singapore, this British attempt was doomed from the start.
In fact, it misfired so badly that it sparked an unprecedented
crisis in Anglo-Malaysian relations.
The seeds of the impending disaster had in fact been sown
earlier. Before departing to London on his defence aid mission,
Tan Siew Sin, the Malaysian Finance Minister, was informed by Brit-
ish diplomats that a settlement on economic and defence affairs
with Singapore would be a pre-condition for any financial help.*
* During a lengthy interview granted to the researcher,asenior
British diplomat with firsthand experience of the event conceded
that, on the part of Britain, it was an example of somewhat crude
diplomacy.
(806) The main issue was providing acc4dationfoY Malaysian troops
on Singapore soil after the separation. Although Britain offered
temporary acc tion for Malaysian troops,	 Kuala Lumpur
rejected it on the pretext that it was inadequate. See Lau Teik
Soon, op.cit., pp.163-166.
(807) Lau Teik Soon, op.cit., p.172.
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The Government in London, however, pleaded domestic economic con-
straints as the reason for turning down Malaysian requests. As
Harold Wilson later told the House of Commons, "(We] have to cut
our coats here very much in accordance with the financial resources
that we have available". (808/9 ) By contrast, the Malaysian per-
ception of this whole episode was that, "should Singapore choose
to delay the conclusion of these treaties, Malaysia would
suffer". (810) This suspicion seemed to contain a certain truth
since Lee KUan Yew had visited London recently, prior to the whole
episode. Malaysian frustration knew no bounds when Tan Siew Sin's
proposals were treated unsympathetically in London.
As a matter of fact, Kuala Lumpur perceived the whole event
as a British attempt to force them to reach an agreement with
Singapore, since Lee KUan Yew enjoyed an unusually privileged
position amongst the socialist colleagues of Harold Wilson. They
even attributed British partiality for Lee KUan Yew to his student
days as a Labour "activist" in Britain. (811)
However, the "domestic economic restraints" argument
deployed by Harold Wilson did not soothe the wounded pride of the
Malaysian government. As a result, the Malaysian outburst against
Britain was for the first time strikingly outspoken. A unanimous
call to review the whole Anglo-Malaysian relationship was to be
heard amid the anti-British uproar in the Malaysian parliament in
(808/9) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .730,
28 June 1966, Col. 1589.
(810) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.121.
(811) Denis Warner, "Malaysia After Confrontation", The
Reporter, January 26, 1967, p.33.
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June 1966.( 312) The future Prime Minister, Mohammed Bin Mahaldr,
led the battle charge. "Britain, Sir, is nearly bankrupt", declared
Mahatt.r. "The pound is tottering, the strike of seamen is cripplingi
the EMpire,:the blissful source of booty is now disappearing ...",
Mahatir continued, and further concluded that "Britain, like the
life-time President, is used to good living in imperial style.
And so, for lack of anything else, the old lion must try and play
metropolitan power with US". (813) Tan Siew Sin, the Finance Minister,
hit even harder, calling Britain "a tired and dispirited nation
which perhaps has lost even the will to govern itself". (8t4)
Once again, the East-of-Suez policy became another point
of criticism on the ground that it reflected a secret British
desire to abdicate.	 Another speaker, Tan thee Khoon, observed
"it is no secret that Britain is desperately anxious to get out of
South East Asia, if not fully out of East of Suez altogether".0316)
This was the climax of the most virulent anti-British
sentiments ever voiced in Kuala Lumpur. ( 13 11 ) Quite understandably,
Britain was alarmed at this unprecedented Malaysian hostility.
This hostile attitude made British authorities sound out
Australia, "whether Britain could use their facilities if she were
(812) Norman J. Palmer, op.cit., pp.135-136.
(813) Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Ra sayat Malaysia, 16 June 1966,
Co1.598.
(814) Ibid., Co1.695.
(815) J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., 203. p.15.
(816) Ibid., p.607.
(817) Norman J. Palmer, op.cit., pp.135-136.
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ejected from Singapore or Malaysia".(818) Ironically, the event
coincided with the Bangkok Accord reached between the foreign
ministers of Malaysia and Indonesia on 11 June 1966. Although the
Accord was subject to approval by their respective heads of state,
the event proved to be the turning point in Indonesian-Malaysian
relations. In this context, Chin Kin Wah's remarks seem pertinent
when he writes that the Malaysian outburst against Britain, "was
made against a background of growing Malaysian confidence, feeling
of fraternity with Indonesia, and national assertiveness ..."(8193
Looking back at these developments, it can now be seen
that the powerful internal and external factors mentioned above
were responsible for pulling the two nations apart.
In Britain, the internal factors were the defence review
and the debate on the East-of-Suez role; (820) externally, they
were the gradual but steady growth of Malaysian "rapprochement"
with Indonesia, along with the possible end of confrontation. The
turn of events in Indonesia encouraged the critics of the East-of-
Suez presence to attack the expenditure on Malaysian defence.
(818) T.B.Mill4r, "Great Britain's Long Recessional", op.cit.,
p.557
(819) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.122.
(820) Patrick Gordon Walker, The Cabinet, Jonathan Cape, 1970,
London, p.126.
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As Woodrow Wyatt was reported to ask, "What lunacy is it that
makes us stand all the cost of protecting interests in south East
Asia which seem more important to others than to ourselves".(821)
In the wake of this sharp rise in deployment of British armed
personnel in the region, such a vehement criticism was easily
justified in 1966. (822) For the critics of Fast-of-Suez presence,
such a steep rise raised not only financial and strategic
questions but also involved moral and diplomatic issues as
well.	 At this stage, we turn our attention to the post-
confrontation period.
(821) Straits Times, 9 February 1966.
(822) By the end of 1965, the total number of British personnel
had risen to 65,000, as compared to 50,000 in 1964. Fabian Tract,
"Britain and South East Asia", No. 365, op.cit., p.1.
(823) Ibid., pp.1-2.
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III
Anglo-Malaysian Differences in the Post-Confrontation Period
In this section, attention will be concentrated on the
third phase of Anglo-Malaysian relations which began in the after-
math of the Bangkok Accord and the termination of confrontation on
11th August 1966.* In the background, as we have already seen, were
two forceful factors, one internal and one external, pulling these
two hitherto close nations still further apart. (8) It was the
combined effect of these two factors that made both the nations
rather outspokenly critical of each other's intentions. During
this third phase new areas of tension emerged. One example is the
validity of the Bangkok Accord itself. Another is the withdrawal
of forces from Borneo territories.
Before analysing this state of affairs, a brief review of
the background factors will provide us with a proper perspective.
The first and foremost factor in this regard can be identified as
the defence review undertaken by the Labour government in 1965,
together with the publication of the Defence Paper in 1966, and
the subsequent changes triggered by the paper itself.(625)Ijv
* The argument in this section was largely formed and developed
during my discussion with Sir Frank Cooper and Sir Michael C.
Walker.
(824) Norman J. Palmer, op.cit., pp.131-132.
(825) Derek McDougal, op.cit., p.3234; See also, Alastair Buchan,
"Is Britain Still a World Power", Listener, Vol.LXXV, No.1929,
March 17, 1966. pp.373-375.
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the sphere of overseas operations, the Paper clearly meant that
it was now necessary not only "to decide which political
commitments we must give up or share with our allies, but also to
limit the scale of military tasks". ( 326 ) Accordingly the Paper
laid down two pre-conditions for any overseas operations. Firstly,
it was stated "we will not accept an obligation to provide another
country with military assistance, unless it is prepared to provide
us with the facilities we need to make such assistance in
time". (8271 And secondly, it was made clear that "there will be no
attempt to maintain defence facilities in an independent country
against its wishes". (828)
A growing disillusionment with the allies' cooperation was
evidently behind British frustration. (829) As Mt. Sheldon, a
Labour backbencher, observed, "This role which we arrogate to
ourselves - that of the unpaid and unwanted policeman of the
world - is one which singularly fails to impress these countries
whose interests we might be supposed to be preserving". (830)
But these sentiments were not shared by the government of the
day. (8-) The government favoured a partial reduction of the armed
forces in the Past-of-Suez region, rather than an abrupt and total
(826) Cmnd:2901, op.cit., para.3.
(827) Ibid., para.7.
(828) Ibid., para.7.
(829) J.D.B. Miller, "British Interests and the Commonwealth",
Journal of Commonwealth and Political Studies, Vol.IV, No.2,
1966, pp.180-190.
(830) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .725, 25
February 1966, Col .860.
(831) Patrick Gordon Walker, op.cit., p.123.
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abdication, onA01- , grounds. Firstly, it would have meant
abdicating the "special role" still enjoyed by Britain in
comparison with the two super powers. Secondly, such an act would
have generated a power vacuum, giving rise to outright inter-
vention.(832) Thirdly, in case of complete withdrawal, Britain
would have been unable to influence the course of events in the
region. (883 ) And finally, such a step was regarded as an utter
waste of the existing facilities and the expenditure incurred in
the past.(834)
These points were never stated in one place or at one
particular time, but emerged gradually after publication of
Cmnd.2901, (1966), on various occasions. Two major champions of
the official policy were naturally the Prime Minister and the
Secretary of State for Defence themselves. (8) Harold Wilson's
"eyeball to eyeball" speech indicated the depth of his faith in
the "special" role of Britain. "Is it really said", asked Harold
Wilson, "that we have nothing to contribute except speeches that
no one will listen to?" He added further, "I believe that Britain,
through history, through geography and Commonwealth connections,
has a vital contribution to make ... Perhaps there are some
members who would like to contract out and leave it to the
Americans and Chinese, eyeball to eyeball, to face this thing
(832) Ibid., p.187.
(833) Edward Skloot, op.cit., pp.927-957.
(834) Commonwealth Survey, Vol.II, No.6, 16 March 1966, p.238,
and Hugh Manning, op.cit., pp.253-260.
(835) Alastair Buchan, "Is Britain still a World Power", op.cit.,
p.374.
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out". Wilson warned against such a folly, saying that, "The world
is too small for that kind of attitude today, it is the surest
prescription for a nuclear holocaust I could think of".(836)
Voicing somewhat similar sentiments, he was quoted as saying on
another occasion that, "our presence in Asia gives us a chance to
prevent polarization ... I believe Britain has a role, and not at
prohibitive cost, in preventing polarization".( 837) Denis Healey
also talked about Harold Wilson's deep faith in the "special role"
of Britain between two super powers.4838)
Denis Healey, the Secretary of Defence, also argued in
favour of retention of the forces but on different grounds. "1 am
sure that would have been very wrong", Healey observed of the
possibility of total withdrawal. "Although we cannot foretell
future developments, we should not now take actions that would put
us in a position in the seventies, when whatever the situatiocilems,
we could have no influence upon it". (839) In other words, the
possibility of creating a. vacuum by premature withdrawal, as well
as an inability to intervene in an emergency, were the major
restraints on any decision by the government to withdraw
(836) Alastair Buchan, "Ft of Suez, The Problem of Rower%
Journal of Royal United Service Institute, Vol.112„ NO.647.
August 1967, p.210.
(837) Toni Schonenberger, "The British Withdrawal from Singapore
and Malaysia ...", Contemporary South Fhst Asia, Vol.3, N6.4„
September 1981, p.120.
(838) Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, op.cit., p,215.
(839) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1/01.727. "Tbreigra
and Defence Affairs Debate", 26 April 1966, Co1.579.
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completely from the East-of-Suez region. (840) But at the same
time, the government was trying, "to square the circle of (our]
capabilities and (our] obligations".(541,
Within the context of these official views, the cardinal
point in Britain's foreign policy towards Malaysia can now be
outlined. In the middle of 1966, for Britain the regional
situation was still unsettled. There was, therefore, no
possibility of total withdrawal from the region in the near
future.
There was a hint that Britain did not regard South-East
Asia as safe enough to be left to the local powers. "There is no
doubt whatsoever", observed Denis Healey, "that for Britain to
leave Malaysia and Singapore now could plunge the whole of South-
East Asia in bloody chaos".(842) Accordingly, the Minister of
Defence for the Royal Air Force, Lord Shackleton's visit to
Malaysia, in June 1966, was aimed at explaining the policy of a
partial reduction in the British presence in the region. He
wished to assure Malaysia that in the post-confrontation era,
a British armed protection would be available. (843 ) The British
Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, in June 1966, clearly denied
any intention to "evacuate Singapore and go home". On the contrary,
"it is our intention", he asserted, "to stay in Singapore as long
(840) Alastair Buchan, "Britain in the Indian Ocean",
International Affairs, VO1.42, No.2, April 1966, pp.184-193.
(841) Alastair Buchan, "Is Britain Still a World Power", op.cit.,
p.374.
(842) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .727, 26 April
1966, Co1.618.
(843) Straits Times, 7 June 1966.
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as we can do this with the goodwill of Malaysia and Singapore
themselves".(844)
In comparison with this British attitude, Malaysian
perceptions of the regional power balance, and their expectations
about Britain's behaviour, were moving in a totally different
direction. (8
	 Unlike the early period, the difference on tactics
seemed to be widening. (8
	 For example, Britain had believed in
strengthening Suharto's position in relation to the PKI and
Sukarno by providing economic aid prior to April 1966. At that
time, Malaysia regarded such a policy as not only bound to inflame
the PKI's propaganda machine, but as also likely to reduce
Suharto's chances of winning the power struggle. (847) However,
this "impatient Britain, patient Malaysia" format changed quickly
after the conclusion of the Bangkok Accord on 11th June 1966.(84a)
After June 1966, Malaysia seemed to believe more in a strengthened
SUharto government, while British diplomats now regarded any such
move as "premature".(848)
This British apprehension was well aired when Denis Healey,
during his visit to Kuala Lumpur in July 1966, expressed grave
doubts about the Indonesian government's ability to honour the
(844) Michael Stewart, "Britain's Foreign Policy Today",
Australian Outlook, Vol.20, No.3, 1966, p.117.
(845) Robert 0. Tilman, op.cit., pp.158-159.
(846) Asian Almanac, VO1.3, NO.50, June 12-18, 1966, p.1572.
(847) Asian Almanac, Vol.3, No.48, May 29 — June 4, 1966, p.1555.
(848) Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: The Changing Face
of Confrontation", op.cit., pp.396-7.
(849) Ibid., p.395.
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Accord. (8 °) By contrast, at this stage Malaysia genuinely
believed in the success of "rapprochement" with Indonesia, and
accordingly regarded British withdrawal from the Borneo
territories as a pre-requisite.(851)
Once more, we see that the two countries were moving
further and further apart, not only about implementing the Bangkok
Accord, but also about the future of the British forces in Borneo,
which wa5 known as East Malaysia. Concern about the Bangkok Accord,
as brisf jklat. , been said, was evidently behind the Malaysian desire to
see Britain withdraw from Borneo. (82) But at the same time,
Malaysia desired to counteract British influence in the Borneo
territories.
As a result, during July and August 1966 there were
persistent requests from Malaysia for the withdrawal of British
troops from East Malaysia, despite the fact that British military
advisers were against it at that stage since the danger to these
territories could not be discounted. (63) Therefore, when Healey
denied any possibility of premature and total withdrawal, Tun
Abdul Razak openly stated that, "obviously with the end of
confrontation, British troops will have to leave the two
states".(8540
Thus in July-August 1966, the British Government was
(850) Daily Telegraph, 6 July 1966.
(851) Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: The Changing Face
of Confrontation", op.cit., p.400.
(852) Chin Kin Wah, Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.122.
(853) Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, op.cit., p.221.
(854) The Times, 8 June, 1966.
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under mounting pressure from opposite quarters. Malaysian leaders
were keen on withdrawal as soon as possible. British military
were against it, whilst in Britain the critics of East-of-Suez
policy were getting impatient. Finally, the British Government
decided in favour of Malaysian requests while making the
ratification of the Bangkok Accord a prior condition of British
withdrawal. Accordingly, the British Defence Minister, after a
visit to Malaysia including Sarawak, announced in London that
"British troops would be-withdrawn from Borneo soon after the
ratification of the Bangkok Agreement, as Malaysian forces can
take full responsibility for the defence of Eastern
Malaysia'.
Later on Denis Healey, the Defence Minister, recalled that
"I had an awful period in July 1966, when the TUnku was pressing
us to take our troops out of Borneo and the military was against
it". Healey continued, "I agreed to take them out and gamble, but
both Michael Stewart and I warned them that once we had taken our
troops out, it was unlikely that we would agree to send them
back''. (86)
Fortunately, the ratification of the Bangkok Accord mater-
ialised on 11th August and on the very next day, British troops
started moving out of East Malaysia. The withdrawal was completed
by October 1966. The most striking feature of withdrawal was that
Malaysia never requested that British forces should withdraw from
mainland Malaysia as well. On the contrary, they seemed keen that
Britain should continue in the region. Accordingly, whilst "Tun
(855) Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia", World Today,
Vol.22, No.9, September 1966, p.404.
(856) Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Willimms, op:cit., p.221.
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Ra7ak affirmed Malaysia's continued interest in AMDA and in the
CSR's presence in the peninsula", 4857, no withdrawal of Common-
wealth forces from West Malaysia was requested.
The rather reluctant British withdrawal from the Borneo
territories in October 1966 creates certain doubts in one's mind.
Why was it that the Malaysians were so keen on seeing the British
forces leave Borneo, as David Hawkins has observed, "even when we
were fighting in Borneo for Malaysia?" Hawkins observed that,
"some Malay politicians were showing more concern for getting us out
of Borneo as quickly as possible after confrontation than for
resisting confrontation itself". (8)
The answer can be traced to the fact that the Borneo
territories, now known as Fist Malaysia, had been virtually under
British administration even after the merger and British forces had
enjoyed the local people's confidence. 48s9 ) Moreover, any
Malaysian plans for Malayanization of Borneo could not be success-
fully launched due to confrontation and the dominant British
influence. "This influence was manifested in the comparative
performance of British troops and administrators as well as in
what Kuala Lumpur took to be British support for dissident local
politicians". 4860) Malaysian misgivings were so deep that in
September 1966, while visiting Sarawak, Tunku Abdul Rahman was
(857)Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.124.
(858) David C. Hawkins, "Britain and Malaysia - Another View",
Asian Survey, Vol.9, No.7, July 1969.
(859) Fabian Tract, "Britain and South East Asia", op.cit, pp.8-9.
(860) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.122.
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quoted as saying that to him, "Sarawak [still] appeared to be a
-British colony".(861 ) [The local leadership in Sabah was in
an assertive and defiant mood in August 1965, after the separation
of Singapore. Firm and swift action of the central government in
removing Donald Stephens, the dissident Chief-Minister/Pram
federal cabinet had pacified further troubles in Sabah. In Sarawak,
such an opportunity did not arise until 1966]. After June 1966,
encouraged by the regional developments the Malayanization plans
were takerlup earnestly in Kuala Lumpur. The existing Chief Minister
of Sarawak, Donald Ningkan, was dismissed on the charge of blocking
the "Malayanization" of the state. (862) His dismissal in June 1966,
argued Mackie, "epitomizes essentially the same conflict between
two conceptions of Malaysia as the earlier troubles in Singapore and
Sabah did". (863)
In fact, the British-dominated civil service in Sarawak
favoured the liberal interpretation of -Malaysia'. It made the
Malaysian leadership deeply apprehensive about Britain's
intentions. (864 ) The situation was made explosive by the open
attempts of the local leadership to seek British support against
Malaysian victimization. ( 84 ) British diplomats in the region,
however, decided against intervention this time. In view of the
excellent record of the British forces in Borneo, and their own
favourable intentions towards the federation, these charges of
(861) The Times, 26 September, 1966.
(862) Denis Warner, "Malaysia After Confrontation", op.cit.,
pp.34-35.
(863) J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, op.cit., p.303.
(864) Ibid., p.33.
(865) Hawkins, "Britain and Malaysia", op.cit., p.556.
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interference perplexed British diplomats. In this connection,
David Hawkins' argument contains a grain of truth. In his opinion
"Perhaps the most certain way to lose a friend is to help him too
much". According to Hawkins, "In some ways our support may have
been a little too enthusiastic".(666)
The manner of Donald Ningkan's dismissal in June 1966 was
one more instance of Malaysian intransigence causing embarrassment
to British diplomacy. However, the growing disillusionment with
the region made Britain a rather passive onlooker or Malaysian
affairs after June 1966.
Yet another aspect of the Anglo-Malaysian relationship
came under great strain due to the recent cuts proposed by the
British Prime Minister. (867) The subsequent Malaysian request for
rapid withdrawal of the British forces from Borneo, as has already
been mentioned, was inspired by their desire to improve relations
with Indonesia. This desire "was encouraged also by the prospect
of Britain's shedding of military obligations in the process of
reassessing her overseas commitments". (868) On the other hand,
the Labour Government was increasingly under pressure from its
own back-benchers seeking total demise of the overseas role, (869)
and its efforts to mobilize the allies' support for sharing the
(866) David C. Hawkins, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p26.
(867) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons. Vol .732, 20 July,
1966, Cols.631-2.
(868) Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Changing Face of
Confrontation", op.cit., p.397.
(869) Report on 65th Annual Conference of Labour Party, 3rd-7th
October 1966.
235
defence burden had not succeeded so far.
In this despPrate situation, the British Defence Secretary
took the opportunity to announce a major reduction of forces in
the Borneo territories. ''° "In Malaysian eyes, the British
withdrawal from Borneo could have been faster. But a sudden run-
down of British forces to below the pre-confrontation level would
have created difficult gaps, on account of Britain's refusal of
additional defence aid".( 87I) However, difficulties soon emerged
on the question of the transfer of equipment to Malaysian forces
in the Borneo territories, as well as about the amount of defence
aid. ($72) The British Government was hard-pressed on the economic
front and was not in a position to satisfy Malaysian demands. The
Malaysians in return started to look elsewhere for their
development requirements. ( 873 ) But Malaysian bitterness about the
British attitude was made amply clear when Tun Razak was reported
in The Times as saying "it is not the Malaysian habit to go
begging".	 Malaysian assertion of independence from British
influence became a regular feature of their foreign policy in the
post-confrontation period. (B7)
(870) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .734, 19
October 1966, Co1.208.
(871) Chin Kin Wah•, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.134.
(872) Ibid.,
(873) Parliamentary Debates, Devan Ra'ayat, Malaysia, Third
Session, 20 June, 1966, pp.915-916.
(674) The Times, 12 October 1966.
(875) Foreign Affairs: Malaysia, op.cit., Vol.1, No.3, August
1966, p.33.
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The last instance of wrangling over defence aid occurred in
October 1966, when the British authorities made it clear that the
expense of any logistical support activities had to be met by the
host government in Borneo. Tension was aggravated by the fact that
"a measure that seemed an economy to one party, was seen quite
differently by another". (876) For the Malaysian Government, the
incident was still further evidence of Britain's unwillingness to
share the Malaysian defence burden in the post-confrontation era.
These Anglo-Malaysian differences, however, never reached
an alarming stage due to the closeness of their mutual interests.
But in June 1966 and onwards, both countries slowly but steadily
moved in different directions.(877)Consequently, these differences
were more sharply noticeable in late 1966. By the middle of 1966,
it was already acknowledged in Kuala Lumpur that Britain had lost
its previous strength and would sooner or later have to withdraw
to EUrope.(878) On the other hand, "after nearly a decade of
independence, Malaysian leaders were facing the realities of
	 .
regional politics for the first time and non-alignment seemed the
obvious choice open to them". (879)
Moreover, Britain now felt more secure in NATO and
Europe. (0) The Malaysian leaders perceived non-alignment as the
(876) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.134.
(877) F.S. Northedge, "Britain's FUture in World Affairs",
International Journal, Vol.XXII, No.4, 1968. pp.605-7.
(878) Parliamentary Debates, Devan Ra'ayat, Malaysia, Third
Session, 16 June 1966, p.653.
(879) J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., 73-74.
(880) Cmnd. 3203: Statement on Defence Esthnates, t9(1-B,
Lonclor , fib,rual-y tgv+,
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only way to survive in the highly polarized balance of power in
South east Asia. 4881 ) As a result of these internal factors, then,
the two countries drifted further apart in their choice of
foreign pojicies.4882)
However, towards the close of 1966, British foreign policy
had embarked upon a new course indicated by the debate on the Fast-
of-Suez role. Consequently, the Anglo-Malaysian relationship also
entered a new phase at this stage. It is to this last phase of the
relationstip that we now turn our attention.
IV
Arlo-Malaysian Relations: The Termination of a Special 
Relationship, October 1966 - December 1967
In this last section, we encounter an entirely different
perspective within Which British foreign policy towards Malaysia
was operating. The perspective was comprised of two situations. One
was that the debate on Fast-of-Suez policy entered its last phase,
-the	 forthe firs/ -time.
andtsecond was that/since its independence the Federation of
Malaya/
	 Malaysia was not under any external or internal
threat. In order to understand British foreign policy towards
Malaysia in the last phase, we must examine the nature of these
two elements in turn.
The Fast-of-Suez policy had been a dominant factor since
	  1 q57„ but in October 1966 and afterwards its
(881) Parliamentary Debates, Devan Ra l ayat, Malaysia, Third
Session, 20 June 1966, Cols.863-865.
(882) Marvin Ott, "Malaysia: In Search of Solidarity and
Security", Asian Survey, Vol.VIII, NO.2, February 1968, pp.127-132.
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importance was greatly enhanced.( 883) The national debate on
Britain's special "role" Which had started in 1965 finally reached
its climax in 1967. The Command Paper CMnd. 3203: Statement on
Defence (1967) made its appearance on 28th February 1967, and soon
afterwards embroiled both supporters and critics of the overseas
role in a new controversy. The Government had partially acknowledged
the critics' points, but nevertheless desired to maintain Britain's
commitments to its allies on their existing level. ( 884) At the same
time, however, the Government was committed to cutting the cost of
defence and reducing the strain placed on the armed forces.(885)
This curious policy of cutting the forces, but not the
defence task, had been a familiar one since
	 Nevertheless, in
1967, the gap between Britain's overseas commitments and overall
economic and defence capability had grown far too large to be
ignored any longer. However, the defence paper, whilst referring
to confrontation, also made it clear that, "Britain should not
have to undertake operations on this scale outside Europe".
But on the other hand, a small presence outside Europe was
supposed to be essential to provide stability so that "the
friendly countries could live in peace and work for economic
upliftment".(887) Absence would have been most fatal in South
(883) Alan Sked and Chris Cook, Post-war Britain: A Political 
History, The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1979, pp.264-266.
(884) Saul Rose, "The British in Southeast Asia: Retreat from
Empire", Round Table, Vol.LXX. No.239, p.574.
(885) Cmnd. 3203: Statement on Defence Estimates, 1967-68,0P.eit.)
I. pa 7d. 1.
(886) Ibid., para.25.
(887) Ibid., para.25.
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East Asia, where it was feared that, "British withdrawal would
both increase local turmoil and create a vacoum which would
largely be filled by the communist powers".( 888) For the mainten-
ance of this small presence, a naval he in the Indian Ocean was
favoured. It was hoped that, "these arrangements would offer us
greater flexibility in our future defence planning, particularly
in relation to the Far East".(889)
In relation to Malaysia, however, the Defence Paper did
not show a similar enthusiasm. The Paper quoted Tun Abdul Razak
thanking the British and the allies for help received during the
confrontation period. The paper proudly added on counter—
confrontation operation that, "It was a fine example of what
British forces can do outside Europe to maintain international
stability. Without their contribution to the Commonwealth efforts,
much of South east Asia might have collapsed in disorder, perhaps
inviting competitive intervention by other powers with the
consequent risk of general war". (0) Nevertheless, the paper
stated that, "with the end of Indonesia's confrontation, all our
troops will be withdrawn from East Malaysia. From April 1967, the
number of troops in the command will be reduced to 30,000".(891)
It is worth mentioning here that the government refused to
(888) J. Frankel, "Past of Suez: The Aftermath", Yearbook of
World Affairs, Vol.23, 1969, pp.21.
(889) Cmnd.3203, op.cit., para.27.
(890) Ibid., para.22.
(891) Ibid., para.25.
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fix a final date for total withdrawal. <892 ) Warning against any
rash decision, Healey argued that, "Before we fix a date in this
way, we must have an idea of what will happen when we go". His
contention,
 was that "We must give our diplomacy a chance to
construct a different basis for the security of the countries
which we are leaving". (893)
More precisely, the Government decided against any total
withdrawal, although Denis Healey announced a substantial
reduction,of force in the Far Fast Perhaps, more significant was
the fact that for the first time it was accepted that this
reduction might impair the naval bases in Singapore. (8)
Healey's announcement caused yet another uproar in Sing-
apore and Malaysia. Although both countries had adjusted to the
idea of a gradual withdrawal the proposed speed was staggering.(895)
The Malaysian Government started to solicit support from AMDA
allies, but got only evasive answers. (896) Despite the repeated
assurances of the Defence Paper, there was a growing possibility
of an even bigger withdrawal. Accordingly, Denis Healey visited
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in April 1967 to make the necessary
(892) For the arguments in favour and against the total withdrawal
at this stage, see J. Frankel, "East of Suez: The Aftermath",
op.cit., pp.20-26.
(893) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons. Vol .742. 27
February 1967, Col, 315.
(894) Ibid., Co1.103-4.
(895) Saul Rose, "The British in Southeast Asia", op.cit., p.574.
(896) "Tun Razak's Visit to New Zealand and Australia", Asian
Almanac, Vol.V, NO.20, May 20 1967, pp.2085-2088.
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arrangements. (897 ) He started negotiations with the concerned
government 's "over the further cut of 20,000 servicemen by April
1968", and offered a substantial amount of aid to absorb the
shock.(698)
If we compare the events of July 1966 with those of July
1967, a total contrast is visible. In July 1966, the Malaysians
were showing signs of impatience with the British presence and were
pressing hard for Britain to withdraw. But in July 1967 and after
wards, it was the Malaysian leadership who felt duly concerned
about the announcement of Britain's withdrawal. (699 ) The Malaysian
government, quite understandably, tried to dissuade Britain from
this irreversible decision. (°°) These Malaysian attempts were
tarnished, however, by a "sort of Afro-Asian shame", for seeking
protection from an ex-imperial power. (901)
The reasons for this change in the Malaysian attitude
towards Britain can mainly be found within recent developments in
British foreign policy itself. The British foreign policy which
favoured an overwhelming presence in South East Asia had been intim-
ately linked to Malaysian security requirements. (902) In the event,
(897) Asian Almanac, Vol.V, NO.26, 1 July 1967, p.2161.
(898) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.136.
(899) Robert O l Tilman, op.cit., pp.131.
(900) Leonard Beaton, op.cit., p.540.
(901) Ibid.
(902) Patrick Gordon Walker, The Cabinet, op.cit:, p.133. see
also J.D.B.Miller, "British Interests and the Commonwealth",
Journal of Commonwealth and Political Studies, Vol.IV, NO.1, March
1966, pp.187-188.
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the Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia had provided the
raison d'6tre for the British "special role" in the region until
1966.( 903) But the turn of events in South East Asia between
October 1965 and August 1966 had rocked the foundation of this
policy. (904) J.D.B. Miller's observation that, "the closer
Indonesia comes to Malaysia, the more colonialist the British will
look", 0) certainly contained some truth. The penny had already
dropped in London. In fact, Kenneth Younger regarded the year 1967
as a favourable time to start the process of disengagement from
South Fast Asia. His reason for believing this was that "the
Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation (has] just ended and China is
in a poor condition to contemplate overseas adventure". (906)
Moreover, in Younger's opinion, it was also a good moment to put
some pressure upon the governments of Malaysia and Singapore
to make the mutual adjustments demanded by the altered
complexities generated by the post-separation era. 07)
Apart from making their presence felt in higher circles,
these events also encouraged the critics of the East-of-Suez
presence. During 1966-67, as a result, there was an unexpected
rise againsttEast-of-Suez presence in the British Parliament.(908)
oolhounteci.
Finally, the decision	 kby Cmnd:3356 in July 1967 in favour
(903) Ibid., pp.123-124.
(904) J.D.B. Miller, "British Interests and the Commonwealth,
op.cit., p.189.
(905) Ibid.
(906) Kenneth Younger, "British Interests and British foreign
Policy". op.cit., p.348.
(907) Ibid.
(908) Derek MacDougal, op.cit., pp. 232-234.
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of phased but total withdrawal by the end of 1975 was the
"death-knell of the British Empire East-of-Suez", according to
Richard Crossman, who was one of the major opponents of the policy.
In his opinion, the decision was "abandonment of all that Harold
and Herbert Bowden, and George Brown and Denis Healey were saying
only a year ago".(909)
Undoubtedly, Britain's reversal of its East-of-Suez policy
was the major motivating factor behind Malaysia's reconsideration
of its international standing, as well as of its own attitude
towards Britain. (910) Therefore, in May 1967, when Denis Healey
acknowledged that the "base facilities in Malaysia and Singapore
exceeded Britain's requirements",( 91I ) the Malaysian government
was genuinely alarmed. (912)
The Malaysians were worried mainly on three accounts.
Firstly, about the future of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence
Agreement; secondly, about the future security of Malaysia; and
thirdly, about "the possible adverse effects withdrawal could have
on economic and political stability".( 913)This expression of
(909) Richard H. Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol.II,
Hamish Hamilton, London. 1972, pp.411-412; Crossmans view's on the
end of imperial era were also echoed by J. Frankel in his long
article, "FAst of Suez: The Aftermath"; op.cit.. pp. 20-37, Other
leading authorities in this field also hold similar opinions.
(910) Chandran Jeshurun, The Growth of Malaysian Armed Forces,
op.cit., p.15; and J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit., p.89.
(911) Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore,
op.cit., p.137.
(912) J. Frankel, "East of Suez: The Aftermath", op.cit., pp.26-27.
(913) Foreign Affairs: Malaysia, Vol.1, No.3, August 1966, p.33.
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Malaysian concern was in total contrast to TUnku Abdul Rahman's
Independence Day message in 1966. "We are determined", the
confident Prime Minister of Malaysia had declared, "to make this
country economically sound, so that political and economic
changes elsewhere, such as in Britain, do not disturb us".(914)
The purpose of the Malaysian Prime Minister's visit to
London in June 1967, accordingly, was to seek clarification on the
future of British commitments to AMDA in particular and to South
East Asia in general.( 91.5 ) The talks in London, according to a
Malaysian source, covered all the relevant problems. The Malaysian
request for the continued presence of CSR on their territory was
favoured by Britain, only because such a force, "would have been
truly a Commonwealth concept and an integral concern".(916)
However, on the future of AMDA, Britain outlined a three cornered
strategy. It was decided that during the withdrawal period ie.
until 1975, there should be sufficient British sea and air forces
in the area. ( 91-7 ) "The main purpose of this presence", according
to Kenneth Younger was "to enable the governments of the area to
sort out their relations with one another and to begin to establish
new patterns of regional cooperation", within this period. 8)
(914) Foreign Affairs: Malaysia, Vol.1 No.6. September 1967,p.35.
(915) "The British Withdrawal was planned in three phases. Phase
I, withdrawal of 10,000 men by April 1968; Phase II, Further
withdrawal of 20,000 men by 1970-71; Phase III, Total withdrawal
by the middle of 1970's". See J. Saravamamuttu, op.cit., p.75.
(916) Foreign Affairs: Malaysia, Vol.1, No.6, September 1967 p.35.
(917) Kenneth Younger, "British Interests and British Foreign
Policy", op.cit., p.348.
(918) Ibid.
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In the second phase ie. after 1975, Britain assured Malaysia that
it would maintain a sufficient number of reserve forces at home.
These forces would be airlifted to Malaysia in case of an
emergency. Finally, Britain welcomed the Malaysian proposal to
convene a five powers conference on regional defence at Kuala
Lumpur. ( 919 ) However, to help Malaysia "in absorbing the initial
shocks of transformation", Britain made an offer of considerable
economic aid over a five-year period. The amount offered to
Malaysia was £25 million, plus all the British military
installations on her territories. (920
The last phase of the Anglo-Malaysian relationship is
marked by a growing maturity on either side. The British Government
had abandoned most of its delusion about its "special role" in the
Fast-of-Suez region by July 1967-( 921 ) Although William Rodgers,
the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, had already acknow-
ledged in July 1967 that, "we no longer bask in the sunshine of
mid-Victorian England", (922) the Prime Minister was still
optimistic about the benefits of an East-of-Suez presence. Harold
Wilson accepted in his memoirs that, he "was the last one to be
converted".( 923) This conversion, more specifically, came in late
1967, under economic pressures.(924)
(919) Ibid., pp.35-36.
(920) J. Frankel, "East of Suez: The Aftermath", op.cit., p.31.
(921) Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol .750, 20 July
1967, Co1.2605.
(922) Philip Darby, op.cit., pp.322-325.
(923) Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, op.cit., p.243.
(924) Kenneth Younger, "British Interests and British Foreign
Policy", op .cit., p.345.
246
The Malaysian government, for its part, had started to
widen its international horizon by establishing new contacts with
the West, with non-aligned, and even with some communist
countries. ( 925 ) The Malaysian attitude towards Britain had also
assumed a new understanding in place of the former bitter, moral-
istic tone. Against this background, it was not surprising that
the questions of the redundant labour force and the amount of
compensation to be paid by Britain were solved without any acrimony.
Malaysian jappreciation of Britain's economic problems now made them
rather fatalistic in their response to the withdrawal. For example,
when Britain decided on December 18, 1967, to withdraw even earlier
than had been announced in July of that year, the Malaysian
response was resignation to fate. This acceptance of the
inevitable was apparent in TUnku Abdul Rahman's reflection on the
British volte face. "A lot of anxiety and fear have been shown
recently with the impending British withdrawal of their troops
from Malaysia and Singapore", TUnku observed, adding that, "Now we
have got to see how best we can defend ourselves".( 926 ) According
to Dr. Mahathir, a critic of Pro-British policy, at long last,
Malaysia was able to detach itself from the "British apronstring
complex", and has started to "emerge with its own distinctive
international personality". (927, Malaysia had indeed come of age.
(925) J.F. Cady, op.cit., p.179; and J. Saravanamuttu, op.cit.,
pp. 25-31.
(926) Tunku Abdul Rahman's address at Jakarta Club, on 5th March
1968, Foreign Affairs: Malaysia, Vol.1, no.7 and 8 March 1968,
pp.81-82.
(927) Data Abdullah Ahmad, op.cit., p.10.
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Conclusion
At the close of our study, we may now consider the broader
significance of our thesis for the interpretation of international
politics at large. We may ask, more specifically, what light it
sheds on the principal theories of international politics.
In the field of international politics, we come across a
wide range of theories of various levels of generalization.
However, most of these are either too narrow or too broad to be of
much value for our purpose. With this in mind, we will concentrate
on the more important middle range theories. These may be divided
into four groups. The first group is composed of power theory. The
second group consists of theories which relate foreign policy to
tensions inherent in democratic societies. In the third group are
those theories Which lay particular emphasis upon nationalism.
Finally, in the last group are theories which stress the primacy
of economic over political considerations. We will consider each
of these groups in turn.
Power Theory
The supremacy of power in politics has been extolled by
various political philosphers from Machiavelli to the present
day(928). However, a central position in the realm of inter -
national politics was only assigned to power during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, as the optimisticvision of
inevitable progress towards an enlightened and harmonious world
order started to wane. Such optimism received a decisive set back
(928) See for example, Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The
Doctrine of Raison d'êtat and its Place in History, Yale
University Press, New Haven,1962.
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as a result of the two world wars and the rise of two super
powers. After 1945, in particular, the theme of a constant
struggle for power is taken up as the key to interaction between
states. This concept of power has various aspects of which
stress upon the balance of power, supremacy of national interests,
collective security and alliance strategy are the most
familiar. (929)
From a purely theoretical point of view, the best post-war
representative of power theory is Hans J. Mbrgenthau, the leading
exponent of "realism in politics". According to Morgenthau, the
key to understanding the intricacies of politics is "the concept
of interest defined in terms of power". ( 930 ) The adoption of
realism in the study of politics, Morgenthau maintains, has the
great advantage of removing "the concern with motives and
ideological preferences", ( 93I ) thereby rendering the study of
world political order rational and scientific. (932) Before
attempting to assess the relevance of this theory for our thesis,
however, it is necessary to consider some of its component parts
more closely.
In its most familiar form, power theory finds expression
in the concept of the balance of power. ( 933 ) Although the meaning
(929) See for example, Inis L. Claude Jr. Power and Inter-
national Politics, Random House, New York, 1962.
(930) Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, The Struggle
for Power and Peace, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1966, p.5.
(931) Ibid.
(932) H.J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1946.
(933) Inis L. Claude Jr., op. cit., pp. 13-88.
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of this concept has changed very greatly over the centuries, its
continuing relevance is rightly insisted upon. (934) In theory the
balance of power denotes an ideal situation of equilibrium, and the
attempt to keep it in one's favour is supposed to be the moving
force behind every nation's actions.(935/6)
A second concept closely associated with power theory is
that of national interest.( 937) Raising it to the level of raison
d'êtat, classical theorists like Meinecke regarded it as "the
fundamental principle of national conduct, the state's first Law
of Motion". ( 93e ) In the course of developing the concept of
raison d'etat, Meinecke argued that, "the well-being of the State
and of its population is ... the ultimate value and the goal; and
power, maintenance of power, extension of power is the indis-
pensable means which must - without qualification - be
procured.''
 See for example, Paul Sedbury (ed.), Balance of Power,
Chandler Publishing Company, California, 1965, and E.B. Hass,
"The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy Making", Journal of 
Politics, Vol. 15, August, 1953. pp. 370-398.
(935/6) Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on
International Politics, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962;
see the chapter, "Balance of Power in Theory and Practice",
pp.117-181; and see also, George Ldska, International Eguili-
brium, A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organisation of 
Security, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957.
(937) See for example, Joseph Frankel, National Interest, Pall
Mall, London, 1970.
(938) Friedrick Meinecke, op. cit., p. 1.
(939) Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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It is this thought which is echoed by thinkers like Morgenthau
when he asserts that the survival of a state is the supreme value
and "can best be served by the acquisition, maintenance and
extension pf a nation's power". C940)
The concept of security as the primary national interest
•••"'
adds a third dimension to power theory. ( 941 ) This third dimension
leads us to the concept of collective security and its corollary,
alliance strategy. (P42 ) Both these concepts are concerned with the
practical ,affairs of a nation and represent power theory in its
material rather than abstract form.(943)
Power theory, then, has been perhaps the most contro-
versial theory of international politics. The pluralist criticises
it for treating the state as the sole actor; the moralist condemns
it for being too crude and debasing basic human goodness; the
sceptic criticises it for insisting on rationality at the cost
of irrational elements; and the internationalist criticises it
for being Dirocentric.( 944) However, a detailed critique of power
(940) Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defence of National Interest,
(941) Fred Greene, Dynamics of International Relations: Power, 
Security and Order, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, New York, 1964.
(942) Robert L. Rothstein, "Power, Security and the International
System", (A paper delivered at the American Political Science
Association Convention, Chicago, September 1967; See also George
Ldska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, The
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Second Print, 1968, pp. 26-55.
(943) Liska, op. cit., p.12.
(944) For the critique of power theory see Raymond Aron, "Beyond
Power Politics", in Peace and War: A Theory of International 
Relations, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, (Continued overleaf)
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theory in general is not our concern at present. What concerns us
is whether this theory sheds any light on any important aspect of
British foreign policy towards Malaysia.
In its most familiar form, power theory helps us in
understanding Anglo-Malaysian relations by relating them to the
shift in the world balance of power brought about by the Second
World War. This shift was inimical to British imperial status,
forcing Britain as it did out of her imperial strongholds in Asia
and Africa. The best illustration of this approach is Sir Oilver
FcnS9, Britain and the Tide of World Affairs. (945 ) In addition,
F.S. Northedge, Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy 1945-
1973 (944) approaches the subject in a similar way.
(944)Continued from overleaf. 1966, pp. 703-766;
Trevor C. Salmon, "Rationality and Politics: The Case of Strategic
Theory", British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 2, NO.3,
1976, pp.293-310; John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political 
Idealism, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1954, see especially
pp.86-93; George Liska, International Eguilibrium: A Theoretical 
Essay on the Politics and Organization of Security, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1957.
(945) Sir Ofivex frarKs, Britain and the Tide of World Affairs,
The BBC Reith Lectures, 1954, O.U.P. London, 1955.
(946) F. S. Northedge, Descent from Power: British Foerign Policy
1945-1973, George Allen and Unwin. London, 1974. In this
connection an article by Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Retreat from
World Power, "World Politics, Vol. XV, NO.4, July 1963, pp.655-
688, is worth mentioning here.
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One of the most convincing explanations for the British
policy of decolonisation and withdrawal from Malaysia has been
advanced by the defenders of national interest and strategy
theory. For them, the defence needs of the British Raj in India
were the sole determinants of the British acquisition of the
•••4
South East Asian colonies. To some extent, this argument can be
supported by historical developments in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. According to strategy theory, the fact
that India, had been given freedom in 1947 meant that no reason
could be given for retaining the colonies in South East Asia. As
a matter of fact, after 1947, British withdrawal could not be
postponed for long. Although every scholarly work touches upon
this point in passing, Philip Darby's British Defence Policy
Ft of Suez( 947) is the best illustration of this way of
thinking. For Darby, the key to British policy is contained in
the prophesy made by Lord Curzon in 1902. Curzon's prophesy was
that, "when India has gone and the great colonies have gone,
do you suppose that we can stop there? Your ports and coaling
stations, your fortresses and dockyards, your crown-colonies
and protectorates will go too. For either they will be as
unnecessary as the toll gates and barbicans of an empire that
has vanished, or or they will be taken by an enemy more powerful
than yourself".(948)
In addition to Darby, studies conducted by C.J. Bartlett,
Alastair Buchan and Michael Howard are amongst the more interest-
esting examples of national interest and strategy theory.(949)
(947) Philip Darby, op.cit.,
(948) Ibid., p.1.
(949) C.J. Bartlett's The Lona Retreat: (Continued overleaf)
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Although the national interest and strategy theories give us sound
and deep insight into policy motivations, these are nevertheless
partial and are not concerned for instance, with either domestic
or economic factors. The third dimension of power theory,
i.e., collective security and alliance strategy, has proved to be
of considerable help in theorising about the Anglo-Malaysian
relationship. M.V. Naidu, in his Alliances and Balance of Power: A
Search for Conceptual Clarity, attempts to theorize on
•-•
regional/selective alliance. According to Naidu, the solidarity of
this type of alliance depends upon two elements - common fears and
common interests. "When the common external threat", Naidu argued,
"recedes into the background or is overcome, the most powerful
reason for alliance is destroyed, Which in turn greatly dilutes
other elements of solidarity.. ."°' This applies equally force-
fully to the demise of AMDA, as has been demonstrated in Chapter V
of our thesis. Another argument made in the thesis, which was that
restrictions were placed on Britain by its very preponderance of
power vis-a-vis Malaysia, is also strongly reinforced by Naidu's
arguments. The stronger power, contends Naidu, "would naturally
(949) (Continued from overleaf) A Short History of British
Defence Policy, 1945-70, Macmillan, London, 1972, and Alistair
Buchan, "Britain East of Suez: The Problem of Power," Journal of
Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 112/647, August 1967,
pp.209-215. See also Michael Howard, "Britain's Strategic
Problems East of Suez," International Affairs (London) Vol. 42,
No.2, April 1966, pp.179-183.
(950) M.V. Naidu, Alliances and Balance of Power: A Search for
Conceptual Clarity, Macmillan, London, 1975, p.162; See alsothin
Kin Wah, Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, op.cit.
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like to convert its military strength into political power.
Ironically, however, such demands for the exercise of political
power ... usually become the very reason for the resentment of the
follower or client states and also for the erosion and breakdown
of the alliance."(9451) Needless to say, 	 AMDA was subjected to
similar pressures in August 1965 and again in 1966. Throughout
these ten years i.e. 1957-67, any British attempt to exercise
political influence was deeply resented in Kuala Lumpur and only
ended with negative results. The separation of Singapore and the
role played by British intervention in domestic affairs of
Malaysia prove this point. Moreover, the extraordinary freedom
that Malaysia had enjoyed vis-a-vis Britain within Anglo-Malaysian
relations, is also hinted at by this theory.(952)
Power theory is on still firmer ground when strategic
considerations are taken into account. In strategic terms, the
crucial position of Malaya and Singapore cannot be denied during
the pre-Second World War period. However, the independence of India
destroyed at a stroke the basic structure of British imperial
pretensions: henceforward, there was simply no point in Britain
maintaining a large number of forces in South Fast Asia. Yet, in
spite of this, Britain still continued to station forces on
Malaysian soil 7------unfH the nineteen seventies Lastly, it should
be mentioned that the final decision to withdraw was necessitated
as much by economic and political considerations as by strategic
ones.
Power theory, then, may certainly claim superiority over
(950) M.V. Naidu, op.cit., p.28.
(951) Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1968, pp.49-51.
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other theories by virtue of its ability to accommodate various
external factors such as the rise of super-powers, the cold war,
the rise of nationalism in Asia and Africa, and the communist
ideological threat to British imperialism. However, it does not
provide a completely satisfactory design for the analysis of
British foreign policy since it ignores the constraints imposed on
foreign policy by domestic factors. This theoretical limitation is
partially removed by the next model, which places domestic
constraints at the heart of its concern.
(b)	 Models of foreign policy in democratic society
In this group we may place theories which focus on a funda-
mental tension between the domestic requirements of a democratic
society, on the one hand, and the harsh realities of international
politics, on the other. ( 952 ) This tension consists in the fact that
in a democracy internal -soft' demands like welfare, full employ-
ment, housing etc., tend to gain ascendancy over the -hard' demands
of defence and foreign policy. ( 953 ) James Rosenau, the pioneer
in this field, has attempted to give some decisive insights into
this external vs. internal factors controversy. On the basis
of a lengthy quantitative excercise, he has announced that in
comparison with external factors, "greater potency occurs in
(952) See for example, Roy E. Jones, Principles of Foreign
Policy, The Civil State in Its World Setting, Martin Robertson,
Oxford, 1970.
(953) James N. Rosenau and Garry D. Hoggard, "Foreign Policy
Behaviour in Dyadic Relationships: Testing a Pre-Theoretical EXten-
sion",in James N. Rosenau (ed.), ComParing Foreign Policies: 
Theories, Findings and Methods, Sage Publications, New York, 1974
pp.117-145.
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internal factors. (954) In addition, democratic ideology favours
open politics and the politics of consensus. ( 955 ) Since the govern-
ment owes its power to popular goodwill, it is under constant
pressure from the electorate. As a result, the policies adopted by
(such a society] are subjected to many different influences".(958)
Kenneth Waltz, in Foreign Policy and Democratic
Politics, critically examines these assumptions in a comparative
study of decision-making in the U.S.A. and the U.K. (957) EMpire
to Welfare State, English History 1906-1967( 958) by T.O. Lloyd
is another illustration of this approach. Lloyd examines the
gradual development of new trends of "mass-politics", a world-
wide phenomenon after the First World War. This phenomenon is
exemplified by two powerful currents which have swept the
world since then, viz, the rise of organized labour movements,
and the spread of nationalism in Asia and Africa. Both these
(954) ibid., p.142.
(955) David W. Moore, "Governmental and Societal Influences on
Foreign Policy in Open and Closed Nations" in James N. Rosenau
(ed.), Comparing Foreign Policies, op. cit., pp. 171-199.
(956) Ibid., p.190. This view of the relation between the
structure of open or closed society and foreign policy has also
been advanced by Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and
Foreign Policy", in J.N. Rosenau, (ed.), International Politics
and Foreign Policy: A Reader.The Free Press, New York 1969,
pp. 261-275.
(957) Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics,
Macmillan, London, 1968.
(958) T.O. Lloyd, EMpire to Welfare State, English History 19Q6-
1967. Oxford University Press, London, 1970.
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developments for him were instrumental in undermining the
imperial status of Britain.
A similar view has been adopted in the so-called
- linkage' theory of politics. (959 ) In Linkage Politics, James N.
Rosenau argued that the degree of domestic support required for
the execution of foreign policy decisions determines the extent
to which domestic pressure can be successfully applied to the
conduct of foreign policy.( 96°) Rosenau also argued that a part-
icular society might be too open to outside influences, making
it particularly vulnerable to external pressures. Rosenau tested
the linkage politics model on two British experiences: the
decision to join the EEC, and the Suez Crisis in 1956. In the
second example, Rosenau argued that because of its over-dependence
on the U.S.A., the British government could not hold out against
increasing American pressure to abort the Suez invasion in 1956.
Another major explanation offered by theories of democracy is
that there has to be a balance between the domestic support
structure and foreign policy. In the British case, there was an
imbalance between British commitments and capabilities which
dangerously increased after 1957, due to the substantial cuts in
defence expenditure, the rising cost of armaments, the growing
complexities of world politics and general British inability to
(959) James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics, Collier-Macmillan,
London, 1968.
(960) This view has been shared by Harold and Margaret Sprout,
"Environmental Factors on the Study of International Politics",
in James N. Rosenau, (ed.), International Politics and Foreign
Policies. op.cit., pp.411-56.
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curtail her commitments to an appropriate level.( 961 )This growing
imbalance, coupled with the worsening economic situation, finally
compelled the reluctant British government to relinquish its world
role, and to decide upon complete withdrawal from East-of-Suez in
1968.( 962) An insider's view of the problem has been recorded by
Christopher Mayhew Britain's Role Tomorrow. (963) Mayhew, who was
minister for the Navy in Harold Wilson's cabinet, resigned in 1966,
in protest over cuts in defence made without any concomitant cuts
in naval responsibilities.
Another valuable variant of democratic theory is what has
been termed the perception model. "We act according to the way the
world -appears' to us, not necessarily according to the way it
- is'", as Kenneth Boulding has argued. Not only, that, "but the
images which are important", he contends, "are those which a nation
has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which
constitute its international environment".(964) Perhaps the most
important amongst these images is the image of its own strength or
(961) Walter Goldstein, The Dilemma of British Defence: The
Imbalance between Commitments and Resources, Ohio State University
Press, 1966.
(962) See for example, Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The dilemma
of Rising Demand and Insufficient Resources, op.cit, and F.S.
Northedge, "Britain as a Second Rank Power," International Affairs,
Vol. 46, NO.1, January 1970, pp. 37-47.
(963) Christopher Mayhew, Britain's Role Tomorrow, Hutchison and
Co., London, 1967.
(964) Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International
Systems", in James N. Rosenau (ed.),International Politics and
Forel= Policy, op. cit., p.422.
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weakness. This image is based on its notions about its " economic
resources and productivity, political organization and tradition,
willingness to incur sacrifices and inflict cruelties and so
on". (96)
It has been argued that shifts in the perception of
national priorities were responsible for the decision taken in
1967 leading to total withdrawal rrstr". from East-of-Suez. In this
connection, D.C. Watt's, Personalities and Policies, Studies in the
Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century(966)
is worth mentioning. It is argued there that the government's
perceptions of national aspirations and needs played a far more
decisive role than appeared to be the case on the surface. Watt's
thesis is that their involvement in the Second World War distorted
the ruling class's perception of British power by nurturing the
illusion of British great power status. It was only the brutal
shock of the Suez debacle, in 1956, that shattered that illusion.
The memoirs of Anthony Eden are the best illustration of this
phenomenon. <) To a large extent, however, Harold Wilson's
memoirs provide a similar illustration of failure to adjust to the
changes in the overseas role until forced by a series of economic
(965) Ibid., p.426, Kenneth Bbulding's view has been supported by
Margaret Hermann, "Leader, Personality and Foreign Policy
Behaviour", in Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and
Methods, ed. by J.N. Rosenau, op. cit. pp.201-234.
(966) D.C. Watt, Personalities and Policies, Studies in the 
Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century,
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1965.
(967) Anthony Eden, Full Circle, Cassell, London, 1960,
pp.560-584
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crises in 1967.(968)
Suggestive though they are, these democratic theories of
foreign policy formulation do not give sufficient insight into the
conduct of,British foreign policy in the period under study.
Whereas the balance of power theories emphasise international
factors at the expense of domestic factors, the democratic
theories go to the opposite extreme, concentrating upon domestic
constraints at the expense of external ones.
(c) Theories of Nationalism
In the analysis of post-war international relationships
between imperial and post-colonial states, theories of nationalism
offer one of the most interesting frameworks within Which to
analyse and interpret both the pre-independence and post-
independence situation. Three better known interpretation of
nationalism, i.e. liberal, Marxist and conservative, are worth
our consideration in this section.
The first of these interpretations is the liberal view,'
according to which any kind of foreign rule is undesirable because
it hinders the moral, cultural, political and social development
of the subject people. Therefore, freedom from alien rule is
the sacred right of every nation. This freedom, it is held,
(968) Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, op.cit., pp.417-487.
(969) Inspired by the liberal-idealist philosophy of Kant, the
German philosophers like Fichte, Schilling and Herder developed
nationalism as a political doctrine. Prominent English philos-
ophers like Edmund Burke and J.S. Mill extended it into a liberal-
humanist principle. Finally, the Fourteen Points expounded by
President Wilson of U.S.A. in 1918 gave it pacifist and populist
support.
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requires that a truly independent nation shall sever all externally
imposed links with its colonial past; only self-imposed or chosen
limitations on national freedom, that is to say, are acceptable.
Any other kind of link with the former ruler is incompatible with
self-government and compromises independent nationhood.
What is important for the present discussion, however, is
the fact that nationalism does not evaporate into thin air after
the achievement of independence. This is because it always entails
a vision of a future society. During the post-independence period,
however, nationalism meets the tough challenges posed by various
other loyalties prevalent in traditional Asian societies. On the
one hand, when devoid of a common enemy, nationalism starts losing
its original dynamism. On the other hand, it becomes more conserv-
ative because it is now the ideology of the ruling elite. Saul
Rose commented on the second phase of Asian nationalism that,
"Because the new states of Asia (in the second stage of national-
ism) are primarily concerned for their survival, their policies
are taking a more pragmatic, less dogmatic form".(970)
Apart from this liberal view, another interpretation of
nationalism comes from Marxist-Leninist theory. However, since
this then tends to relate nationalism exclusively to economic
factors, it will be discussed in the next group of theories.
The third interpretation of nationalism is proffered by
the conservative school of thought. In total contrast to Marxist-
Leninist belief, the conservative argument is that it was not
economic exploitation but the very nature of European rule itself
Which had a destablising impact upon the traditional societies of
(970) Saul Rose, "Asian Nationalism: The Second Stage,"
International Affairs, Vol. 43, No.2, April 1967, p.269.
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Asia.( 971 ) Kedourie, for example, has argued that it was mainly
cold and impersonal European administrative methods that were
responsible for encouraging the spread of nationalist
sentiment .5972) Above all, Kedourie holds, adoption of the
European belief in, "literacy as an ideal and as a technically
feasible goal,"( 973) completed this vicious circle.
According to Kedourie, it was the political instability of
the colonial world that compelled Britain to step in and assume
the responsibilities of government. c974 ) The case of India in the
eighteenth century is given as the principal evidence for this
view, but Malaya in the nineteenth century is also subsumed under
the same general thesis. The subsequent decline of the British
empire is attributed to the spread of nationalism in Asia and
Africa. The movement of nationalism from Europe to the imperial
territories is regarded as the unforeseen and unintended
consequence of British imperial domination. In the post-Second
World War years, under pressure from the super powers and hostile
nationalist movements throughout the &Tire, Britain was
ultimately forced to grant independence to the colonies.(975)
According to this interpretation, the final decision to withdraw was
(971)Elie Kedourie, (ed.) Nationalism in Asia and Africa,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1970, p.1-151.
(972) Ibid., p. 27.
(973) Ibid., p. 29.
(974) Ibid., pp. 11-13.
(975) See for example, Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: 
The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples, Beacon
Press, Boston, 1960 and also, John Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and
Self-Government, Longman Greens and Co. London, 1960.
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taken under nationalistic pressures rather than due to any economic
or military weaknesses.
How well does any of these explanations fit the facts, as
they have emerged in the course of our research?
If we now attempt to locate British policy either before
or after the independence of Malaya within the above mentioned
framework of Asian nationalism, the endeavour frustrates us
completely. As T.H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz have stated in an
article already quoted, "It is hardly possible to make any
generalisation about nationalism in Asia that will not be falsified
in Malaya. Whether we consider the relation of nationalism to
colonial rule, or its relation to religion, or its relations to
economics, we shall find that the simple truism will not work." (976)
Unfortunately, none of these interpretations of nationalism
seems to offer a plausible explanation for the course of Malaysian
history, either before or after the grant of independence. It may be
conceded, in the first place, that the original British contact
with the Malay peninsula was made for strategic reasons. Neverthe-
less the peninspy gradually grew in economic importance to
such an extent that other considerations dropped into the
background. There was of course a need to enforce law and order,
but despite that, Malaya was never placed directly under British
rule, as India, for example, had been before 1947.
Secondly, the one and a half centuries of British presence
in Malaya did not create a significant body of anti-British
nationalist sentiment among the inhabitants of that country.(977)
(976) Aziz and Silcock, "Nationalism in Malaya", in W.E.Holland,
op. cit., p. 269.
(977) Ibid., p.365.
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At any rate, it was certainly not Malayan nationalism that
compelled Britain to grant independence in 1957. Nor, once again,
was it the Malaysian nationalist opposition which led Britain to
terminate its special links with the region in general, and
Malaysia in particular, at the end of 1967. Thus despite their
sky-high claims, the theories of nationalism fail to render any
plausible explanation for our thesis. Hence, we turn to the last
group which is that of primacy of economic factors over the
political ones.
(d)	 Theories of Economic Determinism: Whilst theories of
nationalism would postulate that hostile nationalist forces
compelled Britain to withdraw, another fashionable view attributes
that withdrawal solely to economic factors. This view, which is
largely based on Marxist doctrine, depicts the relations between a
'colony' and the 'metropolis' in terms of dependency theory.(978)
According to this theory, the history of the British empire in the
second half of the twentieth century is essentially a history of
the British attempt to exploit colonial resources for the imperial
cause, whilst the Commonwealth and dependent territories were prim-
rily meant to provide a market, as well as support for the Sterling
Area.( 979) But first, let us look at the general doctrine itself.
The primacy of economic over political factors in shaping
the course of events in the international sphere has been asserted
(978) Charles Reynolds, "International Economic and Political
Relationships", in Theory and Explanation in International 
Politics, op.cit., pp. 231-234.
(979) B.R. Tomlinson, "The Contraction of England", National
Decline and the Loss of apire," Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, Vol. XI, No.1., October 1982, pp.66-67.
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by a long line of scholars extending back to 3. A. Hobson. (980)
It is "the capitalist - imperialist forces Which are the pivot
of financial policy", Hobson maintained. Although this "does not
mean that gther forces have no independent aims and influences",
economic considerations are nevertheless, he said, "the true
determinant of actual policy". (98) According to this classical
position, domestic capitalist economies commonly maintain them-
selves by expanding into new overseas territories, where the
exploitation of natural resources and the creation of new markets
stave off the emergence of internal crisis.
According to the proponents of this theory, the primacy
of economic relations in the interstate sphere has not diminished
in the post-imperial period. Appearances to the contrary notwith-
standing, it continues under new forms, to which the new name of
neo-imperialism may be given. (982) In this revised version of
economic determinism, the flea-imperialists try to maintain their
political hegemony in the post-imperialist era by "safeguarding
foreign markets and investments, by protecting present and
potential sources of raw material, by controlling the sea and air
communication routes, by preserving spheres of influence, by
(980) J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, Allen and Unwin, London,
1968 and V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism,
International Publishers, New York, 1970.
(981) J.A. Hobson, op.cit., p.96.
(982) Michael Barratt Brown, After Imperialism, (Revised Ed.)
Heinemann,London, 1970, and Robin Jenkins, EXploitation: The 
World Power Structure and the Inequality of Nations, Macgibbon and
Kee, London, 1970 See the chapter "Relations Between Rich and Poor
Nations", pp.86-138.
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creating new opportunities via military and economic aid; and
finally by maintaining the structure of world capitalist
markets ... (983) Thus while granting independence, the old
imperialists try to retain control over their economic system.
Amongst the various attempts to apply this theory to
Britain, two divergent views are to be found. One view is
represented by R.F. Holland, for whom British decolonization
since 1945 is to be explained in terms of domestic economic
factors. Holland stresses in particular the significance of the
colonies as commodity producers and as "counter-inflationary
cushions" for the metropolitan British economy. In the post-war
world, he argues, the economic demands of the metropolis led the
Attlee administration to drop any colonies that were "net
liabilities", whilst simultaneously "maintaining a grip on those
(largely African) possessions which remained blawAtble
assets."(984) In the course of applying this analysis, Holland
divides post Second World War imperial policy into three
phases. ( 9195 ) The first phase extends from 1945-1949, and is
marked by a growing British dependence on the colonies for
economic support against U.S. financial pressures. The result was
the grant of independence to unproductive colonies and the
retention of the profitable ones, like Malaya. The second phase,
(983) Harry Magdoff, "The American EMpire and US Economy", in
Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader, ed., by R. I. Rhodes,
Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1970 pp.18-44.
(984) R.F. Holland, "The Imperial Factor in British Strategies
from Attlee to Macmillan, 1945-1963", Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, VOl.XII, NO.2, January 1982, p.169.
(985) Ibid., p.183-184.
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Holland maintains, extends from 1949 to 1956. During this period,
British policy was inspired by a desire to convert the colonies
in Africa and Asia into independent, economically and politically
viable countries, united by loyalty to the Commonwealth. The result
was a flow of aid into colonial development programmes. By 1955,
however, the British government was doubtful about the outcome of
the scheme, being particularly concerned by the prospect that the
British Exchequer might become a "much-cow" since the economic-
ally sound colonies did not show any sign of assuming their own
financial responsibilities. (966) As a result, a third and final
phase, which coincides with the post-Suez era, is marked by "a
new bureaucratic hostility towards the colonial connection."(987)
During the nineteen sixties, any remaining connection with the
economically unprofitable colonies was therefore systematically
attacked by Labour and Conservative supporters alike. By severing
this connection, the Conservatives hoped to redress the balance
of payments deficit, whilst Labour supporters hoped to increase
welfare activities at home.
Although Holland's analysis is occasionally illuminating,
his work as a whole involves absurd oversimplifications and out-
right distortion of historical facts. For example, in the case of
Malaya, Holland contends that the proposed Union of Malaya in 1946
was intended to "free Chinese entrepreneurship from some of the
constraints long imposed by cautious administrators and fiercely
conservative Malay Sultans."( 988) Far from being true, this
statement conflicts at every point with the well-documented pre-
(986) Ibid., p.180.
(987) Ibid., p.181.
(988) Ibid., p.170.
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war history of the Chinese community in Malayaat ignores, for
example, the racial, religious, political and economic roots of
the historical situation. The Chinese community in post-war Malaya
did not need to be "freed from restraints", for the simple reason
that in modern Malaya they always had enjoyed a near monopoly in
the economic sector. (989) In a somewhat similar spirit, Holland
argues that the communists in Malaya were fighting "to prevent the
metropole mapping a future in which their group interests (as
landless peasants and wage earners...) were likely to get scant
respect."( 990) Once again, the argument only leads one to ignore
the complex factors behind Malayan insurgency.
The other view found within this framework is represented
by B.R. Tomlinson. In contrast to Holland. Tomlinson gives a more
balanced view. His argument is that the changes in the structure
of the world economy in the present century "have meant that the
ability of the imperial powers to get what they wanted out of
their colonial possessions was constantly weakened."( 991 ) It is
not an adverse balance of power, but structural economic changes
on a global scale, Which must be held responsible for the decline
of British power. Although in basic agreement with Holland's
argument that the colonies were exploited by the metropolitan
imperial power, the depth and width of Tomlinson's approach makes
(989) D.G.E.Hall, A History of South Fast Asia, Macmillan and Co.,
London, 1964, second edition, pp.534536; and Victor Purcell, The
Chinese in South-east Asia, O.U.P., London, 1966, second edition,
p.30
(990) Holland, op.cit., p.175.
(991) B.R. Tomlinson, op.cit., p.70.
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his whole analysis much more satisfactory.
Nevertheless, Tomlinson's excessive stress on external
economic factors leads once more to over-simplifications and
distortions. For example, he asserts at one point that "Britain
could only dominate the world economy and act as a successful
imperial power so long as other nations chose to use the City of
London as the contact point for their bilateral and multilateral
economic relations." 4992 ) This, however, does not explain how the
faith of other nations in the City of London was generated, a
matter which is of course wholly inexplicable, unless some account
is taken of the internal structure of the British economy. But
that is precisely what he systematically ignores in his enthusiasm
for the determining role of external factors. Likewise, his other
argument, which is that the deprivation of development funds
undermined the capacity of local elites to collaborate with imper-
ialists,( 993) is wholly inapplicable to Malayan history during
1945-57.
It has already been demonstrated in the second chapter
that Malaya was originally acquired for strategic rather than
for economic reasons. Secondly, even in the heyday of the British
empire, Malaya was ruled only indirectly. It is true that American
dollars earned by Malaya during the post-war period were a vital
source of sustenance to the Sterling Area; and it is also true
that, after Malayan independence, economic ties with Britain were
kept intact during the next decade. It is not true, however, that
the British-Malayan relationship can be presented as a one-way
traffic in economic benefits. At the time of independence, and
(992) Ibid., p.65.
(993) p. G9, -
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even afterwards, Malaya was one of the richest countries in the
region, second only to Singapore. Much of this wealth was a direct
result of Malayan connections with the British economy and world
markets. Since we have already touched on this matter in the
second chapter, however, there is no need to pursue it further
here.
If we now pursue the economic theme through into the post-
independence period, it proves no more plausible than in the
earlier period. No reasonable explanation can be offered for the
extension of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement coinciding with
a growing British desire to join the EEC. Indeed, Britain's
increasing commitment to military operations in the Borneo
territories came at the same time as the first unsuccessful
British attempt to join the Ebropean Community. The ultimate
decision to withdraw from South Ft Asia in 1967, however, was not
made in the light of Britain's failure to -exploit' the Malaysian
economy for - imperialist' purposes.
We may now summarise the result of this brief examination
of the most influential theories of International Politics. It is,
quite simply, that none of these theories is able to provide an
adequate explanation of political reality. To that extent, it
would seem that Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff are correct When they
assert that the quest for a general theory by reference to which
we can validate our conclusions and arguments, is tantamount to
the quest for utopia. (994)
(994) James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,
Contending-Theories of International Relations, A Comprehensive
Survey, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1981, p.17.
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An alternative method to this quest for a general theory,
more relevant for our own work, is that proposed by Charles
Reynolds. In his Theory and EXplanation in International Politics,
Reynolds draws on the work of philosophers like R.G. Collingwood
and Michael Oakeshott to support his preference for historical
7-at
method. (995 ) In historic method, the criterion of a satisfactory
explanation is its - internal coherence'.( 996) What is needed, in
other words, is to use all available evidence in order to weave
the facts into an intelligible narrative. This is the task which we
have attempted to carry out in the present thesis, using primary
and secondary sources, as well as first-hand information derived
from interviews with officials and diplomats. We may conclude by
restating very briefly what we have tried to do, with a view to
indicating the sense in which the thesis constitutes an original
contribution to knowledge.
In the Preface, it was stated that the primary focus of
the thesis would be the interconnection between the broader and
narrower contexts of British foreign policy towards Malaysia. From
this perspective, it was said that the thesis might be regarded as
"a modest contribution to an understanding of the problems of
adjustment which Britain encountered in the course of its
transition from an apire into a mere European state". (p.3)
Needless to say, a vast amount of research has already
been done on the broader aspects of the decline of the British
(995) Charles Reynolds, Theory and EXplanation in International 
Politics, Martin Robertson, London, 1973.
(996) Ibid., p. IC1-7
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Dapire.( 997) Whilst there is much that is suggestive in this
literature, it is on too high a level of generality to be of
direct value for the intermediate level of study which we have
attempted here. This is most obvious in the case of the work of
scholars like Toynbee, whose main concern is with the inner
dynamics of civilization at large. At the other extreme, there are
particularistic studies which tend to be too narrow in their
focus, as we have already seen in Chapter 1. The aim of our inter-
mediate study has been to fill the lacuna left by the broader and
narrower studies. We have done this by focussing on the detailed
interconnection between the broader and narrower contexts of
British disengagement from Malaysia in order to illuminate a
crucial phase of Britain's transition from an Empire to an
ordinary state.
(997) See for example, Arnold Toynbee, The World and the West,
O.U.P., London, 1953; Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British 
Power, Eyre-Methmen, London, 1972; Keith Robbins, The Eclipse of
a Great Power: Modern Britain, 1870-1975, Longman, London, 1984;
Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic
Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000, Unwin Hyman,
London, 1988.
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